Public Adm'r of New York County v. Royal Bank of Canada

• Decision Date: 16 February 1967
• Citation: 19 N.Y.2d 127,278 N.Y.S.2d 378
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 224 N.E.2d 877 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF the COUNTY OF NEW YORK, as Administrator of the Estate of Miguel R. L. Lopez et al., Respondents, v. ROYAL BANK OF CANADA, Defendant, and Royal Bank of Canada (France), Appellant.

Page 378

278 N.Y.S.2d 378

19 N.Y.2d 127, 224 N.E.2d 877

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF the COUNTY OF NEW YORK, as

Administrator of the Estate of Miguel R. L. Lopez

et al., Respondents,

v.

ROYAL BANK OF CANADA, Defendant, and Royal Bank of Canada

(France), Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 16, 1967.

William J. Allingham, Melber Chambers and George W. McGrath, Jr., New York City, for appellant.

Hobart L. Brinsmade, Joseph T. Arenson, Reginald Leo Duff, Waldemar J. Dittmar and Edward G. Miller, Jr., New York City, for respondents.

FULD, Chief Judge.

The underlying issue presented by this appeal is whether service of process on the New York branch of a foreign (Canadian) bank sufficed to give our courts jurisdiction over an incorporated branch of the same bank located in France. However, before we reach that issue, we must pass upon the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the proceedings in our court on the ground that the question certified to us by the Appellate Division is not decisive of the appeal.

We deem the case to be properly before us. (See N.Y.Const., art. VI, § 3, subd. b, par. (4); CPLR 5602, subd. (b), par. 1.) The Appellate Division placed its decision solely on the issue posed by the certified question and has expressly left undetermined other possible bases for its decision. In such a situation, the certified question enables us to accord full review to the issue decided by the Appellate Division and, if the appellant were to prevail in our court, it would be entitled to a reversal--even though only to the extent of having the case remitted to the Appellate Division or to Special Term for consideration of the undetermined questions. (See Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, pp. 365--366.) This case is no different in principle from one where the Appellate Division has denied a discretionary remedy on the law alone, without reaching the question of discretion, and has certified to this court solely the question of law determined by it. It is settled that, in such circumstances, the question of law certified is decisive of the correctness of the Appellate Division's decision, notwithstanding that the appellant, if successful in our court, would be entitled on reversal not to the ultimate relief he seeks but only to a remission to the Appellate Division for consideration of the question of discretion left undetermined by that court. (See, e.g., Great Northern Tel. Co. v. Yokohama Specie Bank, 297 N.Y. 135, 76 N.E.2d 117; see, also, Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, p. 377.) The motion to dismiss the appeal must, therefore, be denied.

It may be helpful, in considering the merits, to say a word, first, about the variant bases for in personam jurisdiction under CPLR 301 and CPLR 302. CPLR 301 authorizes a court to exercise 'such jurisdiction over persons * * * as might have been exercised heretofore.' Thus, in accordance with settled principles of jurisdiction, if a foreign corporation is 'doing business' in New York, it may be served with process here or out-of-state (CPLR 313), and the court will acquire personal jurisdiction over the corporation for any cause of action asserted against it, no matter where the events occurred which give rise to the cause of action. (See, e.g., Bryant v. Finnish Nat. Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 208 N.E.2d 439; Taca Inc. Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England, 15 N.Y.2d 97, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129, 204 N.E.2d 329; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915; International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95.) On the other hand, CPLR 302, the 'long-arm' statute, enables our courts to acquire personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations not 'doing business' here in the traditional sense. It is enough if the cause of action asserted against the defendant corporation arose from its transaction of business in New York--and, in such a case, process may be validly served upon the corporation outside the State. (See, e.g., Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, 15 N.E.2d 443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68; Lewin v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 16 N.Y.2d 1070, 266 N.Y.S.2d 391, 213 N.E.2d 686; Gutfreund v. Russ, 16 N.Y.2d 637, 261 N.Y.S.2d 77, 209 N.E.2d 118.)

In the case before us, the defendant Royal Bank of Canada has conceded that it is doing business in New York and that it was validly served with process here at its New York and that it was validly whether the defendant Royal Bank of Canada (France) was also doing business in New York, by virtue of which the Supreme Court acquired personal jurisdiction over that defendant for purposes of this suit regardless of where the events occurred which gave rise to the plaintiff's cause of action. We agree with the courts below that such jurisdiction was acquired over the French...