Pryor v. David
| Decision Date | 13 January 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 53888,No. 1,53888,1 |
| Parties | Ross Wesley PRYOR, Appellant, v. Thomas A. DAVID, Director of Revenue, State of Missouri, Respondent |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Ward A. Dorsey, John G. Brannon, North Kansas City, for appellant.
Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Walter W. Nowotny, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
HOUSER, Commissioner.
Ross Wesley Pryor, a Missouri citizen, sued the Director of the Department of Revenue of Missouri for an order restraining the enforcement of the director's order revoking plaintiff's driving privileges and for a review and setting aside of the order of revocation. Having failed in the circuit court he has appealed to this Court, which has jurisdiction because a state officer as such is a party. Constitution of Missouri 1945, Art. V, § 3, V.A.M.S.
Pryor was charged in the State of Kansas with driving an automobile while intoxicated, an offense under the laws of that state. Kansas Statutes Annotated 8--530. He posted an appearance bond and was released. Failing to appear in court at the appointed time, Pryor's bond was forfeited. Under Kansas law a forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure a defendant's appearance in court, which forfeiture has not been vacated, 'shall be equivalent to a conviction.' Kansas Statutes Annotated 8--253(c). The Kansas authorities assessed 12 points against Pryor's driving record, revoked his driving privilege for one year, and notified the Missouri motor vehicle registration authorities that Pryor had been convicted of driving while intoxicated and that the Kansas authorities had assessed 12 points on his driving record and revoked his driving privilege for 365 days. On this basis the supervisor of operator license registration, a division of the Department of Revenue of Missouri, assessed 12 points against Pryor's driving record and revoked his driving privilege for one year.
Section 302.160, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., provides: 'When the director of revenue receives notice of a conviction in another state, which, if committed in this state, would result in the assessment of twelve points, he is authorized to assess the points and revoke the operating privilege as provided in section 302.304.' (The latter section provides that the director shall revoke the operating privileges of any person whose driving record shows he has obtained 12 points in 12 months.)
The sole question is whether the forfeiture of a bond posted by a citizen of Missouri on a charge of driving while intoxicated in Kansas amounts to a 'conviction' in Kansas authorizing the Director of Revenue of Missouri to assess 12 points on his driving record and revoke his driving privilege.
Appellant claims that § 302.160 authorizes penalties only upon a conviction in another state of an offense for which 12 points would be assessed in Missouri but that the section does not mention forfeiture of bond; that Pryor did not plead guilty, or authorize anyone to enter a plea of guilty in his behalf, or stand trial or appear in court, and therefore he was not convicted in Kansas, but merely voluntarily allowed a bond forfeiture to occur.
Appellant contends that a bond forfeiture cannot be a conviction because it is neither a plea of guilty nor a verdict or finding of guilty by a court. We are not here called upon to determine whether a bond forfeiture is a conviction within the strict meaning of a conviction of a crime. We are concerned with a statute providing for revocation of driving licenses for violations of traffic laws. It is a traffic safety measure. Appellant's contention must be rejected for both by statute and decision Missouri has equated forfeiture of bail with conviction. Section 302.010(4), RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., in defining the word 'conviction' when used in Chapter 302, provides that 'a forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure a defendant's appearance in court, which forfeiture has not been vacated, shall be equivalent to a conviction, * * *.' And see Levin v. Carpenter, Mo.Sup., 332 S.W.2d 862, 865, 79 A.L.R.2d 859(4). We agree with the Supreme Court of Virginia that a forfeiture of bail Lamb v. Parsons, 195 Va. 353, 78 S.E.2d 707, 710(4).
It is conceded that Pryor forfeited his bond in Kansas, in a case in which he was charged with driving while intoxicated. Forfeiture of bond under both Kansas and Missouri statutes is equivalent to conviction. In legal effect and intendment, therefore, for the purposes of the Drivers' License Law, Pryor...
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Scott v. State, 24901.
...because lawmakers defined it as a conviction under DUI statutes); Bennett v. Mississippi, 528 So.2d 815 (Miss.1988) (same); Pryor v. David, 436 S.W.2d 3 (Mo.1969) (same); City of Minot v. Mattern, 449 N.W.2d 560 (N.D.1989) (same); Virginia v. Brumfield, 224 Va. 250, 295 S.E.2d 878 (1982) (s......
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