St. John v. Coisman

• Citation: 799 So.2d 1110
• Decision Date: 16 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 5D00-3031.,5D00-3031.
• Parties: John ST. JOHN, Appellant, v. Gilbert COISMAN, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)

799 So.2d 1110

John ST. JOHN, Appellant, v. Gilbert COISMAN, Appellee.

No. 5D00-3031.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

November 16, 2001.

Barbara C. Fromm and Gayle Smith Swedmark of Jolly, Peterson & Waters, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Carri S. Leininger and James O. Williams, Jr., of Williams & Leininger, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellee.

SHARP, W., J.

St. John, the defendant below, appeals from an adverse final judgment, after a jury trial which awarded Coisman compensatory damages of $102,500.00,¹ and punitive damages in the amount of $333,000.00. The punitive damage award is challenged on appeal as being so gross the trial court abused its discretion in denying a remittitur of the award, and as being excessive under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001). This latter ground mandates that we reverse and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

The claims Coisman prosecuted against St. John were for false arrest based on state law, assault and battery, false arrest based on 42 U.S.C. section 1983, and for violation of parental rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The verdict returned found for Coisman, the plaintiff below, on all of the claims except violation of parental rights. The punitive damage award was based on the section 1983 false arrest count.

These charges grew out of an altercation between Coisman and St. John when Coisman attempted to exercise his visitation rights with his children, and approached the residence in which Coisman's former wife and children lived with St. John. There had been prior confrontations between Coisman, St. John, and the former wife, and a circuit judge had issued a domestic violence injunction against Coisman. To avoid trouble, Coisman brought with him a Melbourne police officer and did not step onto the property, pursuant to the injunction. However, St. John, an off-duty deputy, insisted Coisman had violated the injunction and demanded he be arrested. When the Melbourne police refused to do so, he called fellow deputies with the sheriffs department. They came to the scene and arrested Coisman. There was no physical violence, but Coisman nonetheless spent one night in jail. Later he was exonerated of the charges, and brought this action against St. John, the arresting officers, and the sheriffs department. A settlement was reached with all defendants except St. John.

We agree there was sufficient evidence for this case to have been sent to the jury and the trial court did not err in failing to direct a verdict for St. John on any of the counts tried. We also agree there was sufficient grounds presented to afford a basis for a punitive damage award. However, the amount of the punitive damage award is the primary focus of this appeal.

This is a new and developing area of law. See Cooper; BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996)

; Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991). Where punitive damages are challenged on federal constitutional grounds in a state court, the first step in the analysis should be to determine whether state statutes apply to potentially limit or reduce the damages. If they do and the result is remittitur or reduction, this may obviate the federal constitutional challenge. But even if reduced, punitive awards may still need to be reviewed under the federal criteria, since the federal criteria are not the same as the state criteria for limiting, capping, or reducing the award.

The trial court held that the caps on punitive damages set forth in section 768.73, Florida Statutes (1999), did not apply to this case, because the jury found the defendant guilty of intentionally violating the plaintiffs civil rights and that the plaintiff was harmed by the conduct of the defendant. See § 768.73(1)(c). The section 1983 count was the only count for which the trial judge instructed the jury that it could award punitive damages.²Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir.1985). It appears that section 768.73 may not apply to a federal cause of action for intentional deprivation of civil rights because section 768.71(1), entitled "Applicability, conflicts," provides that "this part [Part II, Damages] applies to any action for damages, whether in tort or in contract," "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided."³ However, we do not have to reach that question in this case.

The applicable Florida statute is the 1993 version of section 768.73, because that is the statute in effect when this cause of action arose.⁴ See Smith v. Department of Insurance, 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla.1987)

; Gordon v. State, 585 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991),

approved, 608 So.2d 800 (Fla.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1005, 113 S.Ct. 1647, 123 L.Ed.2d 268 (1993). The 1993 version of this statute was limited by its statutory language,⁵ to civil actions based on "negligence, strict liability, products liability, misconduct in commercial transactions, professional liability, or breach of warranty," and did not then include intentional torts, unless committed in connection with commercial transactions. Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Mancusi, 599 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992),

approved in part, quashed in part, 632 So.2d 1352 (Fla.1994). Thus it clearly does not apply to this case.

Section 768.74 is another potentially applicable statute. The trial court did not expressly address the criteria set forth in section 768.74, "Remittitur and Additur," in denying the defendant-appellant's motion for remittitur. It denied relief on the ground stated that the amount of punitive damages awarded "did not shock the conscience of the court."⁶

In any event, the trial court's consideration of section 768.74 does mandate further consideration of the punitive damage award based on federal constitutional criteria, because the criteria in section 768.74 have very little correlation with the criteria set forth in Cooper and BMW v. Gore.

The statutory criteria of section 768.74 are:

(a) whether the amount awarded is indicative of prejudice, passion or corruption on the part of the trier of fact;

(b) whether it appears that the trier of fact ignored the evidence in reaching a verdict or misconceived the merits of the case relating to the amounts of damages recoverable (c) whether the trier of fact took improper elements of damages into account to arrive at the amount of damages by speculation and conjecture;

(d) whether the amount awarded bears a reasonable relation to the amount of damages with respect to the injury suffered; and

(e) whether the amount awarded was supported by the evidence and could be adduced in a logical manner by reasonable persons.

Most of these criteria are designed to measure whether or not there is evidence to support the amount of compensatory damages awarded. Only (d) relates to the federal criteria. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Cooper, punitive damages are an expression of moral condemnation, and unlike compensatory damages, do not rest upon a determination of factual issues.⁷

Further, the standard of review by a state appellate court of a trial court's determination under this section is abuse of discretion,⁸ or under the statute, close scrutiny. § 768.74(3), Fla. Stat. In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has held that when punitive damages are challenged as excessive on federal constitutional grounds, the appellate court's review of the award must be pursuant to a de novo standard. Cooper.

The criteria set forth in Cooper and Gore are controlling when a punitive damage award is challenged as excessive on federal constitutional grounds. These criteria are:

(1) the degree of the defendant's reprehensibility or culpability;

(2) the disparity (the ratio or relationship) between the actual harm caused to the plaintiff and the amount of the punitive damage award;

(3) how much the punitive damage award exceeds civil or criminal sanctions for comparable conduct.

Stated another way, the third criterion is to consider whether the defendant's conduct was sufficiently egregious to merit the amount of punitive damages in light of other awards in similar cases.

With regard to the first criterion, a court must look at the evidence adduced in the case in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. The trial court is in a better position than an appellate court to make this kind of assessment, and it would be helpful if it did so first. From the record it appears that the defendant did act out of malice and ill will towards the plaintiff, sufficient to merit a punitive damage award. However, it also appears that the altercation arose out of a domestic violence situation or conflict, and that the defendant over-reacted because of prior conflicts between the two concerning the plaintiff's visitation with his children and the treatment of his ex-wife. Further, the defendant did not use force or violence.

With regard to the second criterion, the harm suffered by the plaintiff, the record suggests it was relatively small to merit the amount of punitive damages awarded by the jury. The plaintiff was treated badly and suffered embarrassment and humiliation, when he was falsely arrested and jailed for one night. As a result, he lost some work time and was required to obtain the services of an attorney. But he was not physically harmed, and no charges were brought against him.

With regard to the third criterion, courts are directed to look at what other civil or criminal sanctions are available in this state to punish comparable behavior, and balance how they relate to the punitive damage award. The defendant in this case uttered a false statement which resulted in the plaintiff's unlawful arrest. There is no comparable criminal or civil statute...