In re Interest of G.L.H.
| Decision Date | 22 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-19-00312-CV,11-19-00312-CV |
| Parties | In the INTEREST OF G.L.H., a Child |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Cynthia Rucker Allen, Abilene, for Appellant.
Tommy M. Adams, Goldthwaite, for Appellee.
Panel consists of: Trotter, J., Williams, J., and Wright, S.C.J.1
In this suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the trial court ordered that the surname of Appellant Audrey Holmquest's son, G.L.H., was changed to the surname of his father, Appellee Buck Nelson. In one issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it changed G.L.H.'s name because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish (1) that there was good cause for the name change and (2) that the name change was in G.L.H.'s best interest. We affirm.
Appellant and Appellee's romantic relationship ended shortly after Appellant learned that she was pregnant. Appellee had no significant involvement with Appellant during the pregnancy. However, four months after G.L.H. was born, Appellee filed a petition to adjudicate parentage and requested that the trial court (1) establish the parent-child relationship between Appellee and G.L.H.; (2) enter orders with regard to conservatorship, child support, and possession of G.L.H.; and (3) change G.L.H.'s surname to Appellee's surname. Appellant filed a counterpetition in which she requested (1) that she be named sole managing conservator of G.L.H.; (2) alternatively, that she and Appellee be appointed joint managing conservators and that she have the exclusive right to designate G.L.H.'s primary residence; (3) that the trial court render a possession order appropriate for the possession of a child less than three years of age; and (4) that Appellee be required to pay prospective and retroactive child support and medical support. The parties reached an agreement on all issues except the issue of Appellee's name change request.2
Appellant and Appellee were the only two witnesses at the hearing on the name change request. Appellee testified that his relationship with Appellant ended before G.L.H. was born. According to Appellee, his only hesitancy about the pregnancy was that, "in [his] mind, [he] needed a pile of money and a house." Appellee worked hard and obtained his own residence as well as some money. Although Appellant refused Appellee's offer of money, he brought her gifts and put a "significant amount" of money in the bag.
According to Appellee, he was not "fully allowed" to be involved with the pregnancy after his relationship with Appellant ended. Appellant also did not tell him when she went into labor. Appellant immediately went to the hospital when he learned that G.L.H. had been born. Over the next several months, Appellee attempted to have visitation with G.L.H. and "tried to offer help and time with him." However, his attempts to "work" with Appellant "seemed futile." Appellee filed the petition to adjudicate in order to establish his child support obligation and to obtain a possession schedule.
Although Appellee had helped raise his stepdaughters, G.L.H. was his only child, and Appellee wanted G.L.H. to have the same surname as Appellee. Appellee's family had "worked hard" to keep a "good" name, and Appellee was proud of his name. It was "extremely important in [Appellee's] raising from [his] father" that Appellee had his father's last name. Appellee was "raised with that," and he wanted G.L.H. to have Appellee's surname. In Appellee's opinion, a hyphenated last name was "kind of a mouth full" and would lead to complications when G.L.H. was older.
Appellant testified that G.L.H. was fourteen months old at the time of the final hearing. In Appellant's opinion, a name change would not benefit G.L.H., and it was not in G.L.H.'s best interest to have his name changed. However, Appellant had reluctantly agreed that G.L.H.'s surname could be changed to a hyphenated name.
According to Appellant, Appellee left her shortly after she told him that she was pregnant. Although Appellant attempted to include Appellee in doctor's appointments, the gender reveal, and a baby shower, there were long periods of time without any form of communication from Appellee. Appellant told Appellee that he could be listed as G.L.H.'s father on the birth certificate, but Appellee was not at the hospital to complete the paperwork.
Appellant testified that she had to "bring a whole lot of paperwork" whenever she took G.L.H. to "the doctor, dentist, anything" in order to prove that he was her child. Appellant believed that, if G.L.H.'s name was changed, she would "be carrying around birth certificates, social securities, extra IDs" to "anything that we do."
In Appellant's opinion, a parent needed to provide more than a name to a child. Specifically, it was important for a parent to give a child "values, virtues, life lessons." Appellant did not plan to have another child, and as part of her relationship with G.L.H., she wanted her name to "stay with him as a part of him." According to Appellant, it was "outdated" for a child to have the father's last name. Appellant, however, admitted that the situation would be different if she and Appellee were married or had been married.
The trial court granted the requested name change. The trial court stated that it was sympathetic to Appellant's position but that it expected The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law (1) that Appellee filed the petition to adjudicate when G.L.H. was four months old; (2) that, in agreed temporary orders entered on January 10, 2019, Appellee had been adjudicated to be G.L.H.'s father and had been appointed as a joint managing conservator; (3) that Appellee had been granted visitation with G.L.H. and had been paying child support; (4) that G.L.H. was fourteen months old at the time of the final hearing; and (5) that taking into consideration G.L.H.'s young age, each parent's involvement in G.L.H.'s life, and G.L.H.'s current and future needs, "in accordance with § 45.004 of the Texas Family Code," it was in G.L.H.'s best interest to change his surname to Appellee's surname.
We review the trial court's order on a request to change the name of a minor child for an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. Dainard , 478 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner or if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles.
Werthwein v. Workman , 546 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of error. Id. ; In re S.M.V. , 287 S.W.3d 435, 446 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). Rather, "the sufficiency challenge is incorporated into the abuse-of-discretion review." Anderson , 478 S.W.3d at 150. To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, we consider whether the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and whether the trial court erred in its exercise of that discretion. In re J.N.L. , 528 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) ; In re C.M.V. , 479 S.W.3d 352, 358 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.). We conduct the applicable sufficiency review when we consider the first prong of the test. In re H.S.B. , 401 S.W.3d 77, 82 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet). We then determine whether, based on that evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. In re I.D.Z. , 602 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.).
When we conduct a legal sufficiency review, we must determine whether the evidence would enable a reasonable and fair-minded person to reach the finding under review. City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005) ; In re S.M.V. , 287 S.W.3d at 446. We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and indulge every reasonable inference that supports the challenged finding. City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 822 ; In re J.N.L. , 528 S.W.3d at 240. We credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 827 ; In re J.N.L. , 528 S.W.3d at 240. When we review whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court's decision, we consider all the evidence and set aside the judgment only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain , 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) ; In re J.N.L. , 528 S.W.3d at 240.
The trial court does not abuse its discretion when it bases its decision on conflicting evidence or when there is some evidence of substantive and probative character that supports its decision. In re S.M.V. , 287 S.W.3d at 450 ; In re M.C.F. , 121 S.W.3d 891, 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). When, as in this case, the trial court acts as the factfinder, it is the sole judge of a witness's credibility and the weight to be given to each witness's testimony. City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 819 ; In re J.N.L. , 528 S.W.3d at 240.
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it changed G.L.H.'s surname because the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to establish (1) that there was good cause for the name change and (2) that the name change was in G.L.H.'s best interest. Section 45.004(a)(1) of the Texas Family Code provides that "[t]he court may order the name of a child changed if ... the change is in the best interest of the child." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 45.004(a)(1) (West 2014). Further, Section 160.636(e) of the Family Code, which governs an order in which the trial...
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