A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16

• Decision Date: 20 February 1908
• Citation: 232 Ill. 424,83 N.E. 940
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: A. R. BARNES & CO. et al. v. CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 et al.

232 Ill. 424

83 N.E. 940

A. R. BARNES & CO. et al.

v.CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 20, 1908.

Appeal from Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Jesse Holdom, Judge.

Action by A. R. Barnes & Co. and others against the Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 and others. From a judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District, affirming a decree restraining defendants from interfering with complainants' business, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Scott and Farmer, JJ., dissenting.

William H. Barnum, for appellants.

Tenney, Coffeen, Harding & Wilkerson (Horace Kent Tenney and James H. Wilkerson, of counsel), for appellees.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

The superior court of Cook county overruled the demurrer of appellants to the bill of complaint filed against them by the appellees in said court seeking an injunction restraining appellants from interfering with the business of appellees or with their employés, and picketing appellees' premises. The defendants elected to stand by their demurrer, and the court entered a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill, perpetually enjoining defendants ‘from in any manner interfering with, hindering, obstructing, or stopping the business of said complainants, or any of them, or of their agents, servants, or employés, in the operation of the business of said complainants, respectively; from picketing or maintaining at or near the premises of said complainants, or any of them, any picket or pickets; from assaulting or intimidating, by threats or otherwise, the employés of any of said complainants or any persons who may become or seek to become employés of said complainants, or either of them; from congregating about or near the places of business of any of said complainants or about or near any place where their employés are lodged or boarded for the purpose of compelling, inducing, or soliciting the employés of any of said complainants to leave their service or to refuse to work for them or any of them, or for the purpose of preventing, or attempting to prevent, any person from freely entering into the service of any of said complainants; from interfering with or attempting to hinder complainants, or any of them, in carrying on their business in the usual and ordinary way; from following the employés of any of said complainants to their homes or other places, or calling upon them, for the purpose of inducing them to leave the employ of said complainants or of molesting or intimidating them or their families; from attempting, by bribery, payment, or promise of money, offers of transportation, or other rewards, to induce the employés of any of said complainants to leave their service; from organizing or maintaining any boycott against said complainants or any of them; from attempting to induce customers or other persons to abstain from working for or accepting work from said complainants or any of them; from attempting to prevent, by threats or injury or by threats of calling strike, any person from accepting work from or doing work for said complainants or any of them; from attempting to create or enforce any boycott against any of the employés of the complainants, or any of them, and from attempting to induce people in their neighborhood or elsewhere not to deal with them; from sending any circular or other communications to customers or other persons who might deal or transact business with said complainants, or either of them, for the purpose of dissuading such persons from so doing; and from doing any other act or thing in furtherance of the conspiracy set forth in said bill.’ The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court for the First District, and the branch of that court affirmed the decree. From the judgment of the Appellate Court this further appeal was prosecuted.

The demurrer admitted the existence of the facts stated in the bill, and the question to be determined is whether such facts authorized the decree. Briefly stated, the facts so alleged and admitted are as follows: At the time of filing the bill the complainants were, and for several years had been, engaged in the printing business, and each had a valuable plant and an extensive business, in the conduct of which they had made contracts for printing for future delivery which would afford a substantial profit. They were and had been members of a voluntary association know as the ‘Chicago Typothetae,’ which was organized for the purpose of advancing and improving the printing and binding business, and for the purpose of employing skilled mechanics whose services might be required by the members of the association. The defendants were Typographical Union No. 16 and its officers, a labor union existing in the city of Chicago whose members are typesetters and compositors, one of the rules of which was that its members should not work with those who did not belong to that union, and said members were bound, at the command of the union and its officers, to strike and leave the employment of any one who insisted upon employing nonunion men. The plant or shop from which all employés not belonging to this union were excluded was called a ‘closed’ shop, while one in which the employer exercised his right of employing whom he pleased was called an ‘open’ shop. In July, 1905, the Typographical Union announced that after January 1, 1906, eight hours should constitute a day's work; that no workman should be allowed to work more than that time, and that no employer should be allowed to employ workmen who worked more than eight hours. Some of the complainants employed compositors who were not members of the union, and the union directed its members who were working for said complainants to strike because of that fact. The officials of the union called upon members of complainants' association, and demanded that they agree with the union that on and after January 1, 1906, they would submit to the demand for an eight-hour day and a closed shop. The complainants so applied to refused to accede to the demand or make the agreement, and the officials of the union called a strike in said shops. Upon calling the strike, the defendants inaugurated and afterward maintained a system of picketing the places of business of said complainants with pickets, who surrounded the respective places of business and maintained a constant watch upon the employés going to and from their work, and in many cases intimidated them, and endeavored by threats, and in some cases by assaults and open violence, to compel said employés to leave the employment of complainants. In other cases the pickets and members of the union endeavored to induce employés to leave by bribes and offers of money, and by offering to procure for them work in other places, or offering them transportation to leave the city, and the money necessary for such purposes was furnished by the union. The pickets were maintained by and were under the control and direction of the union and its officers and committees appointed by it. This picketing and interference with employés had continued for several weeks before the bill was filed, and 47 affidavits of employés were annexed to the bill, detailing particular acts of the members of the union and the pickets, which affidavits the bill stated were made a part thereof. By these means the defendants seriously interfered with the business of each of the complainants, and took away many of their employés, and prevented them from obtaining other employés who were willing to work, whereby the complainants were prevented from carrying out their contracts and completing unfinished work. The defendants were all acting together and in concert, in pursuance of a common plan to injure the complainants and interfere with their business for the purpose of compelling them to agree to the terms imposed by the union and to enter into the said contract. The union was alleged to be a voluntary organization and its members financially irresponsible, so that no adequate judgment for damages against them, or any of them, could be collected. The agreement which the union had presented to the different printing houses, and which it was endeavoring to coerce the complainants into executing, provided that no one but members of Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 should be employed; that the employer should respect and observe the conditions imposed by the constitution, bylaws, and scale of prices of the union of current date; that beginning January 1, 1906, an eight-hour day should go into effect; that no work should be done for struck shops having difficulty with Typographical Union No. 16, and that the said union agreed to furnish competent union workmen on demand. In the shops where union men were employed, which were called ‘chapels,’ the union had a man who was known as the ‘chapel foreman’ or ‘chairman of the chapel,’ and the union had issued circulars directed to these chapel foremen requesting them to report immediately any work coming to their offices from any of the 19 firms named in the notice, which were mostly firms of the complainants, and stating that the executive committee had ordered that all work stop on work for strike-bound houses. The defendants were attempting to enforce a boycott against the complainants by preventing them from having work done by other printing houses or by shops to whom they might apply for work, and thus preventing them from carrying on their business except upon the condition that they should make the agreement demanded by the union. The union published weekly what was called a directory of union printing offices of Chicago, containing the names of offices where the demands of the union were submitted to and a list of offices on strike, in which latter list were published the names of complainants. The purpose of this directory was to induce people not to deal with the complainants and to compel employés to leave their service....