R.A.S. v. State
Decision Date | 29 May 1998 |
Parties | Ex parte State of Alabama. (Re R.A.S. v. State). 1961990. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Yvonne A.H. Saxon, asst. atty. gen., for petitioner.
Michael A. Dasinger III of Hoiles & Dasinger, P.C., Robertsdale, for respondent.
This case involves a prosecution of an alleged resident child molester in which there was evidence of multiple acts of alleged molestation that had occurred over an extended period of time, and it involves legal questions similar to those presented in R.L.G., Jr. v. State, 712 So.2d 348 (Ala.Cr.App.1997), affirmed, Ex parte R.L.G., Jr., 712 So.2d 372 (Ala.1998).
Traditionally, Alabama follows a strict election rule, by which the State must elect the offense on which it will proceed when the evidence discloses two or more offenses growing out of distinct and separate transactions. In R.L.G. v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals expanded the strict election rule in sexual abuse cases involving a resident abuser of small children where only generic evidence was presented, stating:
"[W]e adopt, for purposes of this case, the 'either/or' rule, but only as that rule is modified for generic evidence: where the evidence of more than one incident of sexual molestation to a child victim by a resident child molester is purely generic and where 'there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular acts, and the only question [for the jury] is whether or not the defendant in fact committed all of [the incidents],' the trial court should instruct the jury that it can find the defendant guilty only if it unanimously agrees that he committed all the incidents described by the victim."
712 So.2d at 367 (emphasis omitted). The "either-or" rule provides that the prosecution must elect which single act it is relying for a conviction or else the trial judge must give a specific unanimity instruction.
This Court granted certiorari review in R.L.G. and affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals' expansion of the strict election rule, stating:
Ex parte R.L.G., 712 So.2d at 373.
In this case, the specific question presented is whether, in child molestation cases involving an alleged resident abuser and where there is both generic and specific evidence of sexual abuse, this Court should further modify or expand the exception to Alabama's long-standing rule requiring the State to make an election.
R.A.S. was convicted of first degree sexual abuse of his stepdaughter A.M., § 13A-6-66(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975; first degree sodomy of A.M., § 13A-6-63(a)(3); second degree rape of A.M., § 13A-6-62(a)(1); first degree sexual abuse of his stepdaughter C.M., § 13A-6-66(a)(3); and first degree sodomy of C.M., § 13A-6-63(a)(3).
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction, R.A.S. v. State, 718 So.2d 108 (Ala.Cr.App.1997), basing its reversal on this Court's holding in Ex parte King, 707 So.2d 657 (Ala.1997), in which a majority of this Court declined to overrule or to make an exception to the long-standing doctrine of election as it was enunciated in Deason v. State, 363 So.2d 1001 (Ala.1978), and Watkins v. State, 36 Ala.App. 711, 63 So.2d 293 (1953).
Even though the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction, it specifically urged this Court to consider extending the expansion of the strict election rule to apply to cases based upon generic and specific evidence, such as this one. The court wrote:
718 So.2d at 116. We granted the State's petition for the writ of certiorari primarily to consider, as requested by the Court of Criminal Appeals, reexamining the holding in Ex parte King and to consider extending the expansion of the strict election rule to apply to cases based upon generic and specific evidence.
After reexamining the holding in Ex parte King and the holding in Ex parte R.L.G., we agree with the State that the strict election rule should be expanded in cases that, like this one, involve a resident child molester and in which there is both generic evidence and specific evidence indicating that multiple acts of molestation have occurred over an extended period.
In R.L.G. v. State, supra, in which the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted an expanded election rule in cases involving only generic evidence, the court discussed many of the same legal issues that are presented in this case, such as (1) a defendant's due process right to fair notice of the charges against him and to a reasonable opportunity to defend against those charges; (2) a defendant's entitlement to a verdict in which all 12 jurors concur, beyond a reasonable doubt, as to each offense charged; and (3) the right of a defendant to have his or her conviction sustained only if it is supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals and this Court reviewed each of these issues in the R.L.G. cases, and we have reviewed them again in this case.
In R.L.G. v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals discussed at length the defendant's right to procedural due process, stating:
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