Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp.

• Decision Date: 18 August 1992
• Docket Number: No. 10805,10805
• Citation: 28 Conn.App. 660,613 A.2d 838
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Lorine QUIMBY v. KIMBERLY CLARK CORPORATION.

Page 838

613 A.2d 838

28 Conn.App. 660

Lorine QUIMBY v. KIMBERLY CLARK CORPORATION.

No. 10805.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 30, 1992.

Decided Aug. 18, 1992.

Daly, J., concurred in part and dissented in part.

Laurence V. Parnoff, with whom, on the brief, was Kathryn L. Braun, Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff).

Philip F. Spillane, New Milford, for appellee (defendant).

Before DALY, LANDAU and HEIMAN, JJ.

LANDAU, Judge.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to strike each of the eight counts of the plaintiff's amended complaint. In its motion to strike, the defendant argued (1) that counts one, two, three, five and six failed to state claims on which relief can be granted "in that the allegations fail to state a common law cause of action based upon alleged violations of the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act," (2) that count four failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted in that it "improperly claimed a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA); General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.; based on alleged wrongful conduct of the defendant, as an employer, as to the plaintiff, an employee of the defendant, and failed to state that such alleged wrongful conduct was performed in the conduct of any 'trade or commerce' as defined in CUTPA," and (3) that counts seven and eight failed to state claims on which relief can be granted in that these counts allege a violation of CUTPA and the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA); General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 38-60 (now § 38a-815) et seq.) "based upon alleged wrongful conduct of the defendant in its capacity as an 'insurer' in the context of a single workers' compensation claim, without alleging that said alleged wrongful conduct was performed by the defendant 'with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.' " We agree with the trial court.

The following facts are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant, a self-insured corporation, was injured in a work related accident. The plaintiff notified the defendant of her injury pursuant to the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., and the defendant, after initially contesting liability, accepted the plaintiff's claim as a compensable workers' compensation claim. During the course of the proceedings before the workers' compensation commissioner for the seventh district, the defendant paid benefits to the plaintiff at various times and in various amounts for medical bills, temporary total disability and temporary partial disability. Despite having made these payments, the defendant continued to contest the extent of the plaintiff's permanent disability, her entitlement to benefits and certain medical bills as being unauthorized and unnecessary for her treatment.

On September 4, 1990, the plaintiff instituted this action against the defendant seeking damages and injunctive relief for various common law and statutory causes of action based on the defendant's alleged wrongful conduct in connection with the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits. The essence of the plaintiff's eight count complaint was that the defendant wrongfully failed (1) to pay benefits in a timely manner, (2) to conduct a reasonable and timely investigation of the plaintiff's claim, and (3) to agree to a reasonable resolution of the plaintiff's claim within a reasonable time. In count one, the plaintiff sought damages for emotional distress. In count two, she alleged that the defendant acted recklessly and in bad faith by failing to pay her benefits timely and that the defendant "wrongfully discharg[ed] the plaintiff and thereby violat[ed] [General Statutes s] 31-290a." ¹ In counts three and six, she claimed that the defendant's bad faith dealings constituted a tortious breach of contract. In counts four, seven and eight, she alleged that the defendant's bad faith refusal to pay benefits constituted CUTPA and CUIPA violations. In count five, she claimed that the defendant's refusal to pay benefits constituted a breach of its contractual obligation to deal in good faith. The defendant filed a motion to strike all eight counts of the complaint. The trial court granted the motion as to counts one, two, three, five and six because the facts alleged did not sufficiently support the plaintiff's claim that the defendant's conduct rose to a level of intentional misconduct, thereby constituting an exception to the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act. The trial court also struck counts four, seven and eight because count four failed to allege that the defendant's conduct constituted "trade or commerce" and in counts seven and eight the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant treated other claimants in a similar manner or that the defendant's conduct was performed "with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice."

The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 20, 1991, in which the following substantive changes were made: (1) an allegation that the plaintiff's injury "was the subject of a voluntary agreement as to workers' compensation executed by the parties and approved by the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Seventh District" was added to paragraph three of the first count; ² (2) an allegation that the defendant acted "intentionally, recklessly and/or negligently" was added to paragraphs eight, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fifteen, sixteen and seventeen of the first count; ³ (3) an allegation that the defendant acted "intentionally, recklessly and/or negligently" was added to paragraphs eighteen and nineteen of the second count; and (4) an allegation that "the defendant Kimberly Clark Corporation has engaged in conduct as aforesaid before, after and during its processing the plaintiff's claim" was added to paragraph twenty-four of the fourth count. The defendant filed a motion to strike all eight counts of the amended complaint. The trial court granted the motion as to counts four, seven and eight for the same reasons that it had struck these counts in the original complaint. It also granted the motion as to counts one, two, three, five and six on the ground that "[t]he new allegations contained in the plaintiff's substitute complaint are insufficient to support a cause of action based on common law tort since they allege no new facts, only legal conclusions." After the plaintiff failed to file a substituted complaint within fifteen days, the trial court granted the defendant's subsequent motion for judgment. See Practice Book § 157. The plaintiff then filed this appeal.

Initially, we briefly outline our standard for reviewing a trial court's granting of a motion to strike. It is well settled that "[w]here an appeal is taken from a judgment following the granting of a motion to strike, we take the facts to be those alleged in the amended complaint construed in a manner most favorable to the pleader.... For purposes of appeal, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Citations omitted.) Amodio v. Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80, 82-83, 438 A.2d 6 (1980); Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 655, 509 A.2d 11 (1986); Ivey, Barnum & O'Mara v. Indian Harbor Properties, Inc., 190 Conn. 528, 530 n. 2, 461 A.2d 1369 (1983). Although the motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded, it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings. Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn 541, 545, 427 A.2d 822 (1980); Sheiman v. Lafayette Bank & Trust Co., 4 Conn.App. 39, 42, 492 A.2d 219 (1987); Greene v. Metals Selling Corporation, 3 Conn.App. 40, 41, 484 A.2d 478 (1984). We review this case on the theory on which the trial court decided the motion. ⁴ See Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 96, 491 A.2d 368 (1986); Fuessenich v. DiNardo, 195 Conn. 144, 151, 487 A.2d 514 (1985).

I COUNTS ONE, TWO, THREE, FIVE AND SIX

We conclude that the trial court properly struck counts one, two, three, five and six on the ground that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support of her claim that the defendant's conduct rose to a level of intentional misconduct, thereby constituting an exception to the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. See General Statutes § 31-284(a). ⁵

"The purpose of the work[ers'] compensation statute is to compensate the worker for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, without regard to fault, by imposing a form of strict liability on the employer." Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215, 217, 425 A.2d 1263 (1979). Under General Statutes § 31-284(a) an employer within the scope of the act is not liable in "any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his [or her] employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained...." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. at 98, 491 A.2d 368.

In these five counts of the complaint, the plaintiff has attempted to allege facts that constitute grounds for avoiding the prohibition in General Statutes § 31-284(a) against suing employers for work related injuries. Both this court and our Supreme Court have "consistently held that the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act operate as a total bar to actions brought by employees against their employers for job related injuries. See, e.g., Sharp v. Mitchell, 209 Conn. 59, 66, 546 A.2d 846 (1988); Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc., 196 Conn. 529, 532, 494 A.2d 555 (1985); Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., [supra, 196 Conn. at 98, 491 A.2d 368]; Jett v. Dunlap, [supra, 179 Conn. at 217, 425 A.2d 1263]." Sgueglia v. Milne Construction Co., 212 Conn. 427, 433, 562 A.2d 505 (1989); Coolick v. Windham, 7 Conn.App. 142, 148, 508...