R.N., In Interest of

• Citation: 224 Ga.App. 202,480 S.E.2d 243
• Decision Date: 07 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. A96A2088,A96A2088
• Parties: , 97 FCDR 94 In the Interest of R.N. et al., children.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

Page 243

480 S.E.2d 243

224 Ga.App. 202, 97 FCDR 94

In the Interest of R.N. et al., children.

No. A96A2088.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Jan. 7, 1997.

Darden & Moyers, Richard M. Darden, Savannah, for appellant.

Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Shalen A. Sgrosso, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

BLACKBURN, Judge.

The mother of these five children appeals the juvenile court's termination of her parental rights, claiming the evidence is insufficient to support the court's judgments. ¹ The question on appeal is whether, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the lower court's judgments, "any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent's rights to custody have been lost." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of J.H., 210 Ga.App. 255, 258(1), 435 S.E.2d 753 (1993). This Court neither weighs evidence nor determines the credibility of witnesses; rather, we defer to the trial court's fact-finding and affirm unless the appellate standard is not met. In the Interest of J.M.K., 189 Ga.App. 140, 141, 375 S.E.2d 131 (1988).

Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-81(a), a juvenile court deciding whether to terminate a parent's rights employs a two-prong test, first determining whether there is "clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability." For purposes of this case, a finding of "parental misconduct or inability" must rest on clear and convincing evidence showing: 1) that the child is deprived; 2) that the cause of the deprivation is a lack of proper parental care or control; 3) that the cause of the deprivation is likely to continue or will not likely be remedied; and 4) that the continued deprivation is likely to cause physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child. OCGA § 15-11-81(b)(4)(A). If the first prong of the test is met, the trial court then considers whether the termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests.

At the time the mother's rights were terminated on August 10, 1995, these children ranged in age from four to ten years. The evidence showed the mother had demonstrated a continuing pattern of conduct that required the Chatham County Department of Family & Children Services (DFACS) to remove the children on a number of different occasions prior to the termination. In early 1989, the juvenile court declared the three oldest children deprived after Chatham County police found them living in a trailer with "maggots on the stove and trash everywhere," which the court described as "unfit for human habitation." The children's hair was infested with lice, and the utilities were being cut off for nonpayment. DFACS placed the children in foster care and worked with the parents. By March 1990, the parents had made sufficient improvements, and the court returned the children to their custody.

By 1992, however, the size of the family had grown from three children to five, and problems were again evident. The mother was hospitalized in December 1992 for depression, and the oldest two children were not enrolled in school until December 2, 1992. Between that date and January 23, 1993, these two children missed twelve of twenty-five school days and were tardy an additional five. In early 1993, eviction proceedings had been instituted against the parents, and the utilities had been cut off in their apartment. The home was strewn with food and clothes. In January 1993, one child burned himself on a space heater. The court entered another order reciting these facts and finding the children deprived. The parents stipulated to this order.

Once again, the parents improved their situation to the point that they were allowed physical (but not legal) custody of two of the children, and later four. As part of a reunification plan, the court later ordered the parents to "provide a stable, adequate, and safe residence" for these children. But after the children were returned to their parents, the problems recurred. A DFACS caseworker testified that even though social workers assisted at the mother's home once or twice a day, the children still were not getting to school, and they continued to have problems with lice. Utilities had been cut off, and "all the problems that had occurred prior to the kids being placed [with DFACS] were back." In May 1994, the mother admitted herself to a mental health "crisis stabilization unit." DFACS again assumed custody of the children.

Throughout the remainder of 1994 and into 1995, the mother made some effort to comply with required counseling, even though the parents separated, moved, then got back together. The petition for termination of parental rights was filed on April 24, 1995.

1. (a) Based on the above facts, the juvenile court did not err in finding the children deprived, the first prong of the test under OCGA § 15-11-81(a). At the time of the hearing, the parties were operating under a stipulated 1993 order which had found the children to be deprived. See In the Interest of B.P., 207 Ga.App. 242, 244, 427 S.E.2d 593 (1993) (unappealed order finding deprivation establishes deprivation for purposes of later termination proceedings). Furthermore, the evidence showed that when the mother had custody of the children, they suffered from lice infestations, did not attend school, and lived in squalid, unstable conditions. See J.M.K., supra at 141, 375 S.E.2d 131 (inability of parent to provide adequate food, shelter, and supervision). This evidence sufficiently supports the juvenile court's finding that these children were "deprived" as defined by OCGA § 15-11-2(8)(A). See In the Interest of C.N.G., 204 Ga.App. 239(1), 419 S.E.2d 42 (1992) (juvenile court has discretion in determining whether child is "deprived" which, if based on evidence, is not subject to the control of a reviewing court).

(b) The trial court was also entitled to determine that the mother's inability to adequately care for the children was the cause of the children's deprivation. OCGA § 15-11-81(b)(4)(A)(ii). A psychologist testified that, when he examined the mother in 1993, he found her to suffer from major depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and a personality disorder. The mother had been hospitalized twice for depression and admitted that when the children were last taken from her custody in 1994, she was in a state of "depression and chaos." The juvenile court properly...