Raby v. Baptist Medical Center

• Decision Date: 09 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 97-A-984-N.,Civ.A. 97-A-984-N.
• Citation: 21 F.Supp.2d 1341
• Parties: Jeffery Eugene RABY, Plaintiff, v. BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER, Ed Alford, Robert D. Mangum, R.D. "Reggie" Bridges, Michael Doty, and Mike DeBoer, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

21 F.Supp.2d 1341

Jeffery Eugene RABY, Plaintiff, v. BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER, Ed Alford, Robert D. Mangum, R.D. "Reggie" Bridges, Michael Doty, and Mike DeBoer, Defendant.

No. Civ.A. 97-A-984-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

September 9, 1998.

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Joseph B. Lewis, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Joseph C. Espy, James E. Williams, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ALBRITTON, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendants on June 18, 1998 (Doc # 54).

The Plaintiff originally filed his Complaint in this case on June 25, 1997, but has filed three Amended Complaints subsequent to his original Complaint. The Plaintiff brings claims for assault (Count I), battery (Count II), negligence (Count III), negligence per se (Count IV), negligent battery (Count V), negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision (Count VI), deprivation of civil rights under color of state law (Count VII), outrage (Count VIII), respondeat superior (Count IX), wanton and willful conduct (Count X), and Defamation per se (Count XI).

For the reasons to be discussed, the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part on Raby's § 1983 claims. The court will address the Motion for Summary Judgment as to the state law claims brought by Raby in a separate Order entered on this date.

II. FACTS

The submissions of the parties establish the following facts construed in a light most favorable to the non-movant:

The Plaintiff, Jeffery Raby ("Raby"), has brought claims based on events which occurred when he was arrested by Baptist Medical Center police officers. Although Baptist Medical Center is a private organization, the Alabama Legislature has passed, and the Governor approved, an Act by which Baptist Medical Center is given the authority to appoint police officers. See Ala. Acts 1996, No. 96-518. Any person appointed by Baptist Medical Center under this Act "shall be charged with all the powers of state or municipal police officers including, but not limited to, the right to bear firearms." Id.

On the day in which the events in this case transpired, Raby's car was parked in the parking lot of Montgomery Cardiovascular Institute (MCI) near the Easter Seals Center.¹ Raby entered the Easter Seals Center and while he was inside, Defendant R.D. "Reggie" Bridges ("Bridges"), a Baptist Medical Center police officer, noted the license number on Raby's car. When Raby emerged from the Easter Seals Center, Bridges demanded identification, and Raby complied with his request. He then radioed the information in and was told that Raby should be arrested for trespassing because of a court order stemming from a prior trespassing conviction. When Bridges attempted to arrest Raby, Raby got into his car and locked the doors. Bridges placed his side-arm in the gap at the top of the driver's side window and demanded that Raby emerge from the vehicle.

Robert D. Mangum ("Mangum"), also a Baptist Medical Center police officer, subsequently arrived on the scene. Mangum attempted to break the driver's side window with his baton while Bridges attempted to unlock the passenger's side door. The evidence is then contested as to Mangum's next actions. Mangum moved either directly in front of or to the side of Raby's car and shot him through the windshield, either as or before Raby drove off. The officers then chased Raby to the Easter Seals Center² where they, and an additional officer named Michael Doty ("Doty") pinned him on the floor, struck him, and handcuffed him. Raby was subsequently admitted to Baptist Medical Center for treatment of his injuries. Raby also contends that he was libeled by the publication of newspaper accounts of the shooting.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing, or pointing out to, the district court that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On the other hand, the evidence of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

IV. DISCUSSION

Because some of the Baptist Medical Center police officers involved in this case participated directly in the events which transpired, while others allegedly established the policies or customs pursuant to which these officers acted, the court will separately address the liability of the officers. The court will then separately address the application of qualified immunity to the acts of these officers.

A. Violation of Raby's Constitutional Rights — County VII

While Raby has not specifically explained the civil rights he contends were violated by the actions of the Baptist Medical Center officers, "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other `seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard ..." Toth v. City of Dothan, 953 F.Supp. 1502, 1510 (M.D.Ala.1996) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). The court will, therefore, analyze Raby's claim under Count VII as a Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.³

1. Mangum's Alleged Violation of Raby's Rights

Raby seeks to hold Mangum liable based on his direct participation in the shooting and subsequent arrest of Raby. He contends that in shooting Raby and in struggling with Raby and punching him in the face, Mangum used an unreasonable amount of force.

When Mangum shot Raby, Raby was seated in his car and Mangum and Bridges had been attempting to arrest Raby for trespassing. In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the Supreme Court set forth parameters within which a police officer can lawfully use deadly force against a fleeing felon. Under Garner, the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect who does not appear to be armed or otherwise dangerous violates the suspect's rights under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable seizure. Id. at 21, 105 S.Ct. 1694. The Eleventh Circuit has described the requirements for using deadly force identified by the Supreme Court as being that the officer must have probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or to others; deadly force must be necessary to prevent escape, and the officer must give some warning regarding the possible use of deadly force whenever feasible. Acoff v. Abston, 762 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir.1985).

In deciding whether a particular seizure is reasonable, reasonableness "is to be determined by `balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.'" Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983)). Proper application of this test requires "careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case ..." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The reasonableness of any particular seizure is also "judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. In determining whether a given seizure is reasonable the court must make "allowance for the fact that police officers are often called upon to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The test of reasonableness is an objective one so the underlying motivation of the officer is irrelevant. Id.

The Defendants have argued that Mangum acted reasonably because he reasonably thought that Raby posed a threat of immediate harm. In support of this argument, the Defendants state...