Quigley v. Quigley
| Decision Date | 29 December 1941 |
| Citation | 38 N.E.2d 624,310 Mass. 415 |
| Parties | OSCAR E. QUIGLEY v. ANNA B. QUIGLEY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
October 27, 1941.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., DONAHUE, QUA DOLAN, & RONAN, JJ.
Marriage and Divorce, Cruel and abusive treatment, Condonation. Probate Court, Report of material facts, Findings by judge, Appeal.
Upon a voluntary report by a judge of probate of all the material facts without a report of the evidence, conclusions not based solely on subsidiary findings must stand unless inconsistent therewith; and the propriety of the decree must be determined on the basis of all the findings.
A conclusion of cruel and abusive treatment of a husband by his wife was not unwarranted in law by findings that a course of intentional irritation by her culminated in her unjustifiably and maliciously threatening him with an unloaded rifle, thus putting him in reasonable fear and injuring his health, and was likely to be followed by "further outbursts of bitter temper by" her "implemented by overt acts," "with resulting injury to" him.
Findings by a trial judge that for over two months after acts of cruel and abusive treatment by a wife toward her husband they lived in the same house, sleeping in separate rooms without sexual intercourse, and that he did not intend to condone her conduct, did not preclude a conclusion by the judge, on unreported evidence, that there had been no condonation.
LIBEL, filed in the Probate Court for the county of Nantucket on December 4 1940.
The case was heard by Poland, J. G. M. Henry, for the libellee.
G. W. Russell, for the libellant.
In the Probate Court a divorce nisi was granted to the libellant on the ground of cruel and abusive treatment. The questions are whether the libellee was guilty of such treatment and, if she was, whether the libellant condoned her conduct.
The judge made a "Voluntary Finding of Material Facts" which from its form and substance appears to have been intended as a complete statement of the facts that influenced him to his decision. Compare Birnbaum v. Pamoukis, 301 Mass 559 , 561, 562.
The evidence is not reported. The findings of fact, whether particular or general, must therefore be taken as true in every respect unless the general findings are inconsistent as matter of law with particular findings, and the questions before us on appeal are whether there is such inconsistency, and if not, whether all the findings should in law lead to a decree different from that which has been entered. Plumer v. Houghton & Dutton Co. 277 Mass. 209 , 215. Hanson v. Hanson, 287 Mass. 154 , 155. Norton v. Norton, 294 Mass. 211 .
The parties are of middle age. They have not been happy in their relations with each other for several years. The libellee has been jealous without proved cause and at intervals has purposely irritated and nagged the libellant and once damaged his automobile and threw a book at him. For two years before the filing of the libel the parties had slept in separate rooms in the same house and had had no sexual intercourse. With this as a background the judge made further findings: On September 25, 1940, the libellant returned to Nantucket from a vacation in Maine. The libellee believed that he had taken another woman on this trip, but "the evidence did not disclose that this was true." The libellee waited for him in the unlighted house, expecting that a woman would be with him and "prepared to make some kind of a disturbance if he was so accompanied." No other woman appeared. The libellee, however, voiced her suspicious and in a state of excitement took a twenty-two caliber rifle which the libellant had in his automobile. The judge states that the libellant "testified that she pointed the rifle at him and threatened him with it," and finds that "in this episode" the libellee committed an unjustified assault. The rifle was not loaded, and there was "no evidence that the libellee knew how to use it," but there was suitable ammunition in the house. At any rate the judge finds that the "libellant was put in reasonable fear by the episode"; that the "conduct of the libellee, resulting in the rifle episode, was malicious and injured the libellant's health"; and that "if the parties continue to live together, further outbursts of bitter temper by the libellee, implemented by overt acts, are probable, with resulting injury to the libellant."
The findings just...
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