Purnell v. Hunt

Decision Date11 January 2021
Docket NumberNo. 1:20-cv-01759-NONE-EPG,1:20-cv-01759-NONE-EPG
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
PartiesGEORGETTE G. PURNELL, Plaintiff, v. N. HUNT, et al., Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO:

(1) FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

(2) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT SHE WISHES TO PROCEED ONLY ON THE CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS HUNT, LUPER, GARCIA-PERALTA AND CARTER FOR EXCESSIVE FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT; OR
(3) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT SHE WISHES TO STAND ON HER COMPLAINT

(ECF NO. 1)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Georgette G. Purnell ("Plaintiff") is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on December 11, 2020. (ECF No. 1). The Complaint brings claims concerning the way Plaintiff was treated by defendants, who are law enforcement officers, after an automobile collision. The Court finds that the Complaint states a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment against Defendants Hunt, Luper, Garcia-Peralta and Carter. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state any other claims.

The Court will provide Plaintiff with leave to file a first amended complaint, with the assistance of the legal standards set forth below, if she believes that additional facts will establish other claims. Plaintiff may also choose to proceed only on the claims found cognizable in this order, or to stand on this Complaint, subject to the Court issuing findings and recommendations to the assigned district judge consistent with this order.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court screens the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint is required to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff's legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs "must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal).

II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff's complaint alleges as follows:

On June 27, 2020, Plaintiff was a passenger in a rental car that was in a collision in Fresno. The driver of the vehicle fled on foot. Plaintiff remained at the scene and contacted the California Highway Patrol. Defendants Sergeant N. Hunt and Officer Luper responded. Plaintiff told them that she was a passenger and the driver fled on foot. Defendants Hunt and Luper arrested Plaintiff. Plaintiff informed them that she had a purse in the car with $890 and other property therein, but they did not permit her to retrieve her personal property from the car.

Plaintiff refused to take a breathalyzer test. Plaintiff believes a warrant was issued to draw her blood. She was taken to a hospital. Defendants Hunt, Luper, Officer Garcia-Peralta and Officer Carter lifted Plaintiff and slammed her facedown on a gurney. Plaintiff saw stars due to the force used. Plaintiff was afraid. One of their knees was placed "in the spam of [her] back applying great pressure," and she could not breathe.

Plaintiff never resisted at any time. She was handcuffed with her hands behind her back during the entire encounter.

Plaintiff attached a government claim form to her complaint and various responses.

Plaintiff also attaches a civilian's complaint she filed with the California Highway Patrol. One of the pages includes a summary of a telephone call that appears to be written by Sergeant J. Tyler concerning Plaintiff's allegations. According to the summary, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hunt, Luper and Garcia failed to secure her property after her arrest. She "believes the officers on scene are corrupt and either stole it or purposely misplaced it to inconvenience her. [Plaintiff] also alleged that the tow company may have failed to secure her property[,] stating that they may have stolen it or failed to secure their yard."

Plaintiff states that her causes of action are under the Fourth Amendment for excessive force; "Protection of personal property after being arrested. Fourteenth (14th) Amendment" and "intentional emotional distress."

III. SECTION 1983

The Court construes Plaintiff's constitutional causes of action as arising under the Civil Rights Act. It provides:

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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. "[Section] 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived her of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing "under color of state law"). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, "within the meaning of § 1983, 'if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'" Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). "The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a 'series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict' constitutional harms." Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation "closely resembles the standard 'foreseeability' formulation of proximate cause." Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

Additionally, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the deprivation of her rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there mustbe an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 695 (1978).

IV. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
A. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force

A § 1983 claim for excessive use of force during an arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-99 (1989). "The question is whether the officers' actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep't, 885 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). To determine whether the force used is "objectively reasonable," the Court balances "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. "The essence of the Graham objective reasonableness analysis is that the force which was applied must be balanced against the need for that force: it is the need for force which is at the heart of the Graham factors." Headwaters Forest Def. v. Cty. of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (Jan. 30, 2002) (quoting Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Under that test, a court must "first assess the quantum of force used to arrest the plaintiff by considering the type and amount of force inflicted." Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Second, a court balances the government's countervailing interests. This involves considering "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively...

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