Queeman v. State

• Decision Date: 14 June 2017
• Docket Number: NO. PD-0215-16,PD-0215-16
• Citation: 520 S.W.3d 616
• Parties: Robert Alan QUEEMAN, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

520 S.W.3d 616

Robert Alan QUEEMAN, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas

NO. PD-0215-16

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Delivered: June 14, 2017

James Gerard McDermott II, Thompson Salinas and McDermott, LLP, Austin, TX, for appellant.

John R. Messinger, Assistant State Prosecuting Attorney, Stacey Soule, Austin, TX, for the State.

OPINION

Alcala, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support this criminally negligent homicide judgment, we address whether a death caused by two driving errors—the failure to control speed and the failure to maintain a proper distance between vehicles—proves a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under the circumstances. Robert Alan Queeman, appellant, was convicted of criminally negligent homicide after failing to prevent his van from colliding with another vehicle, which resulted in the death of a passenger in the other vehicle. The court of appeals reversed the jury's verdict of guilt after finding that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the conviction. We agree with the court of appeals's ultimate conclusion that the evidence in this case is legally insufficient to establish criminally negligent homicide because the evidence presented at trial does not show that appellant's failure to maintain a safe driving speed and keep a proper distance from other vehicles was a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary driver would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from appellant's standpoint at the time of his conduct. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

I. Background

Appellant was driving eastbound on a two-lane highway when his van rear-ended an SUV that was making a left turn off the highway onto an intersecting street. The collision caused the SUV to roll over into the westbound lane where it collided with an oncoming truck before coming to a stop upside down approximately fifty feet from the initial point of impact. Appellant's vehicle traveled approximately another 130-150 feet before coming to a stop. The SUV was occupied by three women: Maria del Rosario Luna was driving, Josefa Payne was in the front passenger seat, and Olga Deleon was in the back seat. Olga Deleon died as a result of injuries sustained in the collision.

Appellant was later charged in a two-count indictment for manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide.¹ See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 19.04, 19.05. A jury acquitted him of manslaughter but found him guilty of criminally negligent homicide. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced him to eighteen months' confinement in a state jail facility.

At trial, Luna testified that she did not remember the details surrounding the accident except that she recalled that she and her passengers were driving home, which meant that she likely would have been making a left turn off the highway where the accident occurred. She could not recall whether her vehicle was stopped or still moving at the moment of impact. She stated that she believed she used her turn signal but could not recall for certain. However, in a statement given to investigators several days after the accident, she stated that she did not use her turn signal.

Appellant's theory about the cause of the accident, which was introduced through Trooper Welch's testimony, was that appellant accidently struck the SUV because it suddenly slowed down to make a left turn without using its turn signal. Appellant claimed that he was driving approximately 36 to 37 miles per hour, which was within the 40 miles-per-hour speed limit, at the time of the collision. Appellant maintained that, when he saw the SUV, he attempted to avoid hitting it but was unable to completely evade it. Appellant suggested that this corrective action resulted in the front-left side of his vehicle striking the right-rear side of the SUV.

Trooper Welch, who was in charge of the accident investigation, issued citations to Luna and appellant for their roles in the collision. Welch issued Luna a traffic ticket for failing to use her turn signal. He cited appellant for failure to maintain control of his speed but did not cite him for speeding. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.351. Additionally, Welch did not suspect appellant was intoxicated or impaired before the accident.

In his investigation, Welch determined that the SUV was stopped or nearly stopped at the time of the collision, that the SUV's brake lights were illuminated, and that appellant did not brake until just before or at the time that he struck the SUV.

Rejecting appellant's claim about his speed at the time of the collision, Welch determined that appellant was traveling "significantly" faster than 36 to 37 miles per hour. Welch opined that appellant was exceeding the 40 miles-per-hour speed limit. Welch made that determination based on his calculation of appellant's post-impact speed, which he concluded was approximately 34 miles per hour based on the length of yaw marks left by appellant's vehicle.² This calculation required an assumption concerning the coefficient of friction between the tires and pavement because Welch did not have the necessary training to measure the actual friction coefficient for the formula. Welch testified that varying the coefficient of friction by ten percent changed the answer nominally between 32 miles per hour for a friction coefficient of sixty percent and 37 miles per hour for a friction coefficient of eighty percent. Welch stated that the coefficient of friction depends on a number of variables, including the weather and the pavement or surface type, but that his baseline assumption of a seventy-percent friction coefficient for dry asphalt on a clear day is "pretty well accepted." Welch indicated that the collision occurred on a clear, dry day. Furthermore, Welch opined that, based on his experience, appellant's vehicle would have been substantially slowed by a collision with a stationary car, like Luna's SUV.³ On the other hand, Welch conceded that he had no way of knowing specifically appellant's actual pre-accident speed.⁴

On appeal, appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Queeman v. State , 486 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016). The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered a judgment of acquittal. Id. at 71. The court of appeals found that the evidence presented could not have provided the jury a basis from which to reasonably infer that appellant was traveling at an "excessive rate of speed." Id. at 77. The court of appeals noted that Welch could not quantify appellant's pre-impact speed and also did not cite appellant for speeding. Id. Therefore, the court of appeals found that any inference by the jury that appellant was traveling at an excessive speed would be impermissible speculation. Id. (citing Merritt v. State , 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ; Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 15-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ). Additionally, the evidence that appellant's vehicle hit Luna's SUV at an angle rather than straight from behind indicated that appellant tried to swerve to avoid the accident. Id. Furthermore, the court of appeals found that the evidence adduced at trial "[did] not show that [appellant] was engaged in any criminally culpable risk-creating conduct—e.g., dangerous speeding, racing, failure to obey traffic signals, or any other misconduct that created or contributed to a ‘substantial and unjustifiable’ risk of death."Id. (quoting People v. Boutin , 75 N.Y.2d 692, 556 N.Y.S.2d 1, 555 N.E.2d 253, 255-56 (1990) ). Nor did the evidence establish that appellant engaged in other types of "serious, blameworthy conduct like distracted driving due to cell phone use and an abrupt, aggressive, unsafe lane change" or intoxicated driving. Id. Instead, the evidence " ‘establishe[d] only that [appellant] inexplicably failed to see [Luna's] vehicle until he was so close that he could not prevent the collision.’ " Id. (quoting Boutin , 556 N.Y.S.2d 1, 555 N.E.2d at 256 ). Thus, the court of appeals found the evidence legally insufficient to support appellant's conviction. Id.

In its petition for discretionary review, the State challenges the court of appeals's judgment on two grounds. It asks,

(1) Is failing to maintain a safe speed and keep a proper distance the sort of "unexplained failure" that this Court suggested in Tello v. State , 180 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), would be unworthy of criminal sanction?

(2) Did the court of appeals ignore basic rules of sufficiency review when it disregarded evidence that supported the verdict and drew inferences contrary to those presumably drawn by the jury?

II. Analysis

After describing the applicable law, we address the State's two arguments. We begin with the State's second ground that asserts that the court of appeals's analysis was flawed by failing to view the facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. After that, we address the State's first ground that the court of appeals erred by deciding that no rational jury could decide that these facts establish criminal negligence.

A. Applicable Law for Establishing Criminal Negligence

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Anderson v. State , 416 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimonies, and the reviewing court must not usurp this role by substituting its own judgment for that of the jury. Montgomery v. State , 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure...