A.R.D.C., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., WD

• Decision Date: 30 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 619 S.W.2d 843
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: A. R. D. C., INC., Appellant-Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO., et al., Respondents-Defendants. 31670.

Page 843

619 S.W.2d 843

A. R. D. C., INC., Appellant-Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO., et al., Respondents-Defendants.

No. WD 31670.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

June 30, 1981.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied

Aug. 4, 1981.

Application to Transfer Denied Sept. 8, 1981.

Dean A. Hodapp, Blumer & Nally, Kansas City, for appellant-plaintiff.

Glenn McCann, James Welsh, Knipmeyer, McCann, Fish & Smith, Kansas City, for respondents-defendants.

Before WASSERSTROM, C. J., and PRITCHARD, DIXON, TURNAGE, CLARK, MANFORD and NUGENT, JJ.

TURNAGE, Judge.

A.R.D.C., Inc. and two of its stockholders filed suit in eight counts against State Farm Fire & Casualty Company and two of its employees. Four of the counts were brought by A.R.D.C. and the remaining four by the individuals. The court sustained a motion to dismiss the counts brought by A.R.D.C. because suit had been filed after its charter had been forfeited for failure to file the annual registration and to pay the required fee. This appeal followed. Reversed and remanded.

A.R.D.C.'s petition was filed in June, 1978, and the petition alleged that State Farm had entered into an oral contract of insurance to protect A.R.D.C. from loss by burglary. The petition alleged the contract of insurance was entered into prior to April 1, 1974, and that on April 1, 1974, A.R.D.C. suffered loss by burglary. One count filed by A.R.D.C. was for the breach of the contract of insurance for the failure of State Farm to pay the burglary loss and the other counts were for fraud, intentional interference with a protected property interest and bad faith.

State Farm filed an answer to the petition and a separate motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. In January, 1979, a first amended petition was filed. In March State Farm filed an answer and another motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. In August State Farm, for the first time, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that A.R.D.C. did not have the capacity to sue and was not the real party in interest. Suggestions filed in support of such motion indicated the ground to be that the charter of A.R.D.C. had been forfeited for failure to file the annual registration report and pay the annual registration fee for the year 1974. The forfeiture of the charter of A.R.D.C. was on January 1, 1975.

Thereafter A.R.D.C. requested additional time to respond to the motion and later filed documents from the secretary of state indicating the forfeiture had been rescinded in November, 1979. The court overruled State Farm's motion to dismiss because A.R.D.C.'s charter had been forfeited but reconsidered such action and then entered an order dismissing all counts brought by A.R.D.C.

A.R.D.C. contends that under § 351.540.2, RSMo 1978 ¹ the rescission of the forfeiture related back to the date of the forfeiture and gave validity to the lawsuit even though it was filed at a time when the charter stood forfeited. State Farm contends that under Clark Estate Co. v. Gentry, 362 Mo. 80, 240 S.W.2d 124 (Mo.1951) the rescission of the forfeiture did not have any retroactive effect and the suit was actually filed by a non-entity because A.R.D.C. had lost its corporate standing with the forfeiture of its charter. State Farm contends the real parties in interest to bring any action on the part of A.R.D.C. after the forfeiture were the directors and officers in office at the time of the forfeiture who became the trustees of A.R.D.C. under § 351.525(4).

In Clark the court held that a corporation was not entitled to file suit in its own name after its charter had been forfeited and that a rescission of the forfeiture did not have any retroactive effect but was prospective only. The court concluded that the effect of the rescission was only to give the corporation power to act thereafter, but this would not relate back to give validity to any act which occurred after forfeiture and prior to rescission. The court also, at page 130, relied on Cleveland v. Gore Bros., 14 Cal.App.2d 681, 58 P.2d 931, 932 (1936) for holding that the filing of a suit by a corporation after forfeiture and prior to rescission does not toll the statute of limitations because the subsequent rescission does not have retroactive effect and could not breathe life into the suit. A.R.D.C. contends that the amendment of § 351.540 by the adoption of § 351.540.2 in 1975 abrogates the holding in Clark. Section 351.540.2 provides as follows:

"Upon the issuance of a certificate rescinding the forfeiture of the corporate rights of a corporation, the restoration of corporate rights and privileges shall have effect from the date of the forfeiture and all acts of the corporation, in the period between the date of forfeiture and the date of the rescission ^* of the forfeiture shall be thereby confirmed and held as the acts of the original corporation; except that, any judgment obtained against any person in his capacity as a trustee under section 351.525 shall not be vacated by reason of any rescission * under this section, but shall continue in full force and effect notwithstanding the rescission *. No corporation shall prosecute any action enumerated in section 351.535 ² following a rescission * under this section if the action was filed after the forfeiture of the corporation's corporate rights but prior to the rescission * of that forfeiture.

On this appeal the parties collide on the issue of the effect to be given to the above amendment. No question is raised concerning the validity of the amendment nor the power of the legislature to adopt such amendment. State Farm basically contends that the amendment does not change the decision in Clark and A.R.D.C. contends the amendment nullifies the holding in Clark.

The effect of an amendment to a statute in the light of decisions construing that statute was stated in Wright v. J. A. Tobin Construction Company, 365 S.W.2d 742, 744(3, 4) (Mo.App.1963) as follows:

"(I)t is presumed that the legislature is aware of the interpretation of existing statutes placed thereon by the state's appellate courts, and that in amending a statute or enacting a new one on the same subject it is ordinarily the intent of the legislature to effect some change in the existing law. If this were not so the legislature in amending a statute would be accomplishing nothing, and legislatures are not presumed to have intended a needless and useless act."

Applying the rule in Wright to this case requires this court to conclude that in adopting the amendment the legislature intended to make a change in the existing law. The amendment did not change any of the existing statutes which declared that upon the failure to file the annual registration and pay the annual fee that a corporation's charter be forfeited and the directors and officers in office at the time would become trustees and would have the right to file suits on behalf of the corporation. Nor did the amendment change § 351.530 which makes it a misdemeanor for any person or persons to exercise any of the powers, privileges or franchises of any corporation after the charter has been forfeited. By leaving those sections intact, the amendment did not affect the ruling in Clark that after the charter of a corporation has been forfeited the dissolved corporation is no longer the real party in interest and the filing of such suit is illegal. Clark was cited by this court recently in J. M. Morris Const. v. Mid-West Precote Co., 613 S.W.2d 180 (Mo.App.1981) in holding that after the charter of the corporation was forfeited it ceased to be a corporation or to have legal capacity to sue.

Clark further held that the rescission of a forfeiture of a corporate charter would not have any retroactive effect because the general rule concerning the effect of statutes is prospective only unless the legislature expressed a clear intent that the statute be given retroactive effect.

This court finds no conflict between the amendment and the statutes previously enacted relating to the statutory trustees being the only persons authorized to file suits and the criminal penalty of misdemeanor imposed upon persons who exercise corporate powers after the charter has been forfeited. This court holds that as to corporations whose charter has been forfeited and prior to a rescission of that forfeiture, the law announced in Clark and Morris remains unchanged. However, after a rescission of that forfeiture the legislature has now declared in express terms that the restoration of corporate rights and privileges has retroactive effect and is effective from the date of forfeiture. The legislature has further declared that all acts of the corporation taken in the period between the forfeiture and the rescission are confirmed and are held to be the acts of the original corporation. No argument is advanced that the legislature may not forgive the violation of a statute by validating an act which was improper at the time. While the filing of the suit in the name of the corporation after the forfeiture was denounced, the legislature nevertheless provided that if the forfeiture were rescinded, the suit was the act of the corporation the same as if the forfeiture had not occurred.

The effect of the amendment for all practical purposes is to treat the forfeiture as if it had never...