E.R.J. v. T.L.B.

• Citation: 2023 ND 85
• Decision Date: 09 May 2023
• Docket Number: 20220199
• Parties: E.R.J., Plaintiff and Appellee v. T.L.B., Defendant and Appellant
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota

1

2023 ND 85

E.R.J., Plaintiff and Appellee v. T.L.B., Defendant and Appellant

No. 20220199

Supreme Court of North Dakota

May 9, 2023

Appeal from the District Court of Divide County, Northwest Judicial District, the Honorable Benjamen J. Johnson, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.

Carrie L. Francis, Minot, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee submitted on brief.

Thomas J. Corcoran, Williston, N.D., for defendant and appellant submitted on brief.

TUFTE JUSTICE.

[¶1] T.L.B. appeals from a district court judgment changing the surname of her child from T.L.B.'s surname to a hyphenated surname under N.D.C.C. § 14-20-57(7). The child's hyphenated name combines her father's and mother's surnames. On appeal, T.L.B. argues the district court: (1) erroneously found she changed her surname after her marriage; (2) erred because it hyphenated H.R.B's name on the erroneous basis that she shared a name with no one else in her household; (3) erred because it did not consider the factors for changing a name under N.D.C.C § 32-28-02(3); (4) erred because it did not consider T.L.B.'s emotional injury as an injury for purposes of N.D.C.C. § 32-28-02(3); (5) erred in hyphenating H.R.B.'s surname because it had insufficient best interests of the child evidence; and (6) erred in hyphenating H.R.B.'s surname because the suggestion to hyphenate the child's surname was raised for the first time at the evidentiary proceeding. We affirm.

I

[¶2] T.L.B. and E.R.J., the child's father, were never married. E.R.J. initiated this action by petitioning the court to alter the child's surname. H.R.B. was one year old at the time the district court issued its judgment. T.L.B. gave H.R.B. her surname when she provided personal information for H.R.B.'s birth certificate, and E.R.J. indicated the child's name was H.R.B. on his signed acknowledgment of paternity. T.L.B. recently married, and the parties contest whether she changed her name upon her marriage.

II

[¶3] A district court's decision regarding whether a name change under the Uniform Parentage Act is in a minor's best interest is subject to clearly erroneous review. Edwardson v. Lauer, 2004 ND 218, ¶ 4, 689 N.W.2d 407. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. In re Berger ex rel. K.C.F., 2010 ND 28, ¶ 8, 778 N.W.2d 579.

[¶4] The statute at issue in Edwardson was N.D.C.C. § 14-17-14(3) [Uniform Parentage Act (1973) § 15], which has since been repealed. Edwardson, 2004 ND 218, ¶ 4. Section 14-17-14(3), N.D.C.C., impliedly granted trial courts the power to change a child's surname if it was in a child's best interest. Id.; In re C.J.C., 2000 ND 27, ¶ 5, 606 N.W.2d 117. Under the implied authority in N.D.C.C. § 14-17-14(3), we concluded a surname change required examination of the best interests of the child, "which is a factual process best suited for clearly erroneous review." Edwardson, at ¶ 5. We conclude clearly erroneous review continues to apply to a name change under the express authority granted by N.D.C.C. § 14-20-57(7) [Uniform Parentage Act (2002) § 636]. Klundt v. Benjamin, 2019 ND 160, ¶ 27, 930 N.W.2d 116; In re Berger, 2010 ND 28, ¶ 8 (reviewing name change of a minor under N.D.C.C. ch. 32-28 under clearly erroneous standard instead of abuse of discretion standard applicable to adult name changes).

III

[¶5] T.L.B. argues the district court erred in finding that she changed her surname upon her recent marriage. T.L.B. testified that she had not changed her name, nor did she intend to do so. She testified, however, that she had entered a hyphenated name on her marriage license, which was a combination of her maiden name and her new husband's surname.

[¶6] A "person's surname does not automatically change upon marriage," but parties to a marriage may change their name after solemnization "by entering the new surname in the space provided on the marriage license application." N.D.C.C. § 14-03-20.1(2)-(3). T.L.B. testified that she entered a hyphenated name on her marriage license. This evidence supports the district court's finding, and the finding is not clearly erroneous.

[¶7] T.L.B. also argues the district court erred in finding that no one in T.L.B.'s household shares a surname with H.R.B and this error requires this Court to reverse the order. Because there was no clear error in finding T.L.B. had changed her name upon marriage, there is no clear error in the finding that H.R.B. does not share a surname with anyone in T.L.B.'s household.

