Putthoff v. Ancrum
Decision Date | 31 October 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 2-96-056-CV,2-96-056-CV |
Citation | 934 S.W.2d 164 |
Parties | Dr. Stephen L. PUTTHOFF, Tarrant County, and Nizam Peerwani, M.D., P.A., Appellants, v. Edward ANCRUM and Jacquelyn Ancrum, Appellees. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Marc H. Richman, Law Offices of Marc H. Richman, Dallas, for Dr. Putthoff.
Tim Curry, Criminal District Attorney, Patrick S. Dohoney and Dana M. Womack, Assistant District Attorneys, Fort Worth, for Tarrant County and Nizam Peerwani.
C. Gregory Shamoun and W. Charles Campbell, Law Offices of Joseph E. Ashmore, Jr., P.C., Dallas, for Appellee.
Before CAYCE, C.J., and LIVINGSTON and BRIGHAM, JJ.
This appeal arises from a suit by the parents of Corliss Diane Ancrum against appellants Tarrant County, Nizam Peerwani, M.D., P.A. and Dr. Stephen L. Putthoff (sometimes collectively referred to as "appellants") for damages caused by an alleged negligently performed autopsy. Dr. Peerwani, P.A. is the Chief Medical Examiner for Tarrant County. Dr. Putthoff was appointed by Dr. Peerwani, P.A. as a Deputy Medical Examiner under TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 49.25, § 3 (Vernon 1979). 1 In their answers to the Ancrums' lawsuit, appellants alleged the defenses of official and sovereign immunity and filed motions for summary judgment based on their claims of immunity. The motions were denied, and this interlocutory appeal was perfected under TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014(5) (Vernon Supp.1996). 2 We reverse the trial court's order denying the motions for summary judgment and render judgment for the appellants.
On March 19, 1991, Corliss Diane Ancrum asphyxiated in her home. The cause of the asphyxiation is unknown. Ms. Ancrum was taken to Arlington Memorial Hospital by ambulance. She was declared dead an hour later. Because the attending physicians could not determine the cause of Ms. Ancrum's death, it was reported by the hospital to the Tarrant County Medical Examiner's Office where an autopsy was performed by Dr. Putthoff. It was Dr. Putthoff's opinion that Ms. Ancrum died of cardiopulmonary arrest, "conceivably ... consistent with an asphyxial death." He was not, however, able to determine what caused the cardiopulmonary arrest beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 49.25, § 9 (Vernon 1979). 3 Dr. Peerwani, P.A. conducted an independent review of the autopsy report and other documents reviewed by Dr. Putthoff and concurred with Dr. Putthoff's findings. The findings of both doctors were immediately made available as public records to Ms. Ancrum's parents.
When the autopsy was completed, and upon Dr. Putthoff's instructions, the medical examiner's staff allegedly placed the body parts that had been removed from Ms. Ancrum's body in a plastic bag and sewed the bag up in Ms. Ancrum's body. The body was then transported to a funeral home.
In May 1992, more than a year after the autopsy of their daughter, the Ancrums hired an attorney to request the medical examiner's office to reopen the inquest and review the autopsy based on the belief that Ms. Ancrum had been murdered by her fiance. In August 1992, the Ancrums hired their own pathologist to exhume the body and perform an examination to independently determine the cause and manner of death. In the course of his examination, the pathologist was unable to find the larynx or the other body parts that allegedly had been placed inside Ms. Ancrum's body cavity. However, he did determine that, in his opinion, the manner of Ms. Ancrum's death was "suspicious of a homicide by asphyxia."
On March 16, 1993, the Ancrums filed their lawsuit against appellants, alleging several negligence causes of action based on Dr. Putthoff's inability to determine beyond a reasonable doubt the manner of Ms. Ancrum's death and the absence of the larynx and other body parts, which the Ancrums allege make it more difficult to prove the cause and manner of their daughter's death. The Ancrums contend that the inability of the criminal justice system to prosecute their late daughter's fiance has caused them emotional distress.
