Quinn v. Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 November 1907
• Citation: 102 Minn. 256,113 N.W. 689
• Parties: QUINN v. MINNEAPOLIS THRESHING MACH. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

102 Minn. 256

113 N.W. 689

QUINN

v.MINNEAPOLIS THRESHING MACH. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 15, 1907.

Appeal from District Court, Meeker County; Gorham Powers, Judge.

Action by Owen Quinn, administrator of Charlotte A. Quinn, deceased, against the Minneapolis Threshing Machine Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

Action to determine adverse claims to land. It was brought by plaintiff's intestate, and after issue joined and before trial she died. The plaintiff, on his own motion, the defendant opposing, was by order of the court substituted, as administrator of her estate, as plaintiff, and suthorized to prosecute the action. The trial resulted in a judgment for the defendant to the effect that the conveyance of the land to plaintiff's intestate from her husband, by virtue of which she claimed the land, was fraudulent as to the defendant, a creditor of the husband. The administrator appealed. Held, that an appellant cannot urge error in a ruling or decision which he invited or procured to be made, and therefore the appellant cannot question the validity of the order of the court substituting him as plaintiff herein.

The fact that the grantor was solvent when the conveyance was made was an important item of evidence on the question whether the deed was fraudulent; but it way by no means conclusive.

The findings of the trial court are sustained by the evidence.M. C. Brady, H. S. McMonagle, and John J. McHale, for appellant.

W. A. McDowell and Lewis E. Jones, for respondent.

START, C. J.

This action was commenced in the district court of the county of Meeker by Charlotte A. Quinn, as plaintiff, against the Minneapolis Threshing Machine Company, to determine adverse claims to real estate. After issue was joined, and before the trial of the action, the plaintiff died intestate, and the administrator of her estate, Owen Quinn, the present plaintiff, by order of the court made upon his motion, the defendant opposing, was substituted as plaintiff in this action in place of the original plaintiff and authorized to prosecute the action as such administrator. In his supplemental complaint the administrator alleged that he was in the exclusive possession of the land. The cause was tried by the court without a jury, the plaintiff appearing and taking part therein, and thereupon the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect following: The original plaintiff, Charlotte A. Quinn, and John Quinn, were husband and wife, and on November 29, 1902, he owned the land in question, and they conveyed it by quitclaim deed to his sister, Rosa A. Johnson, who at the same time and as a part of the same transaction conveyed the land to Mrs. Quinn. Each of the conveyances were made without consideration and with the intent of all the parties thereto to hinder and defraud the defendant, who was then a creditor of John Quinn to the amount of $1,005 for a threshing rig purchased by him of it in August, 1902. The defendant recovered, in the district court of Meeker county, judgment against John Quinn, which was duly docketed in the proper county on October 14, 1903, for a part of such indebtedness. Execution was duly issued thereon, and the land by virtue thereof was duly sold to the defendant for the sum of $443.45 on January 25, 1904. On October 28, 1903, John Quinn filed his petition in bankruptcy in the proper court, was adjudged a bankrupt, and thereafter, and on December 26, 1903, he was discharged by order of the court from all of his provable debts and claims which existed at the date of filing his petition. He was not insolvent until October 28, 1903. The court found as conclusions of law that the discharge in bankruptcy of John Quinn did not discharge the lien of the defendant's judgment, that the defendant is the owner of the land subject to the plaintiff's right of redemption from the execution sale, and that judgment be entered accordingly. It was so entered, and the plaintiff appealed from the judgment.

The plaintiff here urges two general propositions: (a) That the trial court had no jurisdiction to substitute the appellant as plaintiff in place of his intestate, or to make findings of fact or order for judgment or grant the defendant affirmative relief. (b) The findings of fact are not sustained by the evidence.

1. There is no merit in the appellant's first claim. The appellant, as...