R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Coates

• Decision Date: 23 October 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 5D19-2549
• Citation: 308 So.3d 1068
• Parties: R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Appellant, v. Brinda COATES, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lois Stucky, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

308 So.3d 1068

R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Appellant,

v.Brinda COATES, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lois Stucky, Appellee.

Case No. 5D19-2549

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed October 23, 2020

Marie A. Borland and Troy A. Furman, of Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A., Tampa, and Charles R.A. Morse, of Jones Day, New York, New York, and Brian C. Lea, Stephanie E. Parker, John M. Walker and Jason T. Burnette, of Jones Day, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellant.

John S. Mills, Courtney Brewer, and Jonathan Martin, of Bishop & Mills, PLLC, Tallahassee, and Andrew B. Greenlee, of Andrew B. Greenlee, P.A., Sanford, for Appellee.

ORFINGER, J.

We deny Appellant's motion for rehearing, but grant Appellant's motion for certification.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company ("Reynolds") appeals the final judgment rendered against it in a wrongful death action brought by Brinda Coates, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of her sister, Lois Stucky.¹ At trial, Ms. Coates prevailed on her claim that Reynolds defectively designed its Winston and Doral brand cigarettes, and Ms. Stucky, a longtime smoker of these brands, died as a result. The jury awarded Ms. Stucky's three adult children $300,000 in compensatory damages, which was reduced by fifty percent due to Ms. Stucky's comparative fault. In addition, the jury awarded punitive damages of $16 million. Following unsuccessful post-trial motions for mistrial, new trial or remittitur, Reynolds brought this appeal. Of the various arguments that Reynolds raises in this appeal, we find merit only in its challenge to the amount of the punitive damages award and reverse for entry of remittitur or, if remittitur is rejected, a new trial solely on the amount of punitive damages.

Thirteen months after her diagnosis, Ms. Stucky died at the age of 52 from small cell lung cancer caused by smoking cigarettes. Starting at age 17, she smoked Reynolds’ filtered Winston cigarettes until she switched to Doral cigarettes about five years prior to her death. Ms. Stucky believed that she was addicted to the cigarettes, a belief confirmed by expert testimony, because she had tried various times to stop smoking, but could not. Indeed, she continued to smoke even after her lung cancer diagnosis. Ms. Stucky's inability to quit smoking was, perhaps, a testament to the success of Reynolds in designing its cigarettes to reach what one expert testified was the "sweet spot of addiction" and its persuasive advertising skills.

The evidence at trial demonstrated significant reprehensibility by Reynolds in designing its cigarettes. It used a tobacco curing process designed to make the smoke "smoother" and manipulated the levels of nicotine and other additives to make its product easily inhalable, and thus, addictive. Too, its advertising efforts, particularly those advertisements produced in the early years of Ms. Stucky's addiction, were intended to entice young people to begin smoking and to suggest, if not convince, consumers that smoking was safe, or reasonably so. But it was well established that the inhalation of cigarette smoke is not safe. Stucky paid the price for her addiction. The jury determined that Reynolds must also pay its price.

The jury found punitive damages were appropriate and was instructed that, in determining the amount of punitive damages to award, it should consider the nature, extent, and degree of Reynolds’ misconduct, its financial resources, and any mitigating evidence.² Ms. Coates’ attorney proposed $10 million as the appropriate punitive damages amount. Reynolds’ attorney, after pointing out testimony that Reynolds had made changes to its cigarettes to make them safer and had disclosed the dangers of smoking, argued that the upper limits of any award should be an amount equal to the reduced compensatory damages award. The jury disagreed with the suggestions of both attorneys and awarded $16 million in punitive damages.

Reynolds challenges the punitive damages award as excessive, particularly when considered in relation to the $150,000 net compensatory damages award, and argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for new trial or remittitur. Having reviewed the award under both state law and federal due process concerns, we conclude that the amount of the punitive damages award is excessive and that reversal and remand for remittitur or, failing either party's acceptance of remittitur, a new trial on punitive damages, is required.

Excessiveness Under State Law

We begin our analysis under Florida law. We review a trial court's denial of post-trial motions for new trial or remittitur for the abuse of discretion.³ See Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1263 (Fla. 2006) (citing St. John v. Coisman, 799 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ).