In this appeal, appellants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment because Dr. Peerwani, P.A. and Dr. Putthoff, and, therefore, Tarrant County, 4 are protected from liability under the doctrine of official immunity. For the reasons that follow, we agree.
In a summary judgment case, the issue on appeal is whether the movant met his summary judgment burden by establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex.1990); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979). The burden of proof is on the movant, Acker v. Texas Water Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301-02 (Tex.1990), and all doubts about the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact are resolved against the movant. Cate, 790 S.W.2d at 562; Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex.1965). Therefore, we must view the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Great Am., 391 S.W.2d at 47.
In deciding whether there is a material fact issue precluding summary judgment, all conflicts in the evidence will be disregarded, and the evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be accepted as true. Harwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 896 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex.1995); Montgomery v. Kennedy 669 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex.1984). Evidence that favors the movant's position will not be considered unless it is uncontroverted. Great Am., 391 S.W.2d at 47.
The summary judgment will be affirmed only if the record establishes that the movant has conclusively proved all essential elements of the movant's cause of action or defense as a matter of law. City of Houston, 589 S.W.2d at 678.
Official immunity 5 is a common-law defense that protects government officers from personal liability in performing discretionary duties in good faith within the scope of their authority. City of Lancaster, 883 S.W.2d at 653-54. The purpose of official immunity was explained by the supreme court in Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.1994):
The purpose of official immunity is to insulate the functioning of government from the harassment of litigation, not to protect erring officials. The public would suffer if government officers, who must exercise judgment and discretion in their jobs, were subject to civil lawsuits that second-guessed their decisions. Official immunity increases the efficiency of employees because they need not spend time defending frivolous charges.
Id. at 8 (citations omitted). Thus, the articulated basis for such immunity is the importance of avoiding distraction of officials from their governmental duties; the desire to avoid inhibition of discretionary actions; minimizing deterrence of able people from public service; avoiding the cost of an unnecessary trial; and insulating officials from burdensome discovery. Travis, 830 S.W.2d at 102 n. 4 (Cornyn, J., concurring).
There are no Texas cases holding that a medical examiner is entitled to assert official immunity, but we do have ample guidance from the decisions of two federal courts 6 and numerous decisions of other states. In Kompare v. Stein, 801 F.2d 883 (7th Cir.1986), two county medical examiners were sued for an autopsy that they performed that resulted in the prosecution of one plaintiff for voluntary manslaughter. In upholding the district court's granting of the medical examiners' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, the court reasoned:
Qualified immunity is available to government officials performing discretionary functions. Police officers have traditionally been granted qualified immunity in cases challenging police conduct relating to arrest. The medical examiner's function in performing an autopsy is analogous to that of a police officer investigating a suspected homicide. Therefore, coroners enjoy the same qualified immunity as police officers or other investigators for the state prosecutor.
Id. at 887 (citations omitted). Similarly, in Soliday v. Miami County, Ohio, 55 F.3d 1158 (6th Cir.1995), the county coroner was sued for ordering the cremation of an inmate's remains without contacting the relatives of the deceased. The trial court dismissed the claim on summary judgment based on official immunity. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment on the express premise that coroners, as government officials, are entitled to "qualified immunity from civil suits for damages arising out of their performance of their official duties." Id. at 1164.
In addition to these federal decisions, a majority of other states have upheld the application of official immunity to medical examiners. E.g. Stearns v. County of Los Angeles, 275 Cal.App.2d 134, 79 Cal.Rptr. 757, 759 (1969) ( ); Schwalb v. Connely, 116 Colo. 195, 179 P.2d 667, 670-71 (1947) ( ); Stath v. Williams, 174 Ind.App. 369, 367 N.E.2d 1120, 1125 (1977) ( ); Burse v. Wayne County Medical Examiner, 151 Mich.App. 761, 391 N.W.2d 479, 482 (1986) (...
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