Quinn v. Superior Court of Sacramento Cnty.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2021
• Docket Number: C092584
• Citation: 285 Cal.Rptr.3d 71,69 Cal.App.5th 836
• Parties: Quinn LI, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent; Medical Board of California, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

69 Cal.App.5th 836

285 Cal.Rptr.3d 71

Quinn LI, Petitioner,

v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent;Medical Board of California, Real Party in Interest.

C092584

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Filed September 30, 2021

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing October 19, 2021

La Follette, Johnson, DeHaas, Fesler & Ames, Nicole D. Hendrickson, Sacramento; Rothschild Wishek & Sands, Michael Rothschild, Sacramento; John D. Harwell, Manhattan Beach; Max H. Hare, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gloria L. Castro, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mary Cain-Simon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Rebecca D. Wagner, Deputy Attorney General, for Real Party in Interest.

Robie, Acting P.J.

For almost 45 years, California trial courts have followed the rule laid down by Chamberlain that a trial court exercising its independent judgment under Code of Civil Procedure ¹ section 1094.5 must determine whether the administrative agency's findings are supported by the preponderance of the evidence, notwithstanding the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applied in the underlying administrative proceeding. ( Chamberlain v. Ventura County Civil Service Com. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 362, 368-369, 138 Cal.Rptr. 155 ( Chamberlain ); accord, Ettinger v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 853, 858, 185 Cal.Rptr. 601 ( Ettinger ).) That rule was born out of the appellate court's interpretation that the weight of the evidence phrase in subdivision (c) of section 1094.5 is synonymous with the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. ( Chamberlain , at p. 368, 138 Cal.Rptr. 155 ; see § 1094.5, subd. (c) ["Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence "], italics added.) No appellate court has disagreed with Chamberlain or its progeny and our Supreme Court has not, to our knowledge, reviewed or rendered a decision on the merits of the statutory interpretation.

In this writ proceeding, petitioner Quinn Li challenges the continued vitality of the Chamberlain rule, asserting our Supreme Court's recent Conservatorship of O.B. decision impliedly abrogated Chamberlain ’s long-standing interpretation of section 1094.5, subdivision (c). ( Citing Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 329, 470 P.3d 41.) In Conservatorship of O.B. , our Supreme Court held an appellate court applying the substantial evidence standard of review must account for the standard of proof required in the underlying proceeding when determining whether a finding is supported by the evidence. ( Id . at pp. 995-996, 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 329, 470 P.3d 41.) Thus, "[w]hen reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true." ( Id . at p. 1011, 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 329, 470 P.3d 41.) Petitioner asserts the trial court acted in contravention of Conservatorship of O.B. when it denied petitioner's request to stay, during the pendency of his mandamus proceeding, the adverse disciplinary decision by real party in interest the Medical Board of California (the board) regarding petitioner's medical license, because the trial court used the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof rather than the clear and convincing standard of proof in evaluating the merits of the stay request.

We disagree with petitioner's implied abrogation argument but conclude, in sum, that a trial court reviewing an administrative agency's findings under the independent judgment standard of review in section 1094.5 must, like under the substantial evidence standard of review, account for the standard of proof required and applied in the underlying proceeding. We recognize this conclusion breaks with over four decades of established law. As we explain, however, after closely reexamining the statutory construction employed by the Chamberlain and Ettinger courts, it is clear there is no basis for the interpretation that the weight of the evidence phrase in section 1094.5 is synonymous with preponderance of the evidence.

Despite the significance of our conclusion on this important question of law, we deny petitioner's petition for writ of mandate because he fails to raise any argument demonstrating the correct application of the standard of review would have resulted in a different outcome in the trial court. Prejudicial error must be proven; it is not presumed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The board revoked petitioner's medical license but stayed the revocation and placed petitioner on probation for three years pursuant to terms and conditions (the decision). Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate or, in the alternative, administrative mandate and also filed an ex parte application for an order staying the decision pursuant to section 1094.5, subdivision (h). In the stay application, petitioner argued, among other things, that the board is unlikely to prevail in the matter because the decision "was taken in violation of the law, the wrong standard of proof was applied, the correct standard was not met, the findings are not supported by the evidence, the penalty exceeded the Board's authority under the law as it is punishment, not protective of the public, and the Board's Decision was just plain wrong."² The trial court denied the stay application.³

A few days after our Supreme Court filed Conservatorship of O.B. , petitioner asked the trial court to reconsider its denial of the stay application. Specifically, petitioner asked the trial court to "apply the clear and convincing evidentiary standard to the issue whether the [b]oard was unlikely to prevail on the merits, consistent with the holding in [Conservatorship of ] O.B. " The trial court denied the application for reconsideration without explanation, citing only section 1008, subdivisions (a) and (e), section 1094.5, subdivisions (c) and (h), and Chamberlain for " ‘the standard of proof in the original administrative proceedings is wholly irrelevant to the standard of proof applicable to a review of such proceedings.’ "⁴ (Citing Chamberlain, supra , 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 370, 138 Cal.Rptr. 155.)

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court, requesting a stay of the board's decision and an order commanding the trial court to comply with "the standard of review and burden of proof rules articulated in" Conservatorship of O.B. We stayed the board's decision and all further proceedings in the trial court and issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted. The parties filed their respective briefs in response to the order to show cause. We now consider the merits.

DISCUSSION

Section 1094.5 "provides the basic framework by which an aggrieved party to an administrative proceeding may seek judicial review of any final order or decision rendered by a state or local agency." ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 137, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242, fn. omitted.) Subdivision (c) of the statute "provides for both an independent judgment and a substantial evidence review of administrative decisions." ( Bixby , at p. 137, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242, italics omitted.) The trial court determines the applicable standard of review on a case-by-case basis by considering whether the administrative decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right. ( Id . at p. 144, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242.) "If the order or decision of the agency substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the trial court, in determining under section 1094.5 whether there has been an abuse of discretion because the findings are not supported by the evidence, must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence and find an abuse of discretion if the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. If, on the other hand, the order or decision does not substantially affect a fundamental vested right, the trial court's inquiry will be limited to a determination of whether or not the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record." ( Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29.)

IThe Independent Judgment Standard Of Review Applies

We first address petitioner's confusing argument that Conservatorship of O.B. mandates the trial court shall apply the substantial evidence standard of review rather than the independent judgment standard of review in evaluating the merits of his petition.⁵ The independent judgment standard of review applies to agency decisions revoking or suspending a medical license. ( Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 302, 308, 196 P.2d 20 ; Bixby v. Pierno, supra , 4 Cal.3d at pp. 139, 146, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242.) Our Supreme Court did not, in Conservatorship of O.B. , discuss or change the standard of review applicable to this proceeding.

IIThe Application Of Conservatorship Of O.B. To The Standards Of Review In Section 1094.5

In Conservatorship of O.B. , our Supreme Court granted review "to clarify how an appellate court is to review the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding made by the trier of fact pursuant to the clear and convincing standard." ( Conservatorship of O.B., supra , 9 Cal.5th at p. 995, 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 329, 470 P.3d 41.)

The court explained "[t]here [wa]s a split of opinion over how an appellate court should address a claim of insufficient evidence" when the standard of proof in the underlying proceeding was clear and convincing evidence. ( Ibid . ) In the view of...