Quaranta v. Quaranta

• Decision Date: 21 February 1995
• Citation: 622 N.Y.S.2d 778,212 A.D.2d 683
• Parties: Ann QUARANTA, Respondent, v. John QUARANTA, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 778

622 N.Y.S.2d 778

212 A.D.2d 683

Ann QUARANTA, Respondent, v. John QUARANTA, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

Feb. 21, 1995.

Lawrence X. Kennedy, Goshen, for appellant.

Warren E. Meth, Monroe and Martin B. Schaffer, Middletown, for respondent (one brief filed).

Before BALLETTA, J.P., and THOMPSON, SANTUCCI, ALTMAN and HART, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated March 5, 1991, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Peter Patsalos, J.), dated December 22, 1993, which granted the plaintiff's motion to reargue and upon reargument, reversed its prior determination and denied the defendant's motion to terminate his obligation to pay maintenance and (2) a judgment of the same court entered January 13, 1994, which is in favor of the plaintiff and against him in the principal sum of $3,500.

ORDERED that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

ORDERED that the plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment (see, Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248, 383 N.Y.S.2d 285, 347 N.E.2d 647). The issues raised on appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (CPLR 5501[a][1].

On January 15, 1991, the parties, who had been married for nearly 38 years, entered into a stipulation in open court settling their pending matrimonial action. The stipulation resolved all financial issues, including equitable distribution of the parties' property, which included their residence, a mobile home, an automobile, and other property. The defendant agreed to pay monthly maintenance to the plaintiff which would terminate upon the death of either party. The stipulation specifically provided that the maintenance payments were "in full satisfaction" and "in full extinguishment" of any claim which the plaintiff had to the defendant's pension from the City of New York. If the defendant's pension payments increased, the plaintiff's maintenance would increase by 50% of the additional pension amounts. The stipulation was incorporated, but not merged, into the parties' subsequent judgment of divorce. In 1993, the plaintiff remarried and the defendant moved to amend the judgment to delete the maintenance provision. The Supreme Court initially granted the motion, but upon reargument, denied the relief requested and granted the plaintiff's motion for a judgment for maintenance arrears.

Although it is a matter of public policy in New York that one spouse, upon remarriage, may not compel support from a former spouse (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][6][c]; Matter of Benny v. Benny, 199 A.D.2d 384, 386, 605 N.Y.S.2d 311; Sacks v. Sacks, 168 A.D.2d 733, 734, 563 N.Y.S.2d 884; Jacobs v. Patterson, 112 A.D.2d 402, 403, 492 N.Y.S.2d 59), an agreement requiring maintenance to continue after remarriage is not against public policy and is enforceable (see, Jung v. Jung, 171 A.D.2d 993, 994, 567 N.Y.S.2d 934; Sacks v. Sacks, supra, 168 A.D.2d at...