Toth v. City of Dothan, Ala., Civil Action No. 95-D-1624-S.

• Decision Date: 06 December 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 95-D-1624-S.
• Citation: 953 F.Supp. 1502
• Parties: Sylvia TOTH, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF DOTHAN, ALABAMA, Sheriff Lamar Hadden, and F.E. Ingram, officially and individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

953 F.Supp. 1502

Sylvia TOTH, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF DOTHAN, ALABAMA, Sheriff Lamar Hadden, and F.E. Ingram, officially and individually, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 95-D-1624-S.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

December 6, 1996.

Adam M. Porter, Birmingham, AL, David W. Graybeal, Norcross, GA, for plaintiff.

Derel K. Kelly, Gary C. Sherrer, Dothan, AL, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court is defendants F. Eddie Ingram ("Ingram") and former Sheriff Lamar Hadden's ("Hadden") motion for and brief in support of summary judgment filed September 19, 1996. The City of Dothan also filed a motion and brief in support of summary judgment on September 19, 1996.¹ Plaintiff, Sylvia Toth ("Toth"), filed an opposition brief to both motions for summary judgment on October 4, 1996. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant case law and the record as a whole, the court finds that the defendants' motions are due to be granted in part and denied in part.

JURISDICTION

Based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,² 1343(a)(3) and (4),³ and 1367,⁴ the court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction of venue.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff filed this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the defendants. Compl. Specifically, plaintiff claims that defendants used excessive force in the execution of a search warrant and that she was subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure. Id. Additionally, plaintiff brings state law claims of invasion of privacy and trespass. Id.

Prior to December 24, 1993, a confidential informant reported to the Houston County Sheriff's Department that Zoltan Toth, husband of the plaintiff, was selling counterfeit merchandise out of his motel room. Ingram Aff. at 1. On December 24, 1993, the informant purchased some of the merchandise from Zoltan Toth and showed it to Ingram, an investigator with the Houston County Sheriff's Department.. Id. at 1-2. After examining the counterfeit merchandise, Ingram secured a search warrant, signed by a Houston County District Judge, authorizing the sheriff's department to search for "several dozen purses, wallets and watches ... falsely marked with legal trademarks of Dooney & Bourke and Rolex" in Room #127 at the Holiday Inn West, in Dothan, Alabama, where Zoltan Toth was believed to be residing and selling the illegal merchandise.⁵ Id. at 2, Exhibit A (Search Warrant). While Ingram was obtaining the search warrant, Sheriff Hadden stayed behind in order to observe Zoltan Toth's activities. Hadden Aff. at 2. After receiving a call from the informant, however, Hadden testified that he left the scene to meet with the informant; when he returned to the scene, Zoltan Toth's van was gone. Id.

At 11:46 p.m., on December 24, 1993, Ingram and Dothan City Police Officer Andy Hughes⁶ ("Hughes") approached Room # 127 at the Holiday Inn West, but before they could knock on the door, plaintiff, who was alone in the room, opened the door. Ingram Aff. at 2. Ingram and Hughes claim that they advised plaintiff they had a search warrant to search for counterfeit merchandise and that plaintiff allowed them to enter the room. Id. Hadden remained in his vehicle, observing the area for the return of Zoltan Toth's van. Hadden Aff. at 2. Hadden "checked" on the other two officers during their search of the room. Id. He was present for approximately one minute. Hughes Aff. at 3.

Plaintiff, however, recounts a very different version of the search. Plaintiff states that at or about 1:30 a.m. on the morning of December 25, 1993, she was alone in her motel room, which had one door and one window. Toth Aff. at 1. She heard a noise and upon opening the door to investigate, she was "confronted by numerous law enforcement officers around the door with drawn weapons that were immediately pointed at [her] body." Id. at 2. Plaintiff states that two officers pointed their firearms "at point blank range" at her head and then "burst into her motel room." Id. She further alleges that she never saw a search warrant, that Ingram pushed her and knocked her down, and that the defendants searched her room without her permission, threatening to arrest her and refusing to let her take medication for her diabetic condition. Id. She claims the defendants pushed her and struck her with a wooden baton and that she was held on the bed with the baton at her throat while the officers searched the room. Id. Plaintiff admits there was a gun in the room but claims that it was in a drawer. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the officers stayed for "what seemed like about an hour or more." Id.

Ingram describes plaintiff as "belligerent" but, nevertheless, denies that anyone at any time during the search "drew or used any weapons." Ingram Aff. at 2-3; see also Hughes Aff. at 3. Ingram and Hughes also deny that either of them ever touched, shoved, struck or used any other force whatsoever against plaintiff. They deny that plaintiff ever complained about being ill and requesting medicine. Ingram Aff. at 2-3; see also Hughes Aff. at 3. Finding only a .38 revolver "with extra [rounds] lying on the bedside table," the officers were unsuccessful in locating any counterfeit merchandise, and they testify that they left the motel approximately 15 minutes after entering the room. Ingram Aff. at 2-4; Hadden Aff. at 3; Hughes Aff. at 2-3.

Claiming to have suffered post-traumatic stress disorder and depression as a result of this incident, plaintiff brings this suit against Hadden and Ingram in their individual and official capacities as law enforcement officers. Id. at 4. Additionally, she brings this suit against the City of Dothan for its failure to adequately train the members of its police department in the law of search and seizure and appropriate use of force in the execution of a search warrant. Compl.

Primarily relying on the defense of immunity, all defendants have moved for summary judgment in this matter.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Supreme Court has stated:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Supreme Court of the United States has noted, on the other hand, that "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is improper "if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. See Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).

At the summary judgment stage, the court must construe the evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or her] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

In meeting this burden the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11.

DISCUSSION

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code creates a mechanism for recovering monetary damages from and securing injunctive relief against governmental actors and entities whose action under color of state or local law deprive a plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution or federal statutes. Plaintiff brings this instant action based on § 1983, alleging that her constitutional rights protecting against...