Quick v. United Ben. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 1,1
• Citation: 213 S.E.2d 563,287 N.C. 47
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Ida Mae QUICK, Administratrix of the Estate of Donald Gary Quick v. UNITED BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and Jill Quick.

Page 563

213 S.E.2d 563

287 N.C. 47

Ida Mae QUICK, Administratrix of the Estate of Donald Gary Quick v. UNITED BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and Jill Quick.

No. 1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 14, 1975.

Lacy S. Hair, Fayetteville, for plaintiff appellant.

Deborah G. Mailman, Raleigh, for defendant appellee.

COPELAND, Justice.

The first question for decision is whether defendant Quick is a 'slayer' as defined by G.S. § 31A--3(3). If so, G.S. § 31A--11 disqualifies her as a beneficiary under the policy.

G.S. § 31A--3(3) provides:

"Slayer' means

'a. Any person who by a court of competent jurisdiction shall have been convicted as a principal or accessory before the fact of the Wilful and unlawful killing of another person; . . .' (Emphasis supplied.)

The question, therefore, is whether the crime of involuntary manslaughter is a 'wilful and unlawful killing' within the meaning of the above cited provision. A conviction of the crime of involuntary manslaughter establishes the commission of an 'unlawful' act, punishable in the discretion of the court, not to exceed 10 years. G.S. § 14--2; State v. Stimpson, 279 N.C. 716, 185 S.E.2d 168 (1971). Thus, only the term 'wilful' has significance.

The term 'wilful' depends on the context in which it is used. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 31(4) (1961). However, as used in criminal statutes, it generally means 'the wrongful doing of an act without justification or excuse, Or the commission of an act purposely and deliberately in violation of law. (Citation omitted.)' State v. Arnold, 264 N.C. 348, 349, 141 S.E.2d 473, 474 (1965). (Emphasis supplied.) For the reasons stated below, we hold that 'wilful' as used in G.S. § 31A--3 refers to an 'intentional' homicide.

N.C.Gen.Stats., Ch. 31A, enacted by Chapter 210, 1961 Session Laws, was based upon legislation submitted to the 1961 General Assembly by a Special Drafting Committee of the General Statutes Commission (hereinafter referred to as Committee). See Special Report of the General Statutes Commission on An Act to be Entitled 'Acts Barring Property Rights' (1961) (hereinafter cited as Special Report). This report stated that the Committee had 'profited greatly from an outstanding and comprehensive' model disqualification act first proposed in 1936 by Mr. John W. Wade, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. See Special Report, supra, at 11. Also, with specific reference to Article 3 of the proposed Chapter 31A ('Wilful and Unlawful Killing of Decedent'), the report stated that '(t)he proposed Model Act . . . has been substantially followed, as was done in 1941 in Pennsylvania.' See Special Report, supra, at 11. For the complete Model Act, See Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another--A Statutory Solution, 49 Har.L.Rev. 715, 753--55 (1936) (hereinafter cited as Wade). The disqualification statutes of both Pennsylvania and South Dakota are also based on Professor Wade's Model Act. See Chapter 88, Penn.Stats.Anno. (1972); Chapter 29--9, S.Dak.Comp.Laws.

Proposed section 31A--3(1)a was enacted unchanged by the 1961 General Assembly as G.S. § 31A--3(3), par. a. In their comments to proposed section 31A--3(1)a, the Committee stated:

'The proposed statute, § 31A--3 defines the terms 'slayer', 'decedent' and 'property'.

'In subsection (1) it uses the term 'slayer' instead of felon or murderer and is limited to 'wilful and unlawful' killings. These latter words would prevent the statute's application to cases of involuntary manslaughter, justifiable or excusable homicide, accidental killing or where the slayer was insane. It would include manslaughter if the killing was intentional and unlawful (voluntary manslaughter). . . . The definition of the term 'slayer' is very important because it signifies what kind of killing may disqualify one from acquiring property. The requirement that the killing be wilful and unlawful isn't the only possible rule, but does seem a fair policy criterion.' Special Report, supra, at 12. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 1(1) of Professor Wade's Model Act is substantively identical to G.S. § 31A--3(3), par. a. It provides as follows: 'As used in this Act: (1) the term 'slayer' shall mean any person who Wilfully and unlawfully takes or procures to be taken the life of another; . . .' Wade, supra, at 721--22. (Emphasis supplied.) In his commentary on this particular provision, Professor Wade states:

'The definition of the term 'slayer' is particularly important, since it signifies what kind of killing disqualifies a man from acquiring property. The requirement that the killing be wilful and unlawful cannot be said to be the only possible rule; in fact, it 'is futile to attempt to arrive at a 'true rule' by pure logic'. But a line must be drawn at some place. Should a statute of this sort include manslaughter? The answer is doubtful, but it is believed that it should not, if the killing is involuntary. If the wrong was not intentional, it is difficult to say as a matter of policy that the perpetrator should be prohibited from acquiring property.' Wade, supra, at 722. (Emphasis supplied.)

