Cave v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue
| Decision Date | 01 August 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 71--212,71--212 |
| Citation | 501 P.2d 479,31 Colo.App. 185 |
| Parties | James Horace CAVE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, and John H. Heckers, duly appointed Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Revenue, Defendants-Appellees. . I |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
P. Arthur Tague, P.C., James I. Shepard and James R. Craig, Jr., Littleton, for plaintiff-appellant.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., Harold L. Neufeld and Eugene C. Cavaliere, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for defendants-appellees.
James Cave appeals from a judgment sustaining a one year suspension of his license to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of this State by the Department of Revenue.
The Department initiated the proceedings by notifying Cave that he had accumulated a sufficient number of points for conviction of traffic violations to be subject to license suspension and ordered him to appear for a hearing to be held in accordance with C.R.S.1963, 13--4--23.
The traffic violations established at the hearing are as follows: (1) on July 15, 1970, Cave pled guilty in county court to a charge of speeding 68 m.p.h. in a 50 m.p.h. zone; (2) on October 3, 1970, Cave was issued and accepted a penalty assessment notice for speeding 50 m.p.h. in a 40 m.p.h. zone and paid the fine set forth in the notice; (3) on October 12, 1970, Cave was issued and accepted a penalty assessment notice for speeding 75 m.p.h. in a 60 m.p.h. zone and paid the fine set forth in the notice.
The state statutes provide that no person shall drive a motor vehicle unless such person has a valid license issued by the Department of Revenue, set forth regulations for the issuance of such licenses, and provide for their suspension by the Department under stated circumstances. The statutes concerning suspension of licenses contain what is known as a point system under which numbers of points are charged against a driver's record for traffic violations. Upon accumulation of a sufficient number of points, the violator's license is liable to suspension by the Department. 1
The Department of Revenue, acting pursuant to this statute, suspended Cave's license because he had been 'convicted' of three speeding violations resulting in the accumulation of 12 points within 12 consecutive months. The first conviction resulted from a plea of guilty in court, and the other 'two convictions' resulted from acceptance of penalty notices and payments of the fines required by the notice.
Cave contends that the Department of Revenue exceeded its authority in suspending his license. He first asserts that the penalty assessment notices are illegal and unconstitutional and that the acceptance of such a ticket and the payment of the fine cannot be considered a conviction within the meaning of C.R.S.1963, 13--4--23. He argues that, in violation of his constitutionally protected right to due process of law, the penalty assessment procedure imposes upon him the consequences of a conviction without a judicial proceeding to determine his guilt.
The statutes provide procedures for arrest and prosecution of traffic offenders as misdemeanants. As an alternative to trial of traffic offenders, the statutes provide that in certain cases a penalty assessment notice may be issued to the motorist. 2 The motorist is given the option of accepting the notice and paying the fine, and such acceptance and payment by operation of the statute constitute an acknowledgment of guilt of the violation stated in the notice. The statute gives the violator a right to refuse to accept the notice, and upon such refusal, the officer is required to issue a summons. If the driver accepts the notice but fails to pay the fine within five days thereafter, the notice operates as a summons to appear in a court designated in the notice for trial of the traffic offense as a misdemeanor. 3 Payment of the penalty assessment is deemed a conviction for the purpose of assessment of points. 4
It has been held in numerous states that a forfeiture of bail is equivalent to a conviction for purposes of statutes authorizing the revocation or suspension of an operator's driving license. Lamb v. Butler, 198 Va. 509, 95 S.E.2d 239; Lamb v. Smith, 195 Va. 1053, 81 S.E.2d 768; turro v Carpentier, 26 Ill.App.2d 156, 167 N.E.2d 568; and Pryor v. David, 436 S.W.2d 3 (Mo.). See also Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 866.
The Colorado statute provides that either a forfeiture of bail or the payment of a penalty assessment shall be considered a conviction. The statute does not violate any constitutionally protected right of the operator of a motor vehicle and is a valid legislative enactment. The penalty assessment statute does not deprive an offender accused of a traffic violation of his right to a trial. On the contrary, the statute not only expressly preserves the accused's right to a trial but also affords him an alternative procedure which he may accept or reject.
Cave contends that penalty assessment procedure is invalid because it provides that the acceptance and payment of the penalty assessment notice constitutes a plea of guilty without providing procedures and standards constitutionally required to insure the voluntariness of the plea. In support of this position, plaintiff cites the cases of Martinez v. People, 152 Colo. 521, 382 P.2d 990, and Westendorf v. People, Colo., 464 P.2d 866. These cases outline standards for procedures to be followed in receiving a plea of guilty in serious criminal cases. See Crim.P. 11(c). However, more simplified procedures can properly be used for minor traffic offenses. See A.B.A. Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (Approved Draft, 1968). The simplified procedures of the penalty assessment statute do not impermissibly offend the due process clauses of either the Constitution of the State of Colorado or the Constitution of the United States.
Second, Cave contends that the penalty assessment statutes were not complied with and that therefore the resulting suspension of his license is void.
Our Supreme Court has characterized an individual's right to use of the public highways of the state as an adjunct of the constitutional right to acquire, possess, and protect property. People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d 180. The legislature, in the exercise of the police power of the state, may limit this right of a citizen to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways. Statutes enacted by the legislature in the exercise of this police power must be strictly construed and are not to be extended by implication. Accordingly, an operator's license, once issued, is not to be revoked arbitrarily but only in the manner...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Laughlin v. State, 79CA0955
...P. 11(b) before accepting a guilty plea to the charge of driving while impaired. We hold that it must. In Cave v. Department of Revenue, 31 Colo.App. 185, 501 P.2d 479 (1972), responding to a challenge to a guilty plea to a speeding violation, the court held that more simplified procedures ......
-
Jackson v. Department of Revenue of State of Colo., Motor Vehicle Div., 88CA1870
...points to be assessed for the offense did not constitute "conviction" for points-suspension purposes); Cave v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 31 Colo.App. 185, 501 P.2d 479 (1972) (payment of penalty assessment notice without signed acknowledgment of guilt did not constitute "conviction" f......
-
Stortz v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, 27927
...driver's license, pursuant to section 42-2-123, unless there has been compliance with section 42-2-121(3). Cf. Cave v. Dept. of Revenue, 31 Colo.App. 185, 501 P.2d 479 (1972). The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to the district court to issue an appropriate or......
-
Gurule v. State, Dept. of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, 76--052
...reached by the District Court. The parties raise the question of whether the principles enunciated in Cave v. Department of Revenue, 31 Colo.App. 185, 501 P.2d 479 (1972), are controlling. They are not. The sole issue here is the existence of a 'conviction' satisfying § 42--2--123(1)(a) and......