Mitchell v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 23 March 1940
• Citation: 11 A.2d 898
• Parties: MITCHELL v. MITCHELL.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

11 A.2d 898

MITCHELL

v. MITCHELL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 23, 1940.

[Copyrighted material omitted.]

Exceptions from Superior Court, Hancock County.

Libel as for divorce for annulment of marriage by John E. Mitchell against Frances Hammond Mitchell. Decision for libelee and decree dismissing libel, and libelant brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

Argued before BARNES, C. J., and STURGIS, THAXTER, HUDSON, MANSER, and WORSTER, JJ.

Deasy, Lynam, Rodick & Rodick, of Bar Harbour, for plaintiff.

Blaisdell & Blaisdell, of Ellsworth, for defendant.

WORSTER, Justice.

On exceptions. Libel as for divorce for annulment of marriage on the ground of alleged fraud, deceit and duress, brought under the provisions of Revised Statutes, Chapter 73, Section 15.

It was heard by the court, without the assistance of a jury, with the right of exceptions reserved to both parties on questions of law.

Decision below was for the libelee, and the libel was dismissed with a ruling, briefly stated, that the libelant must fail "for two reasons, either of which is sufficient"—First, because he had not shown by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he had been induced by fraud to marry the libelee; second, because the alleged matters relied on had been already "adjudicated in the Florida Courts."

The case is here on libelant's exceptions to that decision, to the findings made, and to the omission to make other requested findings.

The court below found that:

"The libellant and libellee are both residents of Hancock County, Maine.

"The history of the case, according to the evidence is, that the parties, about a year prior to the latter part of April or the early part of May 1936, commenced keeping company, and first had sexual intercourse the latter part of April or the early part of May, 1936.

"During the summer of 1936 the libellee notified the libellant that she was pregnant, and he agreed to marry her, but did not do so. That fall or winter the libellant went to West Palm Beach, Florida, and later the libellee went there. On December 12, 1936 the libellee had the libellant arrested on a bastardy process, and he went to jail. After staying in jail a short time, he married the libellee and was released. The parties have never cohabited since the marriage and the marriage has never been consummated.

"In January 1937, after the birth of the child, the libellant brought a Bill in Equity in the Courts of Florida, asking that the marriage be declared null and void, because he went through the marriage ceremony on account of fear, and that he never gave his consent to the marriage ceremony. That Court dismissed the Bill.

"In the action at bar, the libellee answers and denys that she induced the libellant by threat, duress, fraud or false statements to marry her, and says when he married her he acted freely, and she sets up as a further defense the judgment of the Florida Court cited above."

Passing to the reasons given by the presiding Justice for dismissing the libel, let us first consider the ground last stated in the decree, which reads as follows:

"SECOND: The subject matter litigated in the Florida Court was annulment of marriage. That same subject is being litigated here. The libellant contends that fraud was not relied upon in the Florida proceedings. It is immaterial whether it was or not. Fraud could have been set up in the Bill brought there. And the test is, what could have been set up, not what was set up.

"The Court finds as a matter of law that this matter was adjudicated in the Florida Courts."

Have the matters relied on by the libelant in the instant case been already judicially decided between the parties—

Perhaps this question may be better discussed by dividing it into two parts:

1. Have the matters relied upon by the libelant to support his allegation of duress been adjudicated?

It is a general rule that parties are estopped from litigating issues which had been previously and finally decided between them on the merits of the controversy by a court of competent jurisdiction. Fuller v. Eastman, 81 Me. 284, 17 A. 67; Morrison v. Clark, 89 Me. 103, 107, 35 A. 1034, 56 Am.St.Rep. 395; Parks v. Libby, 90 Me. 56, 57, 37 A. 357; Burns v. Baldwin-Doherty Co., 132 Me. 331, 170 A. 511. And this rule applies to proceedings for annulment of marriage. Sargent, Petitioner, 115 Me. 130, 98 A. 117.

In the instant case, the libelant charges in his libel, among other things, that this marriage was obtained by duress. This is the same issue that was tried and decided on the merits of the controversy, between the same parties, in the case heard in Florida, and the libelant is estopped from now presenting the same claim for judicial determination.

Moreover, his attorney concedes that the question of duress is not open to him here, and so this point may be considered as abandoned by him.

2. Have the matters relied upon by the libelant to support his allegation of fraud and deceit been adjudicated?

The fraud and deceit claimed by the libelant is that he was induced to marry the libelee because of her alleged false and fraudulent misrepresentations to him that he was the father of the child with which she was pregnant, then believed and relied on by him, but which he claims he has since ascertained is false.

In the bill filed in the Florida court appear allegations to the effect that, though the defendant claimed at the time of the marriage that the plaintiff was the father of the child with which she was then pregnant, yet he was not the father and could not have been.

On the allegation that the libelant was not the father of the child, issue was there taken by the defendant, and much evidence was offered as to whether or not the child to whom she gave birth was a full-term child, but neither the master nor the court decided that point.

Nevertheless, the libelee contends, and the court below ruled, that the issue of fraud and deceit now raised could have been decided in that case, so is res judicata here, and she invokes the following rule laid down in Ketch v. Smith, 128 Me. 171, 173, 146 A. 247, 248: "It is accepted law in this state that, conceding jurisdiction, regularity in proceedings, and the absence of fraud, a judgment between the same parties is a final bar to any other suit for the same cause of action, and is conclusive not only as to all matters which were tried, but also as to all which might have been tried in the first action."

However, the general rule relied on by the libelee has no application to a case where the issue was not decided by the trier of facts, but expressly reserved by him for hearing in another case. 34 Corpus Juris, page 797; 24 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d Ed.), 776; Martin et al. v. Turner, Ky. 1909, 115 S.W. 833; Burns et al. v. Nichols, 、Tex. Civ. App. 1918, 207 S.W. 158; Hardin v. Hardin et al., 26 S.D. 601, 129 N.W. 108, 111.

Even if such a reservation of the issue for another hearing was erroneous, and actually resulted in splitting the plaintiff's cause of action, that would not bar him from again presenting the question for decision.

An erroneous judgment of a competent court having jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter remains binding on the parties until reversed. Hardin v. Hardin et al., supra.

In the Florida case, the master appointed by the court to take the testimony, stated in the report he made to the court, which was afterwards accepted, that: "There has been a great deal of testimony before the Master on the necessary period of gestation, which makes some question about the paternity of the child. However, the Master does not consider it necessary that the Court pass upon this question in this particular case."

The reason for this summary dismissal of this evidence from consideration is not stated. The ruling does not purport to be based on the ground that the charge of alleged fraud and deceit was not properly presented by the pleadings. The ruling is an absolute one, and, while informal, plainly indicates that the question of the paternity of the child was not passed upon in decision, but was expressly reserved for another hearing. It is useless to discuss whether the master should have ruled on the question whether the claim of fraud and deceit was properly presented, and if so, to have decided that issue; or whether final decision of the marriage status could have been made without deciding that question; or whether failure to decide it resulted in splitting the plaintiff's cause of action. The fact remains that the master did not decide it but expressly reserved it, and the libelant is not now estopped from presenting the same issue here for decision.

Therefore, the ruling of the court below "that this matter was adjudicated in the Florida Courts" was erroneous in so far as the charge of fraud and deceit is concerned.

But that is not decisive here. That was not the only reason given by the court for the decision rendered. And the libelant, who was afforded a full hearing below on the merits of the allegation of fraud and deceit, has no cause for complaint if his libel was properly dismissed for failure to prove that charge, for any of the reasons stated in the decree. It will be necessary for us to consider only one of those reasons and that one, stated substantially, is that the libelant failed to show that he entered into this marriage on account of the libelee's representations that he was the father of her then unborn child.

There is a common law presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock, although conception took place before marriage. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen, Mass., 608, 610; Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37, 114 N.W. 527, 530, 14 L.R.A.N.S., 544, 126 Am.St.Rep. 253, 15 Ann.Cas. 761.

But that presumption may be overcome by evidence, and here the libelant contends that he has proved that he is not the father of the child; and that he was induced by fraud to marry the libelee. Fraud is not to...