R.A.P. v. B.J.P.
| Decision Date | 09 August 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. C8-88-524,C8-88-524 |
| Citation | 428 N.W.2d 103 |
| Parties | R.A.P., Appellant, v. B.J.P., Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Appellant's tort claims are not barred under the doctrine of issue preclusion.
2. Appellant may have a cause of action against respondent for negligent and/or fraudulent transmission of genital herpes.
3. Appellant's claims against respondent for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred by the two-year statute of limitations, Minn.Stat. Sec. 541.07 (1986).
4. The trial court properly granted summary judgment for respondent on appellant's claims that respondent made fraudulent misrepresentations about her background, because appellant did not identify or put into the record any specific facts showing a triable fraud claim.
5. The trial court erred in awarding respondent costs and attorney fees under Minn.Stat. Sec. 549.21, subd. 2 (1986).
Thomas W. Wexler, Scott A. Higbee, Peterson, Engberg & Peterson, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Stephen C. Davis, Brian Sobol, Katz, Davis, Manka & Haugen, Ltd., Minneapolis, for respondent.
Heard, considered and decided by WOZNIAK, C.J., and SHORT and THOREEN *, JJ.
Appellant R.A.P. brought an action against his former wife, respondent B.J.P., alleging that she negligently, intentionally, and fraudulently infected him with genital herpes. R.A.P. also asserts that B.J.P. fraudulently induced him to marry her by making false representations about her family background and upbringing.
The trial court granted summary judgment for B.J.P., and R.A.P. appeals. We reverse in part and remand the case because we conclude that R.A.P. has potential causes of action against B.J.P. for negligent and fraudulent transmission of genital herpes.
B.J.P. and R.A.P. met in October 1978. They began dating and developed a sexual relationship.
B.J.P. knew at the time she met R.A.P. that she had genital herpes. R.A.P. alleges that he discovered that he had herpes in August 1979. B.J.P. and R.A.P. were married in October 1979.
B.J.P. alleges that she told R.A.P. that she had herpes approximately two weeks after she met him, and that R.A.P. "seemed unconcerned." R.A.P. alleges that B.J.P. did not tell him that she had herpes until after they were married. R.A.P. alleges that he caught herpes from B.J.P. B.J.P. does not dispute this allegation.
The parties remained married for three years, and had a child together in 1982. R.A.P. began marriage dissolution proceedings in January 1983. While the dissolution action was pending, R.A.P. brought this action against B.J.P., alleging that B.J.P. fraudulently and negligently infected him with herpes, that B.J.P. committed battery by having sexual intercourse with him while infected with herpes, and that B.J.P. had "recklessly and intentionally" caused him emotional distress. R.A.P. also alleged that B.J.P. had fraudulently induced him to marry her by making "numerous intentional misrepresentations of material fact about herself, her family, her background, and her upbringing." R.A.P sought compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $50,000.
The parties' marriage was dissolved in June 1986. In June 1987, B.J.P. moved for summary judgment in R.A.P.'s tort action against her, arguing that R.A.P. had no causes of action for fraudulent or negligent infliction of herpes, or for fraudulent inducement to marry, and that his intentional tort claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations, Minn.Stat. Sec. 541.07 (1986).
The trial court granted summary judgment for B.J.P., ruling that "the basic gist of many of the issues" was "covered" in the dissolution action, and that R.A.P.'s intentional tort claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court also awarded B.J.P. her costs and attorney fees under Minn.Stat. Sec. 549.21, subd. 2 (1986).
1. Are R.A.P.'s tort claims barred under the doctrine of issue preclusion?
2. Does R.A.P. have a cause of action against B.J.P. for negligent and/or fraudulent transmission of herpes?
3. Are R.A.P.'s intentional tort claims barred by the statute of limitations?
4. Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment for B.J.P. on R.A.P.'s claim for money damages based on B.J.P.'s alleged misrepresentations about her background?