IV

A

[¶8] T.L.B. argues the district court erred because it changed H.R.B.'s name solely under section 14-20-57(7), N.D.C.C., and did not also consider section 32-28-02(3), N.D.C.C. T.L.B. cited no authority requiring application of both statutes when changing a minor's name. She argues the court was required to apply both statutes because it is possible to harmonize them under N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07. We disagree. "The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal." State ex rel. N. Dakota Hous. Fin. Agency v. Center Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 ND 175, ¶ 9, 720 N.W.2d 425.

[¶9] These two sections differ in the findings of fact they require a district court to make before it has authority to change a minor's surname. Section 32-28-02(3), N.D.C.C., is the general statute for when individuals want to change their name or a child's name. See also Berger, 2010 ND 28, ¶¶ 6-7. A court must order a change of name under N.D.C.C. § 32-28-02(3) when the petitioner establishes, among other things, "proper and reasonable cause" to change a name. Section 14-20-57(7), N.D.C.C., applies when a party to a matter adjudicating parentage of a child requests a change of the child's surname "for good cause shown." N.D.C.C. § 14-20-57(7). This case concerns a parentage order; therefore, N.D.C.C. § 14-20-57(7) applies. Neither statute references the other. Both statutes set forth findings upon which the court has authority to order a name change. The statutes provide independent alternative procedures to grant a name change. The district court did not err when it applied only the requirements of N.D.C.C. § 14-20-57(7) without considering additional findings required in N.D.C.C. § 32-28-02(3).

B

[¶10] T.L.B. argues the district court erred by not considering emotional injury-the sort of injury that precludes a finding of "proper and reasonable cause" under N.D.C.C. § 32-28-02(3)-that she would allegedly suffer if the court changed her child's name. Because we interpret section 14-20-57 and section 32-28-02 as providing alternative name change authority rather than overlapping requirements, we conclude the court did not err in declining to apply the requirements of section 32-28-02(3) to this request under section 14-20-57(7).

V

A

[¶11] T.L.B. argues the district court erred because it relied on insufficient evidence to support a finding that hyphenating H.R.B.'s surname would be in the child's best interests. "On request of a party and for good cause shown, the court may order that the name of the child be changed." N.D.C.C. § 14-20-57(7) [Uniform Parentage Act § 636(e)]. The act does not define the term "good cause." N.D.C.C. § 14-20-02. In other contexts, this Court has defined good cause as "a legally sufficient reason." Interest of Guardianship of G.V., 2023 ND 19, ¶ 19, 985 N.W.2d 655 (quotations and citations omitted). However, this Court has not defined "good cause" in the context of N.D.C.C § 14-20-57(7). We interpret this uniform act guided by a statutory directive to make our law uniform with other states which enact it. N.D.C.C. § 14-20-66; N.D.C.C. § 1-02-13.

[¶12] Texas has adopted Uniform Parentage Act § 636(e). Tex. Fam. Code § 160.636 [Uniform Parentage Act (2002) § 636]. There is a split within the Texas appellate courts on the interpretation of this section of the Uniform Parentage Act. Interest of G.L.H., 630 S.W.3d 309, 313-14 (Tex. App. 2021); see also In re H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d 77, 81 n.2 (Tex. App. 2011). One group of appellate courts concluded that "the best interests of the child" and "good cause" are "distinct concepts" and a petitioner must establish both to change a child's surname. G.L.H., at 313-14. The other group of appellate courts concluded that "the good cause requirement in Section 160.636(e) is subsumed in the best-interest analysis because the best interest of a child will 'necessarily be considered [a] good cause for changing the child's name.'" Id. at 314 (citing Anderson v. Dainard, 478 S.W.3d 147, 151 n.1 (Tex. App. 2015)). This latter group weighed the best interest factors only when determining whether there was "good cause." Id. In the interest of promoting a uniform interpretation, we consider these cases in detail to explain our interpretation of "good cause" under the Uniform Parentage Act.

B

[¶13] The Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth, determined that "good cause" and "best interests of the child" were separate concepts. In re M.C.F. 121 S.W.3d 891, 894-95 (Tex. App. 2003) (separately analyzing "good cause" and "best interest"). The court first defined "good cause" as a legally sufficient reason. M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d at 896 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 213 (7th ed. 1999)). "Good cause is often the burden placed upon a litigant ... to show why a request should be granted or an action excused." Id. The court then looked to definitions of "good cause" in other legal contexts from Texas law and law from other states. Id. at 896-97. The court concluded the "good cause" standard was not met because there was a "complete absence of evidence."...