R.R., In Interest of
Decision Date | 18 June 1996 |
Docket Number | No. A96A0410,A96A0410 |
Citation | 222 Ga.App. 301,474 S.E.2d 12 |
Parties | In the Interest of R. R., a child. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Jeffrey B. Bogart, Glenda L. Sullivan, Atlanta, Susan A. Hurst, Smyrna, for appellant.
Mary B. James, for appellee.
This is a discretionary appeal from a final judgment on modification of child custody and child support.
Appellee Valerie Lynn Vann Rountree brought this modification action against appellant William D. Rountree. Appellee and appellant were divorced in December 1993; the settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree provided appellant would have sole custody over the couple's three-year-old son, R. R., until the child attained age 18. Appellee, a school teacher, was awarded visitation rights subject to certain conditions. R.R. had been in the care of appellant since October 1992 while appellee mother had been in various inpatient and outpatient treatment facilities for alcohol abuse. At the time of the divorce, appellant worked for an Atlanta-based software company performing specialized computer programming services involving the use of the computer language COBOL.
In November 1994, appellant accepted employment with United Parcel Service in Louisville, Kentucky; he testified this job offered long-range employment opportunity, would not require him to travel, provided an opportunity to gain increased work experience, and resulted in an increase in his salary. He further testified that he did not attempt to find a job in the Atlanta area immediately before accepting the out-of-state job, and that he had a restrictive covenant in his employment contract with the Atlanta firm. There exists uncontroverted testimony of record regarding R. R.'s secure and loving relationship with his father. Appellant testified that following the move he was willing to work out a new visitation schedule. Appellee testified and admitted her prior history of alcoholism, the course of her treatment, and that she is in recovery; she has remained sober and without any alcohol since March 1993. At the time of her divorce appellee, who was then in the early stages of recovery, recognizing her situation and, in part, being influenced by her addictionologist, agreed to let appellant have sole custody of R.R. in exchange for frequent visiting privileges. Under the terms of the agreement, appellee was granted liberal visitation with R.R. every second and fourth and every other fifth weekend; overnight visitation every Wednesday; and every Friday afternoon from 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., and specified holidays and summer visits. Appellee further testified that because of the distance involved in appellant's move, R.R. is now being denied the same degree of access to his mother and to his maternal and paternal grandparents that he previously experienced. As a result of R. R.'s sudden relocation, he informed appellee that he did not believe she loved him any more and had abandoned him; appellee discussed this matter at length with R.R. and assured him this was not so. She calls R.R. nightly but frequently only gets the answering machine. Appellee acknowledged there has been no decline in appellant's ability to take care of R.R. or to be a good parent to him due to the relocation.
Appellant abruptly moved R.R. during the December holiday season, after securing out-of-state employment, without giving any prior notice either to appellee or R.R. Appellant contends this was due to his concern about appellee's adverse reaction to the move and his belief that prior knowledge of the move would cause R.R. to be upset.
The trial court orally stated on the record: The court explained its ruling as follows: The juvenile court concluded there has been an adverse effect or change of condition which is the destruction of the relationship between the parent and one child, or conduct that was "tantamount to the destruction of it," by appellant having moved so that the child "was not able" to see his mother and visit with her with the same frequency as before the move. Subsequently, the juvenile court issued its written final judgment, and made the following written findings of fact: (a) both parents are fit and proper persons to have custody of the minor child; (b) appellee is a recovering alcoholic and is currently sober; (c) there has been a substantial change of condition "due to the father's removal of his residence and the residence of the minor child ... from Georgia to Kentucky"; and (d) there has been a change of conditions which is the "destruction of the relationship between the child and one parent." The court awarded joint legal custody of the child to both appellant and appellee. As to physical custody the court ruled that if appellant resides in Gwinnett County or within ten miles thereof by July 6, 1995, he shall be the primary physical custodian of the child and that the mother would have visitation rights as stated in the final judgment; but if appellant was not living in Gwinnett County or within ten miles thereof, appellee shall be the primary physical custodian and the father would have visitation rights as stated in the final judgment. Held:
1. (a) Once a permanent child custody award has been entered, the test for the trial court to use in change of child custody suits is whether there has been a change of conditions affecting the welfare of the child. The primary consideration to be given, as the trial court views the evidence, is the welfare of the child. Arp v. Hammonds, 200 Ga.App. 715, 716-717, 409 S.E.2d 275. A showing of changed conditions of an out-of-custody parent, without a showing of its material effect on the child is insufficient to warrant a change in custody. Id.; but compare In the Interest of S.D.J., 215 Ga.App. 779, 780, 452 S.E.2d 155 ( ).
(b) Though vested with discretion, the trial judge is restricted to the evidence and is unauthorized to change the custody where there is no evidence to show a new and material condition that affects the welfare of the child. Arp, supra. The discretion in such matters lies exclusively with the trial court, and if there exists any reasonable evidence to support the court's decision concerning change of custody as between parents, such decision will be affirmed on appeal. Arp, supra at 717, 409 S.E.2d 275. " " Ormandy v. Odom, 217 Ga.App. 780, 781(1), 459 S.E.2d 439. Generally, " " Id., but compare In the Interest of S.D.J., supra ( ). Nevertheless, OCGA § 19-9-1(a)(1) (formerly OCGA § 19-9-1(a)) expressly provides that "in all cases in which a divorce is granted, an application for divorce is pending, or a change...
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