Quiggins v. Quiggins
| Decision Date | 03 September 1982 |
| Citation | 637 S.W.2d 666 |
| Parties | Kenneth Wayne QUIGGINS, Appellant, v. Sharon Kaye QUIGGINS, Appellee. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
George K. Harris, Radcliff, for appellant.
Robert Littlefield, Legal Aid Soc., Elizabethtown, for appellee.
Before HAYES, C.J., and COOPER and WILHOIT, JJ.
This is an appeal from findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment dissolving the marriage between the parties and dividing marital property. At issue is whether the trial court erred in determining that a worker's compensation settlement awarded to the appellant was marital property. On review, we affirm. CR 52.01.
The appellant, Kenneth Wayne Quiggins, and the appellee, Sharon Kaye Quiggins, were married on February 27, 1967, in Lebanon, Tennessee. Three minor children were born to this marriage. In May of 1980, the appellee filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. At that time, she was 36 years of age and employed with Kentucky Finance. The appellant was also 36 years old and employed as a cashier at Hardee's. At the time the petition was filed, the parties owned a home in Elizabethtown valued at $32,000. The appellant owned two $10,000 certificates of deposit representing the remaining balance on a worker's compensation settlement he received as the result of a 1975 injury.
In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, the trial court awarded the appellee custody of the three minor children, child support, and the marital residence. Furthermore, although it awarded the certificates of deposit to the appellant, it found that such deposits "must be considered marital property." It is from such order and judgment that the appellant now appeals.
The issue presented on appeal--whether a worker's compensation award is to be considered as marital property--appears to be one of first impression in this jurisdiction. The trial court, while acknowledging that worker's compensation benefits are exempt from the claims of creditors (KRS 342.180), nevertheless held that once the form of compensation is changed and invested in other property, it becomes "property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage ..." KRS 403.190(2); Ball v. Smiddy, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 715, 716 (1952) quoting J.S. Merrell Drug Co. v. Dixon, 131 Ky. 212, 115 S.W. 179, 180 (1909). The trial court's logic notwithstanding, the controlling factor here is neither the Worker's Compensation Act, nor the fact that the form of the settlement was changed, but rather KRS 403.190(2).
KRS 403.190(2) states as follows:
(2) For the purpose of this chapter, "marital property" means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(e) The increase in value of property acquired before the marriage to the extent that such increase did not result from the efforts of the parties during the marriage.
Under Section (2) of the statute, all property is to be considered marital property unless it falls within one of the enumerated exceptions. There is no exception for property acquired by way of a worker's compensation settlement.
In Lukas v. Lukas, 83 Ill.App.3d 606, 39 Ill.Dec. 161, 404 N.E.2d 545 (1980), the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, construed its own marital property statute in determining that a worker's compensation settlement was to be considered as marital property. Section 503(a) and (b) of the Illinois Dissolution Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, Chapter 40), defines marital property similarly to KRS 403.190. Under the Illinois Act, marital property is defined thusly:
(a) For purposes of this Act, "marital property" means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage, except the following, which is known as "non-marital property":
(1) property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a judgment of legal separation;
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
(5) the increase in value of property acquired before the marriage; and
(6) property acquired before the marriage.
(b) All property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a judgment of dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of marriage is presumed to be marital property, regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entirety, or community property. The presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (a) of this Section.
In Lukas, supra, the parties had been married for over 25 years. Four years prior to their separation, the husband received a lump sum worker's compensation award totaling nearly $12,000. In ruling that such payments were to be considered marital property, the appellate court stated as follows:
A workmen's compensation award paid out to and received by an injured employee during his marriage is not property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent or property acquired in exchange for such property (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, Ch. 40, par. 503(a)(1), (a)(2)), and thus does not fall into the category of non-marital property which cannot be allocated between the spouses. Nor can it be considered non-marital property under the definitions set forth in Section 503(a)(3) through (a)(6) of the Dissolution Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, Ch. 40, par. 503(a)(3)-(a)(6). Accordingly, it is clear that the workmen's compensation award, to the extent that it accrued and was actually paid over to the injured employee during the marriage, is marital property that is allocable in accordance with the standards set forth in the Dissolution Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, Ch. 40, par. 503.
We find no workmen's compensation award exemption under Section 503(a) (...
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