Also, in an extensive analysis of Chapter 31A of the General Statutes, Professor W. Bryan Bolich, a member of the Committee, has made the following observations as to the definition of 'slayer' as used in G.S. § 31A--3:

'This, the principle definitorial section of the chapter, adopts the term 'slayer' instead of 'felon' or 'murder' which occurs in a number of the statutes, and limits the bar of the chapter to a 'wilful and unlawful killing.' The object of the statute is to prevent profit through wrong, and any degree of wrong from murder down to misdemeanor might have been adopted as the basis of the disqualification.

'In selecting this degree of wrong as the one which disables a slayer from profiting by his crime through the acquisition of a proprietary benefit as a result of his victim's death, this section utilizes the criterion adopted by a majority of the statutes and common law decisions on the subject--an intentional criminal homicide. As an expression of public policy it seems a fair standard which requires the killing to be both unlawful and wilful. This duality of requirement excludes any killing by a noncriminal act such as mere negligence, a homicide which was justifiable or excusable or one committed while the slayer was insane, and by any non-wilful crime, including involuntary manslaughter. As used, 'wilful' would seem to mean such an act or omission entailing criminal responsibility on the part of the actor. This should include all cases of murder and of manslaughter when the killing was intentional and unlawful'. Bolich, Acts Barring Property Rights, 40 N.C.L.Rev. 175, 193--94 (1962) (hereinafter cited as Bolich). (Emphasis supplied.)

In this State involuntary manslaughter is defined as an unlawful killing without malice, without premeditation and deliberation, and 'without intention to kill or inflict serious bodily injury.' State v. Wrenn, 279 N.C. 676, 682, 185 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1971). In short, it is an unintended homicide. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 166 S.E.2d 652 (1969); State v. Griffin, 273 N.C. 333, 159 S.E.2d 889 (1968); State v. Foust, 258 N.C. 453, 128 S.E.2d 889 (1963). In many cases, the crime arises when the evidence tends to show that the actor's unlawful killing of the victim was caused by his unjustified and wanton or reckless use of a weapon in such a manner as to jeopardize the decedent's safety. See, e.g., State v. Harrington, 286 N.C. 327, 330--31, 210 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1974), and cases cited. Other states generally define the offense as an unlawful killing in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony (unlawful act type of manslaughter) or in the commission of a lawful act without due caution or circumspection (the gross negligence type). See, e.g., W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law, § 75, 571--602 (West, 1972); Annots., 61 A.L.R. 10 (1946); 99 A.L.R. 756 (1935); 23 A.L.R. 1554 (1923). Thus, it would appear, that the crime of involuntary manslaughter is not a 'wilful' killing within the meaning of G.S. § 31A--3(3), par. a.

The clearest pronouncement that we have been able to find on this question is Prudential Ins. Co. v. Doane, 339 F.Supp. 1240 (E.D.Pa.1972). In that case, the court was called upon to interpret a Pennsylvania statute (based upon Wade's Model Code), which provided that '(t)he term 'slayer' shall mean any person who participates, either as a principal or as an accessory before the fact, in the Wilful and unlawful killing of any other person.' (Emphasis supplied.) The facts giving rise to that action were these:

Defendant Evelyn Doane shot and killed her husband, Isaac T. Doane, during a fight. Mrs. Doane was acquitted of murder, but was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. She did not appeal this conviction. Mrs. Doane was the beneficiary of two insurance policies issued by the Prudential Insurance Company of America on her husband's life. She was also the administratrix of his estate. Faced with the inconsistent claims Prudential paid the death benefits into court and brought an 'Interpleader action.'

The court held: 'Under Pennsylvania law, involuntary manslaughter is the Unintentional killing of another without malice. (Citation omitted.) Hence, the Slayer's Act would not bar the receipt of insurance proceeds by one convicted of involuntary manslaughter.' Id. at 1241--42.

We hold, as did the Court of Appeals, that defendant Jill A. Quick was not a 'slayer' within the meaning of G.S. § 31A--3(3), par. a. Hence, proof of her conviction of involuntary manslaughter does not, Per se, disqualify defendant from receiving the insurance proceeds under G.S. § 31A--11.

The question remains, however, whether the provisions of Chapter 31A of the General Statutes completely supplant the common law principle, heretofore recognized by this Court, that one should not be allowed to profit by his own wrong....