Pyron v. Brownfield
| Decision Date | 15 February 1922 |
| Docket Number | (No. 1867.) |
| Citation | 238 S.W. 725 |
| Parties | PYRON v. BROWNFIELD et al. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Gray County; W. R. Ewing, Judge.
Suit by M. V. Brownfield against R. B. Pyron and others. From an adverse judgment, the named defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Veale & Lumpkin, of Amarillo, and Phillips, Trammell & Caldwell, of Fort Worth, for appellant.
Roscoe Wilson, of Lubbock, Frank Willis, of Canadian, and Underwood & Jackson, of Amarillo, for appellees.
M. V. Brownfield brought this suit against R. B. Pyron, in trespass to try title and to remove cloud from title to 5,944 acres of land in Gray county. He alleged that on January 28, 1909, he gave Pyron and Coke W. Harkrider, partners, the exclusive agency for a limited time to sell said land; that they had not sold it within the time limit, and the contract had been terminated thereby, and also by express revocation; that Pyron is claiming some interest in the land, and has caused to be placed of record a conveyance from Harkrider to him, purporting to convey an interest therein. The plaintiff also sought to reform a writing signed by him, dated January 29, 1909, which he alleged evidenced the enlistment contract. Pyron answered that the land was bought for the joint benefit of Brownfield, Pyron, and Harkrider, and title taken in the name of Brownfield, under agreement that the lands were to be resold and the profits divided, one-half to Brownfield and one-half to Pyron and Harkrider. That said land had been sold by Brownfield for $68,063.50. The purchasers of the lands were brought into the suit, and Pyron asked for an accounting and judgment, establishing his interest in the lands and the proceeds of their sale.
The trial court instructed a verdict for the plaintiff. The appellant contends, not only that this was error, but also that the peremptory instruction should have been in his favor. In order to dispose of these contentions it will be necessary to consider the evidence in its most favorable aspect to each party.
On January 28, 1909, M. V. Brownfield entered into a written contract with one McKinnon, for the purchase of the land for a consideration of $20,000. Five hundred dollars was paid at the time of the execution of this preliminary contract, which provided for payment of an additional $4,500, on delivery of the deed and notes for the remaining $15,000, payable in three years, bearing interest at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum. The sale was later consummated under this contract, and the land conveyed to Brownfield. Prior to the execution of this contract Pyron, acting for himself and Harkrider, had been in negotiation with McKinnon for the purchase of the land. Pyron was engaged in buying and selling land. He was acquainted with these lands, and came to the conclusion that they could be "bought at a bargain." He did not have the $5,000 to make the initial payment, and approached Brownfield for the purpose of borrowing said sum of money. Brownfield did not know anything about the land until his attention was called to it by Pyron and entered into the contract with McKinnon on Pyron's representations, without looking at the land.
Evidence offered by Pyron tends further to show: That when Pyron approached Brownfield he suggested, either that Brownfield lend him the money or go in with him on the purchase. That Brownfield expressed a preference to "go in on the purchase," and requested Pyron to "go ahead and see what could be done." That after some further negotiations with the owner of the land, in which some reduction in the price of the land as first made was secured, "they" agreed to take the land, and it was understood, verbally, that "Brownfield, Harkrider, and Pyron were buying the land together, and that Brownfield should take the deed in his name, as Pyron and Harkrider were getting only a quarter each and Brownfield one-half of the land." That after the execution of the Brownfield-McKinnon contract, but on the same day, and in pursuance to the oral agreement already made, the following instrument was executed by the parties:
Pyron had several offers to purchase the land and submitted them to Brownfield, who suggested from time to time that they "carry the land," as prices were advancing. The first intimation that Pyron had of a denial by Brownfield of Pyron's interest in the land was in 1915, and he never heard of any claim by Brownfield of a three-year limitation on the contract until in 1917.
Brownfield paid the initial cash payment and the notes as they became due. Pyron did not offer to pay anything on this account or any interest on the amounts paid by Brownfield until the bringing of this suit, and both parties evidently construed the contract as imposing no personal obligation on Pyron and Harkrider to make any such payments. There are in evidence some telegrams from Pyron to Brownfield, sent during the years 1910 and 1911, in which Pyron referred to the lands as "our land"; also a letter written by Brownfield to Pyron, dated January 22, 1912, which reads in part as follows:
Evidence offered by Brownfield tended to show: That when Pyron called Brownfield's attention to the land Brownfield refused to make a loan, but stated that he might buy the land himself. That Pyron interested himself in getting the trade through, with the expectation of being employed to resell the land for Brownfield and thus secure a commission. That Brownfield had no agreement to buy the land with Pyron and Harkrider, and no express agreement to list the land with Pyron for resale until after he had closed the trade with McKinnon. That after he executed such contract he told Pyron "that he was going to let him have the sale of the land, and was going to list it with him for sale." That he agreed to give Pyron three years in which to sell the land at $10 per acre and when the land was sold he was to have "his money back and interest on it at 10 per cent., and then the profits were to be divided between him and Pyron." That Pyron represented that he ought to have something in writing to show prospective purchasers, and on Brownfield's acquiescence in the suggestion had prepared the contract already quoted. That when this contract was presented to Brownfield it had already been signed by Harkrider and Pyron. That Pyron represented that he was in a "rush," and Brownfield signed the contract without noticing that the three-year limitation and 10 per cent. interest provision of the verbal agreement had been omitted. That just before the expiration of the three years Brownfield noticed this omission in the contract, and called Pyron's attention to it, whereupon Pyron conceded that such was the understanding, and agreed that he would claim no right after the expiration of such time.
Both parties offered other evidence which tended to corroborate their respective theories as stated above, but we do not think it necessary to refer in detail to such evidence.
On May 15, 1915, Harkrider executed a deed conveying his interest in the land to Pyron, and this deed was placed of record. Brownfield brought this suit on September...
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