Wheeler v. McKeon
| Decision Date | 01 June 1917 |
| Docket Number | 20,245 - (81) |
| Citation | 162 N.W. 1070,137 Minn. 92 |
| Parties | C. M. WHEELER v. HENRY McKEON AND OTHERS |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Pipestone county by the administrator of the estate of Catharine Grover, deceased, to cancel a land contract. The case was tried before Nelson, J and a jury which returned a negative answer to the question "At the time of making the contract, plaintiff's Exhibit H, was Catharine Grover mentally competent to make the same and of understanding the same?" and stated $24,960 to be the fair market value of the land described in the Exhibit, and $800 to be the reasonable value of the improvements made by defendants on the lands described. The trial judge made findings and ordered judgment in favor of plaintiff, provided he paid defendant the sum of $1,242.50 before entry of judgment. From an order denying their motion for a new trial, defendants appealed. Reversed.
Executor and administrator -- action to set aside sale by incompetent decedent.
1. The personal representative of a decedent can maintain an action to set aside the decedent's contract of sale of real property upon the ground of mental incompetency.
Evidence of mental incompetency.
2. The evidence sustains a finding that the plaintiff was mentally incompetent at the time of the execution of the contract of sale involved.
Conversation with decedent -- strict construction of statute.
3. Persons interested in the event of such an action may testify as to conversations and declarations of the deceased, in the nature of verbal acts, tending to show loss of memory, a wandering mind and delusions, as bearing upon the question of competency, and the court properly admitted such testimony. The statute (G.S. 1913, § 8378), which forbids the giving in evidence by a person interested in the event of the action of conversations with or admissions of deceased persons, is in the nature of an exception to the general rule that interested persons are competent witnesses, and must be construed strictly.
Evidence improperly excluded.
4. The business acts of a party whose competency is in question, and declarations and conversations about the time, when they tend to show his comprehension of affairs, are admissible; and testimony of this character was erroneously excluded.
Contract of sale -- reformation -- finding set aside.
5. The plaintiff claimed that the contract of sale was too indefinite for enforcement, and the defendants claimed that the agreement was in fact definite and certain, and that whatever uncertainty existed resulted from mistake in framing the written contract and that it should be reformed. The court found with the plaintiff and against the defendants. In view of the error in excluding testimony bearing upon the question of competency the finding is not sustained.
Howard & Gurley and C. H. Christopherson, for appellants.
Morris Evans and Bryson & Bryson, for respondent.
Action to set aside a contract for the sale of land upon the ground of the mental incompetency of the vendor. The issue of mental incompetency was submitted to the jury which found the vendor incompetent. There were findings for the plaintiff in accordance with the finding of the jury. In the complaint it was alleged that the contract was too indefinite for enforcement. The defendants claimed that the agreement for the sale was definite and certain, and that, if there was any indefiniteness in the written contract, it was because it by mistake failed to state the actual agreement and that it should be reformed. The court found for the plaintiff and against the defendants upon this issue. The defendants appeal from the order denying their motion for a new trial.
1. The action was brought in behalf of Catharine Grover, an incompetent, by her guardian. Mrs. Grover died pending trial, and the plaintiff was appointed administrator and was substituted as plaintiff. The point is made that the plaintiff cannot maintain this action, but that it should be maintained by the heirs who succeeded to Mrs. Grover's property upon her death. No objection was made by plea or otherwise prior to the trial. Conceding, but not holding, that the objection may be first made at the trial, it is not well taken. By statute the administrator is entitled to the possession and to the rents and profits of the real estate of the decedent and "may himself, or jointly with the heirs or devisees, maintain an action for the possession of the real estate or to quiet title to the same." G.S. 1913, § 7296. The authorities upon the general question of the right of the personal representative to maintain an action to quiet title are not in harmony, but under similar statutes the usual holding favors the right. Collins v. O'Laverty, 136 Cal. 31, 68 P. 327; Blakemore v. Roberts, 12 N.D. 394, 96 N.W. 1029; Munger v. Doolan, 75 Conn. 656, 55 A. 169; Ladd v. Mills, 44 Ore. 224, 75 P. 141; Laverty v. Sexton & Son, 41 Iowa 435; In re Higgins' Estate, 15 Mont. 474, 39 P. 506, 28 L.R.A. 116. And see Eyre v. City of Faribault, 121 Minn. 233, 141 N.W. 170, L.R.A. 1917A, 685; Quinn v. Minneapolis T.M. Co. 102 Minn. 256, 113 N.W. 689; Pabst Brewing Co. v. Small, 83 Minn. 445, 86 N.W. 450.
2. Something more than a year prior to the making of the contract Mrs. Grover sustained an injury to her head through a fall. After that she failed. A number of people, familiar with her in her daily life, testified as to her acts, declarations and conduct and gave their opinion, based upon such facts, that she was not of contractual capacity. Her attending physician gave it as his opinion that she was suffering from senile dementia and that she died from it. She was 78 years of age. The contract was made August 18, 1915, and she died on March 8, 1916. The evidence of incompetency was seriously controverted and is not at all conclusive, but it supports the finding of the jury.
3. Mrs Grover's sons, who were interested in the event of the action, were permitted to testify to her conversations, which indicated a loss of memory, a wandering mind and delusions. These conversations were not in connection with the execution of the contract. Objection was made to them as in violation of G.S. 1913, § 8378, which forbids a party to an action or one interested in the event thereof "to give evidence therein of or concerning any conversation with, or admission of, a deceased or insane party or person relative to any matter at issue between the parties," etc. In In re Brown, 38 Minn. 112, 35 N.W. 726, it was held that conversations of a party since deceased might be given in...
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