Quintanilla v. State

• Decision Date: 24 January 2001
• Docket Number: Nos. 04-99-00293-C,04-99-00294-CR,s. 04-99-00293-C
• Citation: 40 S.W.3d 576
• Parties: (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001) Michael QUINTANILLA, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 576

40 S.W.3d 576 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001)

Michael QUINTANILLA, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee

Nos. 04-99-00293-CR, 04-99-00294-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

January 24, 2001

From the 218th Judicial District Court, Wilson County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 98-09-113-CRW & 98-09-114-CRW Honorable Stella Saxon, Judge Presiding

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice, Paul W. Green, Justice, Karen Angelini, Justice

Stone, Justice

Michael Quintanilla appeals his convictions for murder and aggravated robbery alleging that he received multiple punishments for offenses against the same victim in the same criminal episode in violation of the double jeopardy prohibition, and that the trial court erred in excusing a juror. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Factual and Procedural Background

On September 18, 1996, the owner and operator of C & J Icehouse, Louis John Vincik, was found shot to death in his store. After two years without leads, a confidential informant came forward with information that Rene Robles and "Mosca," a name appellant Quintanilla goes by, were responsible for the shooting. After being taken in for questioning, Quintanilla made a voluntary written statement following Miranda warnings, confessing that the shooting occurred during a botched robbery. Quintanilla testified at trial he did not intend to kill Vincik, but only to scare him off because Vincik was coming after him.

Although Quintanilla was indicted and tried for capital murder and aggravated robbery, he was convicted of the lesser offense of murder, with punishment assessed at ninety years confinement. The jury also convicted Quintanilla of aggravated robbery, for which he received a sentence of fifty years confinement. On appeal, Quintanilla claims his conviction and punishment for both murder and aggravated robbery violate the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense.

Double Jeopardy

The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." This provision is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977). Article I, Section 14 of the Texas constitution provides much the same double jeopardy protections as the United States Constitution. Stephens v. State, 806 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The double jeopardy clause embodies three essential guarantees: (1) it protects against a successive prosecution for the "same offense" after acquittal; (2) it protects against a successive prosecution for the "same offense" after conviction; and (3) it protects against multiple punishments for the "same offense." Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980); Iglehart v. State, 837 S.W. 2d 122, 126-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). This appeal concerns the third of these double jeopardy protections; that is, whether Quintanilla has received multiple punishments for the "same offense."

When multiple offenses are prosecuted in a single trial, as was done in the instant case, the double jeopardy clause prevents the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the Legislature intended. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983); Ervin v. State, 991 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). When the same conduct violates more than one distinct penal statute and each statute requires proof of a fact that the other does not, it is presumed that the two offenses are not the same and that the Legislature intended to authorize multiple punishments. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Conversely, if all the elements of one statutory offense are contained within the other, it is presumed that the two offenses are the same and that the Legislature did not intend to authorize punishment for both. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 683, 693-94 (1980).

A review of the statutory elements of the offenses with which Quintanilla was charged reveals that aggravated robbery is a lesser included offense of capital murder, and thus the two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes. Compare Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.03 (a)(2) (Vernon 1994) (capital murder) with Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §29.03 (Vernon 1994) (aggravated robbery). See Parrish v. State, 869 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (greater inclusive and lesser included offenses are "same offenses" for double jeopardy purposes). In the instant case, however, Quintanilla was convicted of murder, not capital murder. Aggravated robbery is not a lesser included offense of murder, nor are the two offenses the "same offense" under Blockburger. Compare Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §19.02 (Vernon 1994) (murder) with Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §29.03 (Vernon 1994) ( aggravated robbery).

Nonetheless, Quintanilla contends the conviction at trial of the lesser offense of murder does not cure the error of multiple punishments for the same offense. He makes this claim based on his additional argument that the elements stated in the indictment control the analysis of double jeopardy issues. We reject Quintanilla's argument for several reasons. First, the argument completely ignores the jury's verdict. This argument asks us to declare a constitutional violation on what might have been, not on what actually took place. In effect, the argument places form the wording of the indictment, over substance the verdict of the jury. We are unwilling to review the indictment in a vacuum without reference to what the jury ultimately decided.

Second, we do not believe that the charging instrument is necessarily controlling when determining double jeopardy in the multiple punishments context. We recognize that various courts' construction of double jeopardy analysis is not uniform or entirely settled. See Parrish v. State 869 S.W.2d at 354 (noting that "the core meaning of Blockburger is now evidently more in dispute than ever before"). While the charging instrument is relevant and controlling when addressing multiple prosecution claims, State v. Perez, 947 S.W2d 268, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), that is not the case in multiple punishment claims. The Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that the statutory elements, rather than the charging instrument elements, are relevant to a multiple punishments double jeopardy claim. As stated by the court:

While Parrish, supra, does not make this distinction, it is logical to compare statutory elements in the multiple punishments context where Blockburger is a rule of statutory construction to be used in determining legislative intent, but compare charging instrument elements in the successive prosecutions context where there are two charging instruments to examine and where the underlying policy is to prevent retrying a defendant for something he has already been tried for.

Id. at 272. Indeed, in a recent decision in a multiple punishments double jeopardy claim, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not even mention the charging instrument. See Ex Parte Hawkins, 6 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Rather, the court focused on the statutory elements of the offenses and looked at other considerations to determine the legislative intent regarding punishment. This approach is appropriate since the paramount consideration in multiple punishment claims is whether the Legislature intended to permit such punishments. See Ervin v. State, 991 S.W.2d 804, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Review of a charging instrument drawn up by the prosecution does not shed light on whether the Legislature intended to permit multiple punishments. On the...