Quillen v. American Tobacco Co.

• Decision Date: 25 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. CV-93-A-1331-S.,CV-93-A-1331-S.
• Citation: 874 F. Supp. 1285
• Parties: Beverly QUILLEN, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY and Donald Knight, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

874 F. Supp. 1285

Beverly QUILLEN, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY and Donald Knight, Defendants.

No. CV-93-A-1331-S.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

January 25, 1995.

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Ann C. Robertson, Rocco Calamusa, Robert Childs, Birmingham, AL, for plaintiff.

D. Frank Davis, Patricia Powell Burke, David R. Arendall, Birmingham, AL, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

ALBRITTON, District Judge.

This cause is before the court on Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, both filed October 11, 1994.

Plaintiff brought suit in Federal Court on November 5, 1993, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., commonly known as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and alleging state law claims for Invasion of Privacy, the Tort of Outrage, and Assault and Battery. Plaintiff has named in her action both her employer, American Tobacco Company ("American Tobacco") and Donald Knight ("Knight"), an individual who was at one time the plaintiff's supervisor at American Tobacco.

There are two theories to plaintiff's Title VII claims. Plaintiff first alleges that she was the victim of sexual harassment under a theory of hostile work environment. Secondly, she contends that defendant discharged her in retaliation for her opposition to the discriminatory treatment that she received.

Defendant American Tobacco ("American Tobacco") has moved for Summary Judgment only as to plaintiff's Title VII claims. American Tobacco asserts a defense based on the 180 day filing requirement mandated under Title VII for plaintiff's sexual harassment claim. American Tobacco also maintains that plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case under both Title VII sexual harassment and Title VII discrimination and retaliation.

Further, American Tobacco contends that should the court determine that a prima facie case under plaintiff's retaliation claim has been established, that American Tobacco has successfully rebutted plaintiff's claim. Finally, American Tobacco argues that if the court denies its Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims against it, the plaintiff should be barred from any prospective relief based on the after-acquired evidence doctrine.

Defendant Knight has moved for Summary Judgment as to all claims against him. Knight, like American Tobacco, asserts that the 180 day filing requirement bars plaintiff's Title VII claims against him. Knight also asserts that a suit against him in his individual capacity under Title VII is not proper. As to the state law claims against him, Knight argues that, should the court dismiss the Title VII claims against him, it will have lost jurisdiction over the state law claims.

For the reasons discussed below, the court finds that defendant American Tobacco's Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be DENIED. The court finds, however, that defendant Knight's Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED as to the Title VII claims against him, but DENIED as to the claims for Outrage, Invasion of Privacy and Assault and Battery.

II. FACTS

Submissions before the court establish the following facts:

Plaintiff was employed as a sales representative for American Tobacco beginning on October 14, 1991. At the time plaintiff was hired, defendant Knight was her immediate supervisor. In January, 1992, plaintiff complained to management that Knight had sexually harassed her. The company held several meetings, and determined that Knight had indeed harassed Quillen. As a result, Knight was demoted to the position of sales representative, he was suspended without pay for one week, and his salary was cut 25%. Knight was reassigned to a sales zone which, according to defendant, did not overlap with the plaintiff's.

Plaintiff claims that following Knight's demotion, the workplace at American Tobacco remained hostile. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the incident with Knight, she began to have difficulties with several of her assigned customers. According to plaintiff, one of American Tobacco's agents told a customer that Quillen had "set up" Knight on her sexual harassment complaint. Plaintiff alleges that she requested to be transferred to another sales district in order to escape the problem, but that the defendant American Tobacco refused.

Additionally, plaintiff states that she was forced to attend a meeting at which Knight was present, despite her having informed American Tobacco that she could not bear to be in the same room with Knight. Plaintiff avers that the previous harassment by Knight, combined with the "gossip and hostility" from her customers and the failure of American Tobacco to take adequate steps to alleviate the situation created and perpetuated a hostile work environment.

Defendant denies that an agent of American Tobacco informed any of Ms. Quillen's customers as to any part of the previous complaint against Knight. Defendant acknowledges that plaintiff and Knight were at the same meeting, but contends, correctly the court believes, that Knight did not harass Quillen at this meeting. In fact, Knight did not even speak to Quillen.

According to American Tobacco, sometime in September they learned that plaintiff had falsified reports that she had made to the company concerning customer calls. This fact is supported by an affidavit submitted by defendant's Southern Field Director, Paul Sitler. Defendant contends that the falsification of reports was their legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Quillen.

Plaintiff admits that she falsified reports, and also admits that this was not the first time that she had done so. However, plaintiff disputes that this was the reason for her termination. According to Quillen, Knight also had falsified reports in the past, American Tobacco knew this, and still retained Knight in its employ. Plaintiff was fired by the defendant company on September 22, 1993.

Defendant also alleges that during the course of discovery they acquired information that Quillen had lied on her application for employment. Plaintiff apparently misrepresented her reasons for leaving two previous positions. In both cases plaintiff stated that she left those jobs because she relocated her residence. In fact, plaintiff had been fired from both positions. According to the defendant, this information should preclude recovery by plaintiff in that she would not have been hired but for her misrepresentation. Because she would not have been hired, she suffered no damages in losing the job.

Plaintiff again counters that defendant's claim that she would not have been hired had they possessed this information is not credible. She alleges and avers that American Tobacco knew that another employee, Knight, had also lied on his application as to a previous termination but was hired nonetheless.

III. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

According to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is only appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings and evidentiary submissions which show an absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir.1993). If the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial rests on the non-movant, the party seeking summary judgment can meet this standard either by demonstrating that the non-movant's evidence is not sufficient to establish an essential element of his or her claim, or by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of an essential element to the claims, and on which they bears the burden of proof at trial. Id. To satisfy this burden, the non-movant cannot rest on the pleadings, but must by affidavit or other appropriate means, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine whether there exists genuine, material issues of fact to be tried. If there are not, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Dominick v. Dixie Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir.1987). "Genuine disputes are those in which the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant." Hairston, 9 F.3d at 919 (citations omitted). It is the substantive law that identifies those facts which are material on motions for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). See also DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir.1989).

All the evidence and the inferences from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir.1990). See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The movant bears "the exacting burden of demonstrating that there is no dispute as to any material fact in the case." Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.1983). See also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). When the court considers a motion for summary judgment, it must avoid weighing conflicting evidence, making credibility determinations and deciding material factual issues. Hairston, 9 F.3d at 919. In the case of an employment discrimination claim, which often...