Yorty v. Stone
| Decision Date | 22 February 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 42045,42045 |
| Citation | 259 So.2d 146 |
| Parties | Sam YORTY and James E. Miller, Petitioners, v. Richard B. STONE, Secretary of State, State of Florida, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
James E. Miller, in pro per and for Sam Yorty, petitioners.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Daniel S. Dearing, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Tallahassee, for respondents.
Former President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, once said in reference to the political arena that, 'If you can't stand the heat, you should stay out of the kitchen.' Perhaps this observation of that terse patriot of Independence, Missouri, expresses in a sense the answer to the challenge by petitioner, Los Angeles' Mayor Sam Yorty, to Florida's new presidential preference primary law which places on the ballot for March 14, all 'presidential candidates who are generally advocated or recognized in news media throughout the United States or in the state.' 1
We recognize the sacrifice that it is to privacy to have your name submitted to the people as a candidate for public office without having the choice whether your name will appear on the ballot. Privacy, however, yields to public interest when a citizen chooses to reach for the high goal of the presidency of these United States. He becomes a public figure in the sense expressed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). 2
Petitioner Yorty seeks writ of mandamus or prohibition to require respondents Secretary of State Stone and Committee members named to comply with petitioner's request to remove his name from the list of candidates to appear on the March 14, 1972, Florida presidential primary ballot. There is no dispute that Mayor Yorty is recognized in the news media throughout the country, as well as in Florida, as a declared candidate for President of the United States; and that he is actively campaigning in the New Hampshire primary of March 7. He just does not wish to submit his name in the Florida primary, contending that he 'doesn't have the financial resources to participate in all of the important primaries' and that thereby his inability to campaign in Florida could cause 'irreparable harm' to his national candidacy if he appeared on the ballot in Florida 'and then fails to do well;' that placing his name on the ballot in Florida is in violation of his right of privacy under Fla.Const. art. I, § 2, F.S.A., and violates due process of law under Fla.Const. art. I, § 9, as well as such rights under Amendments I and XIV of the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction vests under Fla.Const. art. V, § 4(2).
Petitioner cites as his authority this Court's earlier case of Battaglia v. Adams, Secretary of State, 164 So.2d 195 (Fla.1964). The Attorney General says that Battaglia does not apply and is to be distinguished because there President Richard M. Nixon, then a private citizen and not an announced candidate for office, requested and was successful in having his name removed from the primary ballot in Florida. Battaglia was of course prior to the present statute. Our Chief Justice Roberts in that opinion referred to State ex rel. Burch v. Gray, 125 So.2d 876 (Fla.1960), wherein a slate of electors in Florida sought to Include the name of Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas on the Florida presidential primary ballot. Governor Faubus requested that his name be removed from the ballot and this Court affirmed the opinion of then Attorney General Richard W. Ervin, a present Justice on this Court, to remove his name from the ballot. There Mr. Nixon was not isolating a given primary in one of the states from which he sought to withdraw his name as a primary preferential candidate, but based his request for removal of name from the ballot upon 'my decision not to enter my name in presidential primaries,' thus removing his name from Any primary consideration as a candidate. It would seem that it is a matter of 'all or none' in a determination of this kind.
In Battaglia, we also said:
'. . . it appears to be generally held that, in the absence of statutory inhibition (which now has occurred), a candidate has a natural or inherent right to resign at any time and to have his name deleted from the ballot (citations omitted).' (bracketed portions added)
Even in Battaglia, therefore, our view of protected privacy was predicated upon 'resigning,' to have his name deleted. He can do that now under the new statute, if he will execute the affidavit. This, the petitioner states he will not do.
Here, the public interest transcends the bounds of privacy accorded to an individual citizen. The candidacy involved is for a national office, of course, and the candidate can no more pick and choose in which states he may be considered, than a candidate for state office might choose to withhold his name in a given county or counties within the 67 counties in Florida where he may feel that he is weak or could not afford the expense of compaigning, as is suggested by petitioner here.
The people also have a right to an orderly election. There may be a reasonable provision to keep the ballot free of unwarranted and meaningless names submitted which are not in serious contention and which would only burden the ballot and detract from those candidates who are in serious contention on the national or state levels. This control is sought to be provided by the terms of the statute.
The statute is a valid exercise of the police power of the state by the Legislature, in whom that power reposes. It is applied equally to all candidates for the presidency and each stands on the same footing, so that there is no denial of Equal protection and due process under the Florida and United States Constitutions. In this posture of the case we do not need to reach the contention that there was a waiver by Mayor Yorty of his right of privacy which is discussed in Battaglia, supra, and also in State ex rel. Haft v. Adams, 238 So.2d 843 (Fla.1970), and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Supra.
The Florida statute makes provision for a candidate to avoid having his name placed on the ballot by submitting an affidavit that he is not and does not presently intend to become a candidate for President at the upcoming Nominating Convention.
Mayor Yorty argues that the state is 'compelling him' to be on a ballot where he does not prefer to be and that this denies him his right of privacy and equal protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The aforementioned 'escape clause' grants him the 'preference' so that he is really making that decision by declaring himself to be a candidate and refusing to exercise the statutory provision mentioned. The candidate cannot 'have his cake and eat it too.'
A matter of such magnitude as the selection of the best possible candidate for the highest position in this nation should be controlled by the public's right to a complete expression of their views and not by the individual's personal and tactical choices which he exercises as he pursues this goal. The people of Florida should not be denied the right to express themselves in such a choice on any announced candidate, while other states are granted that right of choice, as such candidate chooses. This would be a denial of the Voters' right of free choice and due process. Other states including Ohio, Wisconsin and Oregon have similar statutes, although no case on those statutes has been cited to us.
We accordingly uphold the constitutionality of those sections of Fla.Stat. §§ 103.101(3)(a) and 103.101(4), F.S.A. contested here.
Writs of mandamus and of prohibition are denied. The cause is dismissed and in light of the limited time remaining under the statute, we dispense with petitions for rehearing.
It is so ordered.
We are concerned today with the constitutionality of Section 103.101(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which provides:
The majority of this Court holds in this case that the section may constitutionally force potential presidential candidate Sam Yorty to elect one of only two alternatives, permitting his name to be placed on the Florida presidential preference primary ballot or swearing that he is not, and has no intention of becoming, a presidential candidate in the next election. I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion upholding the validity of the section. It appears to me that the requirements of Section 103.101(4) must yield to the constitutional rights of Petitioner Yorty in the area of privacy and due process.
The section in effect forces potential nominees to become candidates in Florida. Such a position clearly impinges upon the personal and political rights of such persons. Candidacy imports campaigning, i.e., organization for the campaign, solicitation of votes, and expenditure of money and personal energy. A citizen has the right to refrain or refuse to take the arduous role of a political candidate despite a state legislative mandate to the contrary. Traditionally, candidates seeking their party's nomination for president have selected those primaries in which they wished to run. Whether or not they appear on the ballot in a given state should be a matter of their volition, not the state's.
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