Quarry v. Doe 1

• Decision Date: 10 February 2009
• Docket Number: No. A120048.,A120048.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: TERRY QUARRY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DOE 1, Defendant and Respondent.

170 Cal.App.4th 1574

89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 640

TERRY QUARRY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DOE 1, Defendant and Respondent.

No. A120048.

Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division Four.

February 10, 2009.

Zalkin & Zimmer, Irwin M. Zalkin, Michael H. Zimmer, Devin M. Storey and Michael J. Kinslow for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Foley & Lardner, Stephen A. McFeely, Tami S. Smason and Courtney R. Henning for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

RIVERA, J.

Six brothers claim they were sexually abused by a Catholic priest in the 1970's, when they were children. They sued defendant Doe I in 2007 for damages due to adult-onset psychological injuries allegedly caused by that abuse.¹ When they sued, they ranged in age from 43 to 49. They alleged they did not discover until 2006 that the cause of their adulthood psychological injuries was the childhood sexual abuse.

The Bishop demurred to the complaint. He argued that plaintiffs' causes of action were barred under earlier limitations periods and that later expansions of the statute of limitations did not revive their lapsed claims. Plaintiffs contended that the current statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1) applied, pursuant to which their claims did not accrue until 2006, when they discovered the cause of their injuries. The trial court sustained the Bishop's demurrer and dismissed the complaint.

(1) We reverse and hold that the prior limitations periods did not extinguish claims that had not accrued while those limitations were in effect, and that the timeliness of the complaint is to be measured by the statute in effect at the time the complaint was filed.²

I. BACKGROUND

On March 2, 2007, plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Bishop alleging that they suffered childhood sexual abuse in 1972 and 1973 at the hands of a priest employed by the Bishop. They alleged that they developed various psychological coping mechanisms that prevented them from ascertaining the causal connection between their childhood sexual abuse and the adult-onset psychological injuries. As a result, they did not discover that their injuries were the result of the sexual abuse until within the year preceding the filing of the complaint. The Bishop demurred to the complaint, arguing that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure³ section 340.1. The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.

Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on July 12, 2007. They alleged that they did not discover the wrongfulness of the abuse they suffered until the latter half of 2005 and did not discover that their psychological injuries were caused by the molestation until March 2006. The Bishop again demurred. He contended that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statutes of limitations in effect prior to 2003, were revived for a one-year period (2003) by section 340.1, subdivision (c), and after 2003 were again time-barred. The Bishop also argued that plaintiffs could not rely on the common law delayed discovery rule because it had been abrogated by the statute.

The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and entered judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Construction

We here review the narrow question of whether a complaint is time-barred by the terms of a statute and the statute's prior iterations. No factual issues are in dispute. After dismissal is entered on a demurrer sustained without leave to amend, we must accept as true all of the facts alleged in the complaint. (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403 .) Accordingly, our review is de novo.

"`[I]t is well settled that the interpretation and application of a statutory scheme to an undisputed set of facts is a question of law [citation] which is subject to de novo review on appeal.'" (Bodell Construction Co. v. Trustees of Cal. State University (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1515 (Bodell).) In cases "involving matters of law, the appellate court is not bound by the trial court's decision, but may make its own determination. [Citations.] Statutory construction is such a question of law for the courts . . . ." (Evans v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 398, 407 [216 Cal.Rptr. 782, 703 P.2d 122].)

(2) "The applicable canons of statutory construction which guide our interpretation of [statutes] are also well settled. `The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.]' [Citation.] In determining that intent, we first examine the words of the statute itself. [Citation.] Under the so-called `plain meaning' rule, courts seek to give the words employed by the Legislature their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction. [Citation.]" (Bodell, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1515-1516; see also Wolski v. Fremont Investment & Loan (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 347, 351 [where statutory language is unequivocal, "`we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs'"].) "If, however, the statutory language lacks clarity, we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. In such situations, we strive to select the construction that comports most closely with the Legislature's apparent intent, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the statute's general purposes." (In re Travis W. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 368, 371 .)

With these principles in mind, we turn to our examination of the statute's history and meaning.

B. The Statute and Its Amendments

Section 340.1 was enacted in 1986. (Stats. 1986, ch. 914, § 1, pp. 3165-3166.) It sets forth the statute of limitations for an action seeking damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse. Prior to 1987, the limitations period for such claims was one year from the date of the wrongful act, as then prescribed by former section 340, subdivision (3) (Stats. 1982, ch. 517, § 97, pp. 2334-2335), or one year after reaching the age of majority, pursuant to section 352, subdivision (a) (Stats. 1986, ch. 1161, § 1, p. 4148). The 1986 statute extended the limitations period to three years, but only for sexual abuse by a relative or household member. (Dutra v. Eagleson (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 216, 222 .)

In 1990, the Legislature amended section 340.1, extending the limitations period to "within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, `whichever occurs later.'" (Lent v. Doe (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1182 (Lent); see Stats. 1990, ch. 1578, § 1, pp. 7550-7552.) The amendment also expanded section 340.1 to govern actions against all perpetrators, not just household or family members. (Stats. 1990, ch. 1578, § 1, pp. 7550-7552.) The new provision applied to "`any action commenced on or after January 1, 1991.'" (David A. v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 281, 284, fn. 5 (David A.).)

In 1993, Division Two of the First District Court of Appeal construed the above quoted phrase to mean that the 1990 amendment was intended to apply prospectively only and did not revive any claims that had become time-barred under prior law. (David A., supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at pp. 286-288.) In response, the Legislature adopted amendments in 1994 making explicit its intention to revive claims that had lapsed under prior limitations periods. (Former § 340.1, subd. (o); Stats. 1994, ch. 288, § 1, p. 1930; currently § 340.1, subd. (r).)⁴

The 1990 and 1994 amendments applied only to perpetrators and not to entities that employed or otherwise supervised a perpetrator. (Former § 340.1, subd. (b); Stats. 1990, ch. 1578, § 1, pp. 7550-7551; Stats. 1994, ch. 288, § 1, p. 1928.) "Effective 1998, that defect was remedied when the Legislature amended section 340.1, subdivision (a) to include causes of action for sex abuse against persons or entities other than the perpetrator." (Hightower v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Sacramento (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 759, 765-766 (Hightower); see Stats. 1998, ch. 1032, § 1.) Such claims, however, had to be brought before the plaintiff's 26th birthday. (Former § 340.1, subd. (b); Stats. 1998, ch. 1032, § 1; currently §340.1, subd. (b)(1).) In 1999, the Legislature again amended section 340.1 to provide that the 1998 amendments to subdivision (a) "shall apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1999, . . . including any action or causes of action which would have been barred by the laws in effect prior to January 1, 1999." (Former § 340.1, subd. (s); see Stats. 1999, ch. 120, § 1.)

In 2002, the Legislature further expanded the limitations period of section 340.1⁵ as against certain nonperpetrator defendants by removing the cutoff date of the 26th birthday. (§ 340.1, subd. (b); Stats. 2002, ch. 149, § 1.) Accordingly, the statute now permits an action against a nonperpetrator defendant to be brought within three years of discovering that the psychological injuries were caused by the childhood abuse (§ 340.1, subd. (a)) if that defendant "knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee . . . or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that person in a function or environment in which contact with children is an inherent part of that function or environment" (id., subd. (b)(2)). The amendment also revived for a period of one year, commencing January...