Hudec v. Superior Court of Orange Cnty.

• Decision Date: 05 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. S213003.,S213003.
• Citation: 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 748,60 Cal.4th 815,339 P.3d 998
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Charles HUDEC, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Orange County, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.

60 Cal.4th 815

339 P.3d 998

181 Cal.Rptr.3d 748

Charles HUDEC, Petitioner

v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Orange County, Respondent;The People, Real Party in Interest.

No. S213003.

Supreme Court of California

Jan. 5, 2015.

Frank Ospino, Public Defender, Jean Wilkinson, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Mark S. Brown, Assistant Public Defender, and Christopher D. McGibbons, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney, and Brian F. Fitzpatrick, Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.

Opinion

WERDEGAR, J.

A person found not guilty of a felony by reason of insanity may be committed to a state hospital for a period no longer than the maximum prison sentence for his or her offense or offenses (Pen.Code, § 1026.5, subd. (a) ),¹ but the commitment may be extended if, because of mental disorder, the person “represents a substantial danger” to others (id., subd. (b)(1)). In the trial of that issue, “[t]he person shall be entitled to the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings.” (Id., subd. (b)(7).)

The question presented here is whether, in such a commitment extension hearing, the individual facing extended commitment has the right to refuse to take the witness stand. Like the Court of Appeal below, we conclude that by virtue of section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7), a person facing extended commitment has the right to refuse to testify, a right constitutionally guaranteed criminal defendants.

Procedural Background

Charles Hudec, who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, was found not guilty by reason of insanity of killing his father in 1981 and was committed to a state hospital for a period reflecting the maximum term for voluntary manslaughter. In March 2012, the district attorney filed a petition to extend Hudec's commitment under section 1026.5. The trial court denied Hudec's in limine motion to preclude his compelled testimony as a witness for the People. On his petition for writ of mandate, the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause, stayed the trial and, after oral argument, issued the writ, directing the superior court not to compel his testimony. We granted the People's petition for review.

Discussion

Pursuant to section 1026.5, the district attorney may petition to extend a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) commitment for a felony by two years if the person “by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1) ; see id., subd. (b)(8).) The statute expressly provides the respondent with the rights to an attorney (including a public defender if the person is indigent) and a jury trial, and provides that the rules of discovery in criminal cases apply. (Id., subd. (b)(3), (4), (7).) Finally, the statute states: “The person shall be entitled to the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings. All proceedings shall be in accordance with applicable constitutional guarantees.” (Id., subd. (b)(7) (hereafter section 1026.5(b)(7) ).)

Under both the United States and California Constitutions, a person has the right to refuse to answer potentially incriminating questions put to him or her in any proceeding; in addition, the defendant in a criminal proceeding enjoys the right to refuse to testify at all. (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. 1, § 15 ; Allen v. Illinois (1986) 478 U.S. 364, 368, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 ; Cramer v. Tyars (1979) 23 Cal.3d 131, 137, 151 Cal.Rptr. 653, 588 P.2d 793 (Cramer ).) The question here is whether the latter right applies in a commitment extension hearing under section 1026.5.

Courts of Appeal have held commitment extension trials under section 1026.5 to be essentially civil in nature, rather than criminal, because they are directed at confinement for treatment rather than punishment. (See People v. Angeletakis (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 963, 967, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 (Angeletakis ).) Hudec does not dispute this characterization and does not claim he is constitutionally entitled to refuse to testify.² Rather, he claims a statutory right not to testify under section 1026.5(b)(7), which incorporates into an extension proceeding “the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings.”

The parties each rely principally on a Court of Appeal decision: defendant on People v. Haynie

(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1224, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 163 (Haynie ), which read the quoted portion of section 1026.5(b)(7) as providing a commitment extension respondent with the right not to testify at the hearing, and the People on People v. Lopez (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1099, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 (Lopez ), which expressly disagreed with Haynie and held the respondent had no right to refuse to testify. As the Haynie and Lopez courts differed critically in their assessment of prior decisions interpreting section 1026.5 and related statutes, we begin by reviewing the prior decisions and the pertinent statutes' historical development.

