Putnam County Sheriff v. Price
| Citation | 930 N.E.2d 669 |
| Decision Date | 10 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 60A01-0911-CV-551.,60A01-0911-CV-551. |
| Parties | PUTNAM COUNTY SHERIFF, Appellant-Defendant,v.Pamela PRICE, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
James S. Stephenson, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Keith L. Johnson, Terre Haute, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
The Putnam County Sheriff (“the Sheriff”) appeals from the trial court's order denying the Sheriff's motion to dismiss filed in a civil action brought by Pamela Price (“Price”) for damages resulting from an automobile accident. The following issues are presented in this appeal:
We affirm.
As this is an appeal from a motion to dismiss, the facts are taken from the complaint. On November 27, 2007 at approximately 7:15 a.m., Price was operating a motor vehicle northbound on County Road 375 West and reached a point adjacent to 5852 County Road 375 West when suddenly, and without warning, she encountered ice across the roadway. Price lost control of her vehicle, which overturned resulting in personal injury and property damage.
Sometime on or before that date, the Reelsville Water Authority (“RWA”) investigated or was made aware of the icy condition at that location, which resulted from water running across the roadway and freezing. Although RWA was notified that its water line was leaking at or near that location, RWA failed to correct the leak or warn the traveling public of the icy condition of the road. The Putnam County Sheriff's Department (“the Department”) had been called to that location at approximately 5:30 a.m. that same morning to investigate an automobile accident that occurred when a motorist encountered the icy roadway. That motorist had lost control of the vehicle and crashed while crossing that icy area.
Deputy Wallace of the Department notified the Putnam County Highway Department (“Highway Department”) of the icy condition while he was at the scene of the 5:30 a.m. accident and then left. Neither the Highway Department nor the Department took steps to alleviate the icy condition or warn the traveling public of the icy condition between 5:30 a.m. and 7:15 a.m., when the Price accident took place.
Price filed a complaint in Putnam County alleging negligence against the Highway Department, the Sheriff, and RWA. The case, which was subsequently amended to join the Putnam County Board of Commissioners (“the Board”) as defendants, was transferred to Owen County after Price's motion for change of venue was granted. The Sheriff and the Highway Department filed their motion to dismiss and memorandum of law in which they alleged they owed no duty to alleviate or warn motorists of the condition of the county road, arguing that the duty fell to the Board, and that they were immune from suit under both the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) and common law. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss and later denied the motion after taking the matter under advisement. The Sheriff now appeals.
The standard of review of a trial court's grant or denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) is de novo. Sims v. Beamer, 757 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). We do not defer to the trial court's decision because deciding a motion to dismiss based upon failure to state a claim involves a pure question of law. Id. “A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint: that is, whether the allegations in the complaint establish any set of circumstances under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief.” Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs of Nw. Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Ind.2006). “Thus, while we do not test the sufficiency of the facts alleged with regards to their adequacy to provide recovery, we do test their sufficiency with regards to whether or not they have stated some factual scenario in which a legally actionable injury has occurred.” Id. “A court should ‘accept [ ] as true the facts alleged in the complaint,’ and should not only ‘consider the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,’ but also ‘draw every reasonable inference in favor of [the nonmoving] party.’ ” Id. (internal citations omitted).
In order for Price to sustain an action for negligence, Price must establish: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to conform its conduct to a standard of care arising from its relationship with the plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) an injury proximately caused by the breach of that duty. Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind.1991). The existence of a duty is a question of law for the court to determine. Benton v. City of Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224, 232 (Ind.1999). In this appeal we are not presented with issues concerning breach or causation.
In Benton, the Supreme Court observed that “[i]n general, it is only after a determination is made that a governmental defendant is not immune under the ITCA that a court undertakes the analysis of whether a common law duty exists under the circumstances.” 721 N.E.2d at 232. We note the Sheriff's motion to dismiss also raised the issue of immunity because of a temporary condition caused by weather pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(3).
In Walton v. Ramp, 407 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind.Ct.App.1980), this court reversed summary judgment entered for a county on the basis of this statutory immunity. The plaintiffs were involved in a car accident on an icy road, where the ice was alleged to have been caused by the adjacent landowner allowing water to run off his property onto the road. We held the “disposing of water by an adjacent landowner onto the highway, causing an icy slick spot when it is cold,” is not a natural accumulation of snow and/or ice or a temporary condition resulting from weather but a “recurring danger resulting from more than just the weather.” Id. at 1191. Catt v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Knox County, 779 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind.2002), also distinguishes the issues of whether a condition is temporary or permanent versus whether the condition is due to weather or some other cause. A county is only entitled to immunity if it carries its burden of demonstrating the condition of the roadway 1) was temporary and 2) resulted from weather. Id. at 6.
Unlike the situation presented by Catt or Bules v. Marshall County, 920 N.E.2d 247 (Ind.2010), where the county was able to show the plaintiff's loss was actually caused by weather, taking the allegations of the complaint as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss, the condition of the road was caused primarily by a leak in a water line owned by RWA. Moreover, the condition of the road was known to the Sheriff. Pursuant to Catt and Walton, there is no basis for dismissing the complaint on the issue of statutory immunity and the Sheriff does not pursue that argument on appeal. Consequently, we turn to the issue of the existence of a common law duty in this situation.
The Supreme Court noted in Benton, that in a series of decisions, ending with Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972), the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity was abrogated in almost all respects. 721 N.E.2d at 227. The Supreme Court acknowledged that after Campbell, “the common law general rule would be that governmental units would be liable for any breach of a duty owed to a private individual except for such claims as failure to prevent crime, appointment of an incompetent official, or an incorrect judicial decision.” Id.1 With the abolishment of sovereign immunity Campbell recognized that all governmental units were bound by the common...
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Putnam County Sheriff v. Price
...sought interlocutory review. The Court of Appeals granted review and affirmed the trial court's judgment. See Putnam Cnty. Sheriff v. Price, 930 N.E.2d 669 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). Having previously granted transfer thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals, see Ind. Appellate Rule 58(......
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