Quinn v. Stone, 42086

Decision Date02 March 1972
Docket NumberNo. 42086,42086
Citation259 So.2d 492
CourtFlorida Supreme Court
PartiesJohn J. QUINN, individually, John J. Quinn, taxpayer, citizen, John J. Quinn, announced and generally advocated candidate for the Presidency of the United States, Appellant, v. Richard (Dick) STONE, Chairman, et al., Appellees.

John J. Quinn, in pro. per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., W. Robert Olive, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Tallahassee, for appellees.

DEKLE, Justice.

We have consented to advance this cause as requested under Fla.Const. art. V, § 4(2), F.S.A., and Fla.App.R. 3.12, 32 F.S.A. We also dispense with oral argument and further briefs and record in the circumstances. F.A.R. 3.10, subd. e.

We are now presented with the reverse contention of that which was just before the Court in Yorty v. Stone, Florida Supreme Court Case No. 42,045 filed February 22, 1972, 259 So.2d 146. Appellant seeks to compel appellees to Place his name on the March 14, 1972, presidential preference primary ballot under new Fla.Stat. § 103.101, F.S.A., as amended by Ch. 71--236, Laws of Florida (1971). 1 The Selection Committee (appellees) did not find that Mr. Quinn fell in that category provided under the statute as a presidential candidate 'generally advocated or recognized in news media throughout the United States or in the state.' 2

One of the great blessings of this nation and of course one of the recognized Four Freedoms is a Free Press which we enjoy, so that a potential candidate certainly has a reasonable opportunity to project himself and to make himself known as a recognized contender to qualify under the designation in the statute which he attacks. It is widely known through news releases in all media over the state that the Honorable Richard 'Dick' Stone, Florida Secretary of State, as Chairman of this Committee, held public consultations with the news media and others and of course with his committee members to determine the names of any persons who fell within the statutory category. There is no factual showing that the able Secretary and Committee acted arbitrarily or capriciously in not including the name of plaintiff as a recognized candidate. Appellant has no guaranteed personal right to inject himself into a primary election by arbitrarily having his name entered upon the ballot, absent a showing of qualification under law to be there. His suit filed in Leon County Circuit Court in essence challenges the statute's constitutionality Vel non and in its application to appellant, giving this Court jurisdiction for review. Fla.Const. art. V, § 4(2).

The learned chancellor found from the evidence in the trial court that under the statute's mandate to prepare the list of names of presidential candidates for the primary ballot, the Secretary established and followed reasonable procedures in the performance of that duty. In what must be its very earliest citation as precedent, the chancellor in his declaratory decree also cited as authority for denial of appellant's contention, our opinion just released in Yorty v. Stone, Opinion filed February 22, 1972, 259 So.2d 146. He quoted from that opinion the following language which now appears to have been almost prophetic of the contention here:

'The people also have a right to an orderly election. There may be a reasonable provision to keep the ballot free of unwarranted and meaningless names submitted which are not in serious contention and which would only burden the ballot and detract from those candidates who are in serious contention on the national or state levels. This control is sought to be provided by the terms of the statute.

'The statute is a valid exercise of the police power of the state by the Legislature, in whom that power reposes. It is applied equally to all candidates for the presidency and each stands on the same footing, so that there is no denial of Equal protection and due process under the Florida and United States Constitutions. . . .'

This statute deals in the political arena. The Legislature in the exercise of the police power of the state very appropriately vested this discretion in a Committee whose members are probably the most representative group of leaders and officials of the two major political parties in Florida that could be chosen. By virtue of their positions they are knowledgeable and abreast of ongoing events and persons involved in the choice of political candidates within their respective parties. They are particularly suited to make the decision as to who are the recognized contenders for the nominations of each party under the criteria set forth in the statute. In this, a primary election, it is a matter of each political party putting forth its best effort to select its very best candidate and therefore a recognized one who would be likely to find the favor of the voters of this nation. In politics as in other great American sports the 'name of the game' is winning. The manner wisely, perhaps ingeniously, chosen by the governing legislative body made up of members of these political parties to effectuate this high purpose appears to be a very fair and effective formula for the selection of candidates from among whom their party members as voters may choose.

Although the Secretary submits the initial list of potential presidential candidates under the provisions of the statute, any single member of the Committee of the same political party as a prospective candidate may add to the list one who qualifies. Provision is made for such request by a potential candidate in writing, with these requests to be specifically considered upon a convening of the Committee and: 'If any member of the selection committee of the same political party as the candidate requests that such candidate's name be placed on the ballot, the committee shall direct the department of state to place the candidate's name on the ballot.' Fla.Stat. § 103.101(3)(b), F.S.A. It only takes one member of his political party on the Committee to assure that he appears. It would be difficult to contend that this is unreasonable. No abuse of discretion or improper exercise of delegated authority has been shown.

The elective process could be completely frustrated without some reasonable control of the ballot. To place names on a ballot solely on demand or without some reasonable basis for candidacy could easily result in such a lengthy and confused ballot that not only would an intelligent vote be difficult and the mechanical process of submitting and tallying the ballot almost impracticable, but the voter would be discouraged from participating at all in such a difficult and time consuming effort. We are unfortunately experiencing in this free nation in some areas a smaller participation by the voting public in its elective process which is the bedrock of...

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2 cases
  • Redmond v. Carter
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • November 23, 1976
    ...standards in other circumstances in other cases. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); Quinn v. Stone, 259 So.2d 492 (Fla.1972); Johnson v. State, Civil Service Department, 280 Minn. 61, 157 N.W.2d 747 (1968); State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh, 483 S.W.2d ......
  • Savas v. Smith, 92-01036
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • October 30, 1992
    ...filed by John Savas because Mr. Savas had not alleged, and could not by further amendment allege, a cause of action. See Quinn v. Stone, 259 So.2d 492 (Fla.1972); see also Duke v. Smith, 784 F.Supp. 865 DANAHY, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and FRANK, JJ., concur. ...

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