Rachal v. State

• Decision Date: 17 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 71569,71569
• Citation: 917 S.W.2d 799
• Parties: Rodney Charles RACHAL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 799

917 S.W.2d 799

64 USLW 2527

Rodney Charles RACHAL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 71569.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas En Banc.

Jan. 17, 1996.

Rehearing Denied March 20, 1996.

George McCall Secrest, Jr., Houston, for appellant.

J. Harvey Hudson, Assist. Dist. Atty., Houston, Robert A. Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for State.

OPINION

WHITE, Judge.

In October 1992, appellant was tried and convicted of capital murder under Texas Penal Code § 19.03. The offense, a double robbery-murder, was committed in October 1990. The jury affirmatively answered the two special issues submitted under Article 37.071(b). ¹ Appellant was sentenced to death as mandated by Article 37.071(e). Article 37.071(h) provides direct appeal to this Court. Appellant raises fifteen points of error. We affirm.

In point of error fourteen appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that appellant "would commit criminal acts of violence in the future which would constitute a continuing threat to society." Art. 37.071(b)(2). In answering issues raised under Article 37.071(b), the jury may consider evidence admitted at both the guilt-innocence and punishment stages of trial. Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). The jury is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and may choose to believe all, some, or none of it. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the exclusive province of the jury. Losada v. State, 721 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Thus, sufficiency reviews on appeal require that while examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements in question beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Burns v. State, 761 S.W.2d 353, 356-357. ² Reviewing the record before us under the Jackson standard, we must uphold the jury's verdict.

The record reveals, largely from appellant's own confession, the following facts supporting the verdict: On the evening of October 25, 1990, appellant visited his friend, Michelle Dupree and her roommate, Gwendolyn Frank. Three others were present: Tommy German, Howard Gibson, and Felicia Duplachane. The group was smoking marihuana and taking Valium (diazepam). Appellant and German talked about committing a robbery. When all but Frank had agreed to participate in the aggravated robbery, firm plans were laid. The women, dressed seductively, would lure male victims to a location where the male conspirators would ambush and rob the victims at gun point. While Duplachane and Dupree changed into "whoring" clothes, the men got their guns.

The group, joined by a driver identified only as Ant, went to an apartment complex selected for its high pedestrian traffic. Spotting three men ambling about the complex, Duplachane and Dupree walked toward them so as to catch their attention. The three male victims, C. Washington, A. Robinson and T. Davis, beguiled by Duplachane and Dupree, followed the women, uttering lewd exclamations. As they passed by appellant, the women signaled that these men were the targets. Appellant approached the victims, exposed his .357 caliber handgun and ordered them to lie down. As appellant began searching the three men, his accomplices, German and Gibson, joined him. Two male bystanders became aware of the robbery and fled. Appellant yelled for his accomplices to stop them. Two shots were fired at the fleeing men. Without provocation, German then shot one of the prostrate victims, Davis, in the back. Appellant, also without provocation, shot the other two victims, Washington and Robinson, in the head. Washington and Davis were fatally wounded. Robinson survived.

Meanwhile the fourth victim, T. Fonteno, was on the grounds of the apartment complex. He heard gun shots and froze upon seeing appellant turn a corner with gun in hand. Appellant approached Fonteno demanding dope and money. Fonteno replied that he had neither and surrendered his wallet to appellant. Appellant ordered Fonteno on his knees, but fearing execution, Fonteno refused, pleading with appellant that there was no need to shoot him. German joined appellant and raised his shotgun to strike Fonteno with it. As Fonteno raised his arms to protect himself from the blow, appellant shot him in the lower chest and abdomen.

This record reveals a planned ambush, the cold and senseless murder of two men, and the near-fatal shooting of two other men wholly without provocation. Appellant personally shot three of the four victims. The victim killed by appellant was shot in the head at close range as he lay helplessly prostrate on the ground. Appellant also shot one of the surviving victims at close range in the head. Appellant commanded his cohorts to shoot at the two bystanders who fled and he also personally shot Fonteno, leaving him for dead. And, these shootings occurred, as planned, within the precincts of an apartment complex, accentuating appellant's gross disregard for human life.

Nor was this appellant's first offense. During his sentencing trial, appellant's criminal record was introduced, establishing that appellant had previously been convicted of evading arrest, misdemeanor assault, criminal mischief, and unlawful possession of a weapon. Appellant's lengthy juvenile record included theft and burglary for which he had been placed under the supervision of the Harris County Juvenile Probation Department; this probation was ultimately adjudicated because of various violations. An officer from Juvenile Probation testified that she "knew he was headed for violence." Three witnesses also testified that appellant had a bad reputation for violence and law-breaking, and two other witnesses testified from personal knowledge that appellant was violent and aggressive while incarcerated and awaiting trial. Evidence was introduced that only months before the tried offense, appellant had shot and killed a man known as Charles Wilson. ³

Evidence indicated that appellant was without regret or remorse for any of the killings. Indeed, such was appellant's lack of reflection and remorse on the taking of Charles Wilson's life, that soon thereafter he actively sought to place himself in the position to take more lives and did so. E.g., Williams v. State, 668 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); See also Wilkerson v. State, 881 S.W.2d 321, 343 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1060, 115 S.Ct. 671, 130 L.Ed.2d 604 (1994) (Judge Baird dissenting) (explaining importance of lack of remorse as evidence of future dangerousness). And, no sooner had appellant literally turned the corner from having fatally injured two of his victims, than he again attempted robbery and murder of another. Wilkerson, 881 S.W.2d at 325-326. And, again we note that his shooting spree occurred in a heavily trafficked residential area where every bