R., In re

• Decision Date: 17 July 1974
• Citation: 357 N.Y.S.2d 1001,79 Misc.2d 339
• Parties: In the Matter of John R. et al., children alleged to be in need of supervision, Respondents.
• Court: New York Family Court

Page 1001

357 N.Y.S.2d 1001

79 Misc.2d 339

In the Matter of John R. et al., children alleged to be in need of supervision, Respondents.

Family Court of City of New York, New York County.

July 17, 1974.

G. Gary Sousa, Brooklyn, for petitioner Bd. of Ed.

Charles Schinitsky, Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn, by Stephen Pokart, Law Guardian, for respondents.

NANETTE DEMBITZ, Judge:

The instant school truancy cases, consolidated because of common issues of law, arose under the clause of section 712 of the Family Court Act that a 'person in need of supervision' includes a child under 16 'who does not attend school in accord with the provisions of part one of article sixty-five of the education law'. ¹ Other sections of the Act authorize the Family Court to order various methods of treatment for 'persons in need of supervision'. The specified part of the Education Law provides that 'each minor from six to sixteen years of age shall attend upon full time instruction' 'regularly'; 'absence from required attendance shall be permitted only for causes allowed by the general rules and practices of the public schools' (Education Law of New York, sections 3205, 3210; see New York City Board of Education By-Laws, sec. 90, specifying permitted causes for absence). The truancy provisions and the procedure for enforcing them are attacked in the instant cases in fundamental respects.

Constitutionality of Compulsory Education Laws

'There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education . . . some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system. . . . Further, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.' Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213, 221, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1532, 32 L.Ed.2d 15. ²

Thus, the State's function as Parens patriae to insure the education of children continues to be recognized. ³

It is argued that coercion or its threat is of little utility in securing school attendance, and that coerced attendance in any event yields no educational benefit. If indeed an exercise of State power is of no benefit to those it purports to aid, the State coercion violates the Constitutional guarantee of due process of law. See Rouse v. Cameron, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (1966); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F.Supp. 575, 598--600 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 387, 390 (M.D.Ala., N.D., 1972).

Undoubtedly the best remedy for truancy would be progress towards the ideal of perfecting pedagogy and auxiliary services so that all children would be attracted to school, without coercion. It is clear, even from the Court's limited work with truants, that there is greater room for voluntariness; for some of the PINS children whom the Court directs to attend its special school with small classes and daily counselling, apparently would do so voluntarily if offered the opportunity. Bureaucratic and budget changes are needed so that such children could transfer to such schools without Court intervention.

However, the abandonment of all compulsion in some New York City school districts (see Geduldig, cited note 2), has afforded no substantiation for the theory that a wholly voluntary attendance program would stimulate and force such improvements in the schools that truancy would decrease. While this important experiment doubtless would have been more successful with greater experience and greater funds for individualized in-school and out-of-school attention to truants, the Legislature and the Court can properly be concerned with immediate measures to prevent irremediable harm from truancy to present day school children.

Though it is true that the Court's efforts are frequently ineffective with PINS-truant children, on the other hand some do accomplish regular and beneficial attendance at their assigned public school or at a Court-assigned school as well as at auxiliary facilities such as mental hygiene clinics, when directed by the Court to attend and Court-admonished that attendance is required by law. Thus, the Legislature can reasonably believe that New York's compulsory education laws, as applied by this Court, aid the class of individuals they are intended to benefit. They therefore are a constitutional exercise of the State's Parens patriae power. ⁴

Procedure

(A) Provision for Admissibility of Attendance Transcripts

The Education Law provides: 'A duly certified transcript of the record of attendance and absence of a child . . . shall be accepted as presumptive evidence of the attendance of such child in any proceeding . . .' (sec. 3211). The remainder of the section makes it clear that the transcript is to be prepared from the rollbook kept by the child's teacher and that the legislative purpose was to relieve classroom teachers from the burden of court appearances, with attendance officers assuming that responsibility instead. In these proceedings, in accord with the usual practice, an attendance officer was the petitioner in this Court. The Court admitted into evidence over objections, the transcripts which had been prepared by respondents' teachers from their rollbooks in the officer's presence with his check on the accuracy of their transcription, and which had been certified by such teachers as well as the principals of the respective schools.

Respondents' attorney contends that use of the certified transcripts contradicts the 'best evidence' rule. However, the Legislature obviously can enact deviations from common-law or statutory rules respecting admissible evidence. As to the argument that section 3211 has been superseded by section 744 of the Family Court Act, providing for the admission in fact-finding hearings only of 'competent evidence,' it must be noted that section 3211, originally enacted in 1947, was applicable to truancy cases in the predecessor courts to the Family Court (see People v. Pikunas, 260 N.Y. 72, 74, 182 N.E. 675, 676, as to the jurisdiction of such courts over truancy). Furthermore, section 3211 was amended in 1962, the year of the establishment of the Family Court, and the Court is explicitly mentioned in a related amended section (sec. 3232). Thus, on both scores section 3211 must be deemed to have been within the knowledge of the Legislature when it enacted section 744 of the Family Court Act, and the term 'competent' evidence in that section must be construed to include the evidence specified in 3211.

(B) Constitutionality of Use of Transcripts

Because a certified transcript is hearsay, Respondents contend that the Court's reliance on it deprives them of the Constitutional right to confrontation by the witnesses with personal knowledge of their school absences. However, 'merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied.' (Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 82, 91 S.Ct. 210, 216, 27 L.Ed.2d 213.) The determining criterion is whether there are 'indicia of reliability (of the evidence) though there is no confrontation of the declarant.' (Ibid, 400 U.S. at p. 89, 91 S.Ct. at p. 220.) Thus, a conviction for drunken driving, based on a medical examiner's certificate as to the alcoholic content of defendant's blood, was affirmed, on the ground that a 'state legislature . . . may carve out a new exception to the hearsay rule, without violating constitutional rights, where . . . the evidence has . . . qualities of reliability and trustworthiness . . ..' Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480--481 (C.A. 4, 1958).

In this State the highest court upheld against constitutional objection the admission in a manslaughter trial of an autopsy report by an Examiner who had died prior to the trial, declaring:

'The right of an accused in a criminal action to be confronted by the witnesses who testify against him, is not violated by the introduction of so-called public documents or official records required to be kept . . ..' People v. Nisonoff, 293 N.Y. 597, 602, 59 N.E.2d 420, 422. ⁵

Likewise upheld was the conviction of a traffic violator on the ground that the 'reliability of official entries' as to his identity was sufficient 'to make out a case prima facie' (People v. Klepper, 25 N.Y.2d 46, 48, 302 N.Y.S.2d 555, 557, 250 N.E.2d 51, 52).

The hearsay exception established by Section 3211 is similar to the general and time-honored provision upheld in Nisonoff for the admissibility of a certificate of a public officer 'to a fact ascertained . . . by him in the course of his official duty' (CPLR 4520). And for like reasons the transcripts here in issue satisfy the criteria for 'underlying reliability and probative value' (see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842). The transcripts are certified by public employees who have neither a personal nor a professional interest in exaggerating the truancy of pupils in the school. As to petitioner-attendance officer, his success in his duties of remedying truancy by counselling, referrals, and escorting children to school would reflect better on his professional achievements than filing Court petitions. Thus, 'as the records concern public affairs, and do not affect the private interest of the officer, they are not tainted by the suspicion of private advantage.' Chesapeake and Del. Canal Co. v. United States, 240 F. 903, 907 (C.C.A.3d, 1917) aff'd 250 U.S. 123, 39 S.Ct. 407, 63 L.Ed. 889 (1918); see also Richardson, 402 U.S. at p. 403, 91 S.Ct. 1420; Long v. United States, 59 F.2d 602, 603--604 (C.A.4, 1932); compare White v. Zutell, 263 F.2d 613, 614--615 (C.A. 2, 1959). Official documents are therefore deemed trustworthy and admissible though they are prepared in contemplation of litigation, in distinction to 'business records' which...