5. Did the trial court err in awarding B.J.P. costs and attorney fees under Minn.Stat. Sec. 549.21, subd. 2 (1986)?
Summary judgment is appropriate in cases where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn.R.Civ.P. 56.03. On review of a summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted. See, e.g., Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn.1982). In this case, there are a number of material facts in dispute, and it is not clear that B.J.P. is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, he has potential causes of action against B.J.P. for negligent and fraudulent infliction of genital herpes. We therefore reverse in part and remand the case.
The trial court found that summary judgment was appropriate because "the basic gist of many of the issues raised" was "covered" in the parties' dissolution action. The trial court apparently reasoned that the doctrine of issue preclusion bars R.A.P. from raising the same issues again.
The doctrine of issue preclusion prevents parties from relitigating issues which are identical to issues already litigated in other actions between the parties. Johnson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn.1988); Ellis v. Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn.1982). Issue preclusion does not bar this action, because it is clear from the record that none of the issues presented here was litigated in the dissolution action. The dissolution action decided the issues of property division and child custody. The trial court did not determine whether B.J.P. is liable to R.A.P. in tort for damages caused by transmission of genital herpes, or for damages caused by B.J.P.'s alleged fraudulent misrepresentations about her background. 1 R.A.P. is therefore not precluded from raising these issues in this action.
Since the doctrine of issue preclusion does not prevent R.A.P. from raising his tort claims against B.J.P., we must determine whether R.A.P.'s claims state valid, recognizable causes of action under Minnesota law. Whether Minnesota courts should recognize causes of action for negligent, fraudulent, or intentional transmission of genital herpes, or for intentional infliction of emotional distress in this context is an issue of first impression. 2 We hold that R.A.P. has potential claims against B.J.P. for negligent and fraudulent transmission of genital herpes, but that R.A.P.'s intentional tort claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Minn.Stat. Sec. 541.07 (1986).
It is undisputed that B.J.P. knew that she had genital herpes when she had sexual contact with R.A.P. The key issue in dispute is whether B.J.P. told R.A.P. about her illness before or after they had sexual contact.
R.A.P. alleges that B.J.P. was negligent because she had sexual contact with him without warning him that she had herpes. He alleges that he contracted herpes as a result of B.J.P.'s negligence, and that he has suffered significant damage. We agree that, on the facts presented here, R.A.P. has stated a prima facie claim of negligence.
The essential elements of negligence are:
1) That the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty to avoid injuring the plaintiff;
2) That the defendant breached this duty;
3) That the breach of duty was the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff; and
4) That the plaintiff suffered damages.
See Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn.1982); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 281 (1965); W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
B.J.P. contends that R.A.P. has no cause of action against her for negligent transmission of herpes, because she had no legal duty to disclose her illness to R.A.P. before having sexual contact with him. Whether a legal duty existed between B.J.P. and R.A.P. is an issue of law for us to resolve. See Larson v. Larson, 373 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Minn.1985). We hold that B.J.P. had a legal duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid transmitting genital herpes to R.A.P.
Minnesota courts have long recognized that the preservation of public health is a matter of great public importance. Legal duties and rules must therefore be designed, whenever possible, to help prevent the spread of dangerous, communicable diseases. Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 326, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (1919). It is already established under Minnesota law that individuals may be held liable for the negligent transmission of serious infectious diseases. See Kowalske v. Armour & Co., 300 Minn. 301, 305, 220 N.W.2d 268, 271 (1974) (brucellosis); Skillings, 143 Minn. at 327, 173 N.W. at 664 (scarlet fever) 3. This rule is based on the simple principle that people who have dangerous contagious diseases have a duty to protect others who might be in danger of infection. See Skillings, 143 Minn. at 325-26, 173 N.W. at 664; see also Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J.Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107, 109 (1953) (tuberculosis); Hendricks v. Butcher, 144 Mo.App. 671, 129 S.W. 431 (1910) (smallpox); Kliegel v. Aitken, 94 Wis. 432, 69 N.W. 67, 68 (1896) (typhoid fever); Gilbert v. Hoffman, 66 Iowa 205, 23 N.W. 632 (1885) (smallpox).
We see no basis for creating a different rule for genital herpes. Genital herpes is a contagious and debilitating disease. 4 It is extremely painful, and often leads to serious physical 5 and...
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