Sections 768.73 and 768.74, Florida Statutes, govern the review of a claim that a punitive damages award is excessive. The 1997 version of those sections applies here because the cause of action arose on the 1998 date of Ms. Stucky's death. Section 768.73, titled, "Punitive damages; limitation," provides in relevant part:

(1)(a) In any civil action ... involving willful, wanton, or gross misconduct, the judgment for the total amount of punitive damages awarded to a claimant may not exceed three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded to each person entitled thereto by the trier of fact, except as provided in paragraph (b)....

(b) If any award for punitive damages exceeds the limitation specified in paragraph (a), the award is presumed to be excessive and the defendant is entitled to remittitur of the amount in excess of the limitation unless the claimant demonstrates to the court by clear and convincing evidence that the award is not excessive in light of the facts and circumstances which were presented to the trier of fact.

§ 768.73(1)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis added). Section 768.74, titled "Remittitur and additur," then sets out the criteria by which a court must review an award claimed to be excessive. Importantly, section 768.74(5), Florida Statutes (1997), states:

(5) In determining whether an award is excessive or inadequate in light of the facts and circumstances presented to the trier of fact and in determining the amount, if any, that such award exceeds a reasonable range of damages or is inadequate, the court shall consider the following criteria:

(a) Whether the amount awarded is indicative of prejudice, passion, or corruption on the part of the trier of fact;

(b) Whether it appears that the trier of fact ignored the evidence in reaching a verdict or misconceived the merits of the case relating to the amounts of damages recoverable;

(c) Whether the trier of fact took improper elements of damages into account or arrived at the amount of damages by speculation and conjecture; (d) Whether the amount awarded bears a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and the injury suffered; and

(e) Whether the amount awarded is supported by the evidence and is such that it could be adduced in a logical manner by reasonable persons.

Reynolds focuses on sections 768.74(5)(a) and (d) to argue the award must be reversed for a new trial, or at the least, remittitur.

We reject Reynolds’ assertion that the $16 million punitive damages award is "selfevidently" excessive under section 768.74(5)(a) and must fail because its sheer size confirms the jury was impermissibly influenced by prejudice or passion.⁴ A $16 million punitive damages award in a tobacco case involving death simply does not facially reflect either prejudice or passion. See, e.g., Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 232 So. 3d 294, 308 (Fla. 2017) (upholding punitive damages award of $30 million in Engle progeny case where there was no evidence amount could not have been awarded by reasonable jury and trial court found it free from undue prejudice). To the contrary, the award is well within the range of punitive damages amounts awarded in other tobacco cases, as demonstrated by even a cursory review of pertinent cases.⁵ The review of amounts awarded in similar cases "has at least a limited value" when reviewing a punitive damages award against a claim of excessiveness, but each case must be "measured in the light of the circumstances peculiar to it." Odom v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 254 So. 3d 268, 276 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185, 189 (Fla. 1953) ). In this instance, the review of similar cases confirms our conclusion that the $16 million punitive damages award was not indicative of passion or prejudice.

We next address Reynolds’ argument that the $16 million award, which is 106.7 times greater than the $150,000 net compensatory award,⁶ bears no reasonable relation to the injury suffered, as demonstrated by the disparity between it and the comparative damage award. See § 768.74(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1997). It asserts that there was no evidentiary basis presented to support such a "lop-sided," unprecedented award.

Our review of a punitive damages award that exceeds a 3 to 1 ratio requires that we first consider whether the statutory presumption of excessiveness that attaches to such an award was overcome by "clear and convincing evidence that the award is not excessive in light of the facts and circumstances which were presented to the trier of fact." § 768.73(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997). That was shown in this case. Ms. Coates adduced evidence of Reynolds’ history of disregard for the health of its smokers; its purposeful concealment of the negative health risks of smoking; its manipulation of additives and tobacco to ensure addiction; and its efforts to mislead the public on the dangers of smoking, all while knowing of the negative impact smoking had on the health of its customers. Indeed, while Reynolds acknowledged it could manufacture cigarettes that were not as harmful or addictive, its studies had shown that consumers would not smoke them, and it...