I. Statutory and Decisional History

In 1975, this court decided two cases involving the procedures constitutionally required for commitment under the (since-repealed) Mentally Disordered Sex Offender (MDSO) statutes, Welfare and Institutions Code former sections 6300 to 6332. In People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352 (Burnick ), we held that the due process guarantees of both the United States and California Constitutions required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in order for “the state to publicly brand a man as a mentally disordered sex offender and lock him up for an indeterminate period in a maximum security mental hospital.” (Burnick, supra, at p. 310, 121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352.) We relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Specht v. Patterson (1967) 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326, reasoning that “[i]n light of the fundamental similarity between the sexual psychopath proceedings challenged in Specht and in the case at bar, the question before us is whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the ‘full panoply of the relevant protections which due process guarantees in state criminal proceedings,’ ” a question we then answered affirmatively. (Burnick, supra, at p. 318, 121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352.) In a companion case, People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338, 121 Cal.Rptr. 509, 535 P.2d 373, we held an MDSO committee was constitutionally entitled to a unanimous jury verdict (id. at pp. 349–352, 121 Cal.Rptr. 509, 535 P.2d 373 ) and that MDSO's committed to state institutions other than hospitals (because they were deemed not amenable to treatment at a state hospital) could not be confined for an indefinite period (id. at pp. 346, 375–376, 121 Cal.Rptr. 509, 535 P.2d 373 ).

The Legislature responded in 1976 by providing that the term of an MDSO commitment could not exceed the maximum aggregate penal term to which the defendant could have been sentenced. (Stats.1976, ch. 1101, § 9, p. 4977, amending Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 6316.) After enactment of the determinate sentencing law (Stats.1976, ch. 1139), further revisions to the MDSO law were made “to provide additional safeguards against the premature release of dangerous persons.” (Stats.1977, ch. 164, § 6, p. 638.) Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.2, added by the 1977 legislation, created a standard and procedure for annual extended commitments beyond the initial maximum term of commitment set by former section 6316.1. Such an extended commitment could be made if the person suffered from a mental disorder so predisposing him or her to commission of sexual offenses as to present a serious threat of harm to others. (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 6316.2, subd. (a).)

Under the new 1977 procedure for an extended MDSO commitment, the rules of criminal discovery applied, the defendant had a right to appointed counsel if indigent, and trial was by jury unless waived. (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 6316.2, subds. (d), (e), added by Stats.1977, ch. 164, § 3, p. 634.) Moreover, the new section provided: “The patient shall be entitled to the rights guaranteed under the Federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings. All proceedings shall be in accordance with applicable constitutional guarantees.” (Id., subd. (e), italics added.) The 1977 MDSO revisions were intended to “establish[ ] a practical and reasonable system for extending commitments on a year-by-year basis for MDSO's who continue to be dangerous” while making “provisions for due process” and for “representation of all concerned parties.” (Health & Welf. Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1178 (1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) June 29, 1977, p. 2.)

In In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, 467, 149 Cal.Rptr. 491, 584 P.2d 1097, we held equal protection principles demanded that initial NGI commitments, like those under the MDSO laws, be limited to “the maximum term of punishment for the underlying offense.” Relying on the 1977 amendments to the MDSO scheme, we held initial NGI commitments must be limited as in Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.1 to the maximum term of penal confinement, but that NGI commitments could be extended under standards and procedures conforming “[t]o the extent practicable, and in the absence of further legislation on the subject,” to those in Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.2. (Moye, supra, at p. 467, 149 Cal.Rptr. 491, 584 P.2d 1097.)

Further legislation was not long in coming. In 1979, the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1026.5, limiting initial NGI commitments and providing for commitment extensions. As in Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.2, Penal Code section 1026.5 provides that in commitment extension proceedings the rules of criminal discovery apply, indigent defendants have the right to appointed counsel, and trial is by jury unless waived. § 1026.5, subd. (b)...