Pub. Guardian of Contra Costa Cnty. v. Eric B. (In re Eric B.)
| Decision Date | 28 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | S261812 |
| Parties | CONSERVATORSHIP OF the Person and Estate of ERIC B. Public Guardian of Contra Costa County, as Conservator, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. Eric B., Objector and Appellant. |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
Jeremy T. Price, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Oakland, for Objector and Appellant.
Kim Pederson and Anne Hadreas for Disability Rights California, California Association of Mental Health Patients’ Rights Advocates, California Public Defenders Association, American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Law Foundation of Silicon Valley and Mental Health Advocacy Services as Amici Curiae on behalf of Objector and Appellant.
Sharon L. Anderson and Mary Ann McNett Mason, County Counsel, Steven Rettig, Assistant County Counsel, and Patrick L. Hurley, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.
Jennifer B. Henning for the California State Association of Counties and California State Association of Public Administrators, Public Guardians, and Public Conservators as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Respondent.
The Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act authorizes one-year conservatorships for those gravely disabled by a mental disorder or chronic alcoholism
. ( Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350.) Conservatorship proceedings are civil in nature, so the constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants do not directly apply. However, the Legislature has extended many of the same rights by statute to the commitment of persons found not guilty of crimes by reason of insanity (NGI's). ( Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b)(7).) Among those is the right not to give compelled testimony at trial. (See Hudec v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 815, 826, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 748, 339 P.3d 998 ( Hudec ).) The question here is whether those facing conservatorship due to an inability to care for themselves should enjoy the same protection. We conclude that, for purposes of the right against compelled testimony, the groups are sufficiently similar that equal protection principles require the government to justify its disparate treatment of these proposed conservatees. However, because it is undisputed any error here was harmless, we need not decide what level of scrutiny is appropriate or whether the disparate treatment of conservatees can be constitutionally justified. We affirm the judgment.
The Contra Costa County Public Guardian (Public Guardian) petitioned for an LPS conservatorship on the ground that appellant Eric B. was gravely disabled. Appellant requested a jury trial on the petition and objected to giving compelled testimony, based on the holding in Hudec , supra , 60 Cal.4th 815, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 748, 339 P.3d 998. The court overruled the objection.
Psychiatrist Michael Levin, M.D., testified that appellant has chronic schizophrenia
. Treatment included three medications, one of which required weekly white blood cell monitoring. Appellant's minimal insight about his illness made it difficult for him to cooperate with treatment. When not housed in a treatment facility, he had failed to take his medication, which aggravated his symptoms. Levin considered appellant gravely disabled and doubted he could provide for his basic needs without a conservatorship.
Therapist James Grey became appellant's case manager at the Concord Adult Mental Health Clinic in 2016, after paranoid behaviors put appellant's subsidized housing at risk. Appellant had tried to change door locks and damaged his apartment searching for monitoring devices. Although Grey arranged transportation for clinic appointments, appellant was usually unwilling to go. According to Grey, appellant displayed the paranoia, guardedness, and agitation typical of schizophrenia
, and his cooperation with treatment was "very inconsistent." Appellant had full bottles of medication that were months old and other psychiatric prescriptions went unfilled. The county had been serving as appellant's money manager, providing him an allowance, but he often failed to cash these checks. Appellant was treated as a psychiatric inpatient when a temporary conservatorship was ordered but was later released against Grey's advice. Within a week, he was admitted to an emergency psychiatric facility and was eventually transferred to his current placement. Appellant remained guarded and paranoid, with an extremely flat affect and disorganized thoughts. He sometimes believed his mother was not actually his mother and that others posed a threat to him. He had significant difficulty complying with treatment and medications and was generally unable to meet his needs for food and clothing without support.
Called to the stand by the Public Guardian, appellant testified that he lived in a board and care facility and was previously in an intensive treatment unit. After multiple questions about where he had lived, appellant remarked, He knew that Grey believed he should be moved from a temporary to a full conservatorship. Asked what he wanted to happen, appellant gave a rambling and partially incoherent response, asserting he might not need a conservatorship because, though he had a mental health disorder, he did not always need medications for it.1 He said he was told he had attention deficit disorder
as a child. He could name two of his medications but did not understand why he was taking them. He believed, Apparently referring to his inpatient admission, he said: Asked to clarify this statement, he responded, He acknowledged that he was "sort of still dependent" on his current program. He had no plans for where he would live or how he would support himself if released from the conservatorship. He thought he might get a job but acknowledged he had not worked since 2011. He said he would take his medications but when asked how he would pay for food responded,
The jury found appellant gravely disabled. The court appointed the Public Guardian as conservator, ordered that appellant continue in his current placement, and restricted his ability to possess firearms and refuse treatment. On appeal, appellant challenged the order compelling his testimony. He argued that because the right to silence is statutorily provided in NGI extension proceedings, equal protection required that the same right should apply in the LPS context. The Court of Appeal held that LPS conservatees are similarly situated with NGI's for this purpose but ruled the error in compelling his testimony was harmless. Because the Court of Appeal expressly disagreed with the contrary holding in Conservatorship of Bryan S. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 190, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 195 ( Bryan S. ), we granted review to resolve the conflict.2
( People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1093, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 661, 281 P.3d 753 ( Barrett ).) We discuss only the most pertinent commitment schemes here.
NGI Commitments "A person found not guilty of a felony by reason of insanity may be committed to a state hospital for a period no longer than the maximum prison sentence for" the offense. ( Hudec , supra , 60 Cal.4th at p. 818, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 748, 339 P.3d 998 ; Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (a).) Thereafter, the district attorney may petition to extend the NGI commitment by two years if the person "represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others" because of "a mental disease, defect, or disorder." ( Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b)(1).) The respondent has a statutory right to representation by counsel and a jury trial. (Id ., subd. (b)(3)–(4).) As discussed further below (see post , at 293 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 117–118, 508 P.3d at pp. 1119–1120), statutes also require that NGI extension hearings comply with certain federal and state constitutional guarantees applicable in criminal proceedings. ( Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b)(7).) The commitment can be renewed for two-year periods without limitation, subject to the same procedural requirements. (Id ., subd. (b)(10).) Although provided for by the Penal Code, NGI extension trials are considered "essentially civil in nature, rather than criminal, because they are directed at confinement for treatment rather than punishment." ( Hudec , at p. 819, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 748, 339 P.3d 998.) NGI's are typically confined in state hospital facilities. (See Pen. Code, § 1026, subd. (a).)
Other Criminally Based Commitments The Penal Code also provides for the involuntary civil commitment of violent offenders with mental health disorders (see Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq. ) (OMHD's)3 and those convicted of sexually violent offenses (see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq. ) (SVP's). In these instances, the person has been convicted of serious crimes and incarcerated. The civil commitment proceedings may be...
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