Qualey v. Fulton

• Decision Date: 20 November 1980
• Citation: 422 A.2d 773
• Parties: Charles QUALEY v. Stuart Edward FULTON
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 773

422 A.2d 773

Charles QUALEY v. Stuart Edward FULTON

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Sept. 16, 1980.

Decided Nov. 20, 1980.

Jordan & Goodridge, Donald H. Goodridge (oralty), Houlton, for plaintiff.

Barnes & Sylvester, Torrey A. Sylvester (oralty), John O. Rogers, Houlton, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and WERNICK, GODFREY, NICHOLS, GLASSMAN, ROBERTS and CARTER, JJ.

CARTER, Justice.

The plaintiff in this case appeals from an entry of judgment in favor of the defendant after a jury-waived trial, which judgment was based upon the trial court's rejection for lack of credibility of the plaintiff's uncontradicted testimony.

We affirm the judgment entered below.

Plaintiff sought recovery of the value of a tractor-trailer motor vehicle which he alleged to be covered against theft by an insurance policy issued by the defendant. ¹ The defendant admitted issuing an insurance policy extending coverage to a described tractor and trailer. ² Defendant contended below that the plaintiff had never purchased or owned the described units and that they had never been stolen from the plaintiff's possession. ³

The plaintiff's proof at trial consisted of his own testimony and the testimony of one other witness. The plaintiff's trial testimony related to the circumstances surrounding the alleged purchase, use, and theft of the tractor-trailer. The plaintiff's testimony in his pretrial deposition, offered by the defendant, also covered these points. At trial, the plaintiff's only other witness testified that, in June of 1976, at the plaintiff's request, he had painted a vehicle, which he described as a 1973 Transstar (International) truck. The witness did not know who owned the truck or what serial numbers it bore.

The defendant's evidence did not directly contradict any of the testimony adduced during the plaintiff's case-in-chief. The defendant's only witness was a professional adjuster for the defendant-carrier who investigated the circumstances of the plaintiff's claim under the insurance policy. He testified that he interviewed the plaintiff the day following the alleged theft and obtained a written, four-page, signed statement reflecting the plaintiff's description of the purchase and theft of the vehicle. The statement, offered in evidence by the plaintiff, generally agrees with the plaintiff's testimony in his pretrial deposition. The gravamen of the adjuster's testimony was that, as a result of his investigation, he came to the conclusion

that there was no such tractor or trailer ... (b)ecause I could not come up with anyone who had actually seen it. There was no documentation, no bill of sale.

The defendant offered the transcript of plaintiff's pretrial deposition, which was admitted, and produced no other evidence.

The trial court made the following findings of fact:

(1) "(T)hat the plaintiff ... never purchased or acquired or ever owned or ever had any insurable interest or any interest at all in the tractor-trailer unit described in said insurance policy." (emphasis added). ⁴

(2) That the plaintiff "did not own or have any interest, claim or right, whatsoever, in any tractor-trailer unit."

(3) That no tractor-trailer unit in which the plaintiff had any interest "was ever stolen from the Plaintiff ... on September 2, 1976, or September 3, 1976 or at any other time in 1976." The court below ordered that judgment be entered for the defendant and that the action be dismissed on the merits.

The court's decision clearly resulted from its disbelief and ultimate rejection of the plaintiff's testimony, even though that testimony was not contradicted by any other witness on any significant point. In making findings of fact, the court below went beyond concluding that entry of judgment for the defendant was required by the plaintiff's failure to carry his burden of proof. It is, however, unnecessary for us to reach the question of whether those findings survive the application of the "clearly erroneous" test under M.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Upon a proper rejection of the plaintiff's testimony, there was no other evidence in the record sufficient to carry the plaintiff's burden of proving his purchase of the vehicle in question, or its theft. Therefore, if the trial court acted properly in rejecting the plaintiff's uncontradicted testimony, the defendant was entitled to judgment. The validity of the trial court's findings of fact thereupon becomes moot.

The question we resolve, therefore, is whether the trial court erred in rejecting the plaintiff's testimony for lack of credibility. In a jury-waived trial, it is the trial court's responsibility to find the facts. M.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Central to the trial court's fact-finding task is the determination of the credibility of the witnesses. It must then consider the weight and significance to be given to the testimony and other evidence, and determine the facts to be gleaned from the entire circumstances of the case.

Where the trial court considers evidence for purposes of finding facts in place of a jury, he is not required to believe a witness, however incredible he may find his testimony, simply because there is no contradictory testimony or evidence in the record.

The fact that the testimony of a party to a suit is not directly contradicted does not necessarily make it conclusive and binding upon the court. Of course it is not to be utterly disregarded and arbitrarily ignored without reason. It should be carefully considered and weighed with all of the other evidence in the case, and with all of the inferences to be properly drawn from facts established by the evidence; but if, on the whole case, it appears that such testimony is untrue, the court is not required to put the stamp of verity upon it, merely because it is not directly contradicted by other testimony.

Mitchell v. Mitchell, 136 Me. 406, 418, 11 A.2d 898, 904 (1940). Accord, Pease v. Shapiro 144 Me. 195, 200, 67 A.2d 17, 20 (1949). Where the testimony of a witness is without direct contradiction, the fact-finder must rely on his impression of the credibility of the witness as a person and the internal evidence of truthfulness contained in the witness's testimony.

The trial court has the opportunity to see and hear the witness whereas an appellate tribunal is restricted to a consideration of the cold, written record of the testimony. ⁵ The primacy of the trial court's informational opportunity is to be respected.

(W)e must assume that these evanescent factors may have been persuasive, unless what does come before us rationally forbids the conclusions, no matter what the unknown factors were.

E. F. Drew & Co. v. Reinhard, 170 F.2d 679, 684 (2d Cir. 1948).

In addition, the fact-finder has available the indications of truthfulness inherent in the substance of the witness's testimony. Is the witness's version of events believable in the light of general knowledge and common experience? Are the circumstances he relates extraordinary or suspicious? Are they contradicted by inferences from circumstantial evidence? Is the witness consistent in his testimony? Are any significant variances or inconsistencies reasonably explainable in a manner consistent with the truthfulness of the testimony?

When we test the trial court's resolution of the issue of the credibility of the witnesses and of their testimony, we are not in a position to be able to accurately determine the weight the trial court assigned to each of the two sets of factors on which its credibility determination is based....