Qualls v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 March 1971
• Docket Number: No. 54225,54225
• Citation: 184 N.W.2d 710
• Parties: Thomas J. QUALLS, Appellant, v. FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 710

184 N.W.2d 710

Thomas J. QUALLS, Appellant, v. FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee.

No. 54225.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 11, 1971.

Miller, Miller & Miller, of Cherokee, for appellant.

Kindig, Beebe, McCluhan & Rawlings, Sioux City, for appellee.

LARSON, Justice.

Seeking recovery for the loss of fourteen heifers that died of pseudorabies, plaintiff brought suit against the defendant Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company asking judgment declaring liability for the loss under the provisions of his policy. Although defendant objected, the matter was tried as an equity matter, and it is agreed our review here is de novo.

The trial court recognized the policy held by plaintiff extended coverage to loss of livestock by 'attack by dogs or wild animals' and found that 'it is reasonable to conclude that plaintiff's heifers died from Aujeskey's Disease inflicted by a bite of a wild animal, directly to the heifers or indirectly by biting the hogs who in turn were carriers and bit the cattle, inflicting the fatal disease.' However, the court held 'that the insured, as a reasonable person, could not have understood his policy to cover such a situation, when the only peril insured against was 'attack by dogs or wild animals" and dismissed plaintiff's petition. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse.

This appeal presents two principal issues: (1) Did plaintiff's claimed loss fall within the coverage provision of the policy of insurance against loss of livestock? (2) Was the evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that the loss resulted from an attack by dogs or wild animals?

I. Appellee concedes that the cardinal principle applicable to the construction of written contracts is that the parties' intent shall control. It also concedes that a contract of insurance should be interpreted from the standpoint of an ordinary man's viewpoint, not a specialist or expert. See Bates v. United Security Ins. Co., Iowa, 163 N.W.2d 390, 397.

Appellee does not question the sufficiency of the diagnosis of the disease suffered by the dead cattle, nor seriously question Dr. Drefke's qualifications to render an opinion as to how it was contracted. It is true, direct evidence of a vicious attack or bite was not found upon the animals, but the explanation was reasonable that, when the affected animals were discovered, their efforts to relieve the itch had already destroyed any certain evidence of an attack.

Appellant contends the provision establishing liability for loss of livestock through an attack by dogs or wild animals was intended to include all losses which were proximately caused by such attacks, and that by a preponderance of the evidence he did show the fatal disease suffered by these heifers was the proximate result of a bite of a diseased wild animal. He contends the rule of construction applicable to the policy of insurance at issue is the intent of the parties as determined by what the contract itself says and the extent and meaning given by law to the language used in such contracts. Thus, if an attack by a wild animal is shown, he maintains that the loss of the liverstock by a contracting a fatal disease as a result of a bite from an infected wild animal is recognized as the proximate cause of the loss and is covered by the policy. As authority for this position he cites Ballagh v. Interstate Acc. Assn., 176 Iowa 110, 155 N.W. 241. Also see 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 756, p. 785, and § 890, p. 963.

Apparently the trial court believed the policy restricted the loss to a direct or immediate loss due to the attack of dogs or wild animals, and concluded it did not include infectious consequences such as appear herein. In so doing, we think the trial court erred.

We are satisfied the word 'attack' as used in the instant insurance agreement clearly extended to those results which were proximately caused thereby and, regardless of the seriousness or extent of the attack, any bite which was found to infect the livestock with a serious disease is included in the liability assumed under the contract. There was no provision in the contract which restricted the loss to violence causing the death of the animals.

It is, of course, true that 'In order that there may be a recovery on the policy the loss of, or injury to, the insured livestock must result from the particular peril against which insured is indemnified.' 45 C.J.S., § 890, supra. Clearly, the peril insured against here is attacks by dogs or wild animals. Thus, every loss to plaintiff's livestock which is the proximate result of an attack by wild animals, except that from fright (specifically excluded), must be considered within the intent of the parties to this insurance contract. It is said in section 890 of 45 C.J.S. Insurance, at p. 963, 'A policy of livestock insurance covers all losses falling within its terms, such as death or injury of an animal proximately resulting from the risk insured.'

In insurance law it is generally understood that where the peril insured against sets other causes in motion which, in an unbroken sequence and connection between the act and final loss, produces the result for which recovery is sought, the insured peril is regarded as the proximate cause of the entire loss. See Insurance Law and Practice, Appleman 5, § 3083, p. 309, and citations; Bates v. United Security Ins. Co., supra. Also see Carnes v. Continental Casualty Co. (La.App.), 212 So.2d 441, where the court allowed recovery for insured's death when endocarditis occurred as a result of a spider bite and held the death was the result of an accident under the terms of the policy.

In Ballagh v. Interstate Acc. Assn., supra, we ourselves reached a like conclusion and, in reaffirming our previous holding in Delaney v. Modern Accident Club, 121 Iowa 528, 97 N.W. 91, quoted this statement at page 116 of 176 Iowa, at page 243 of 155 N.W. 'Disease brought about as the result of a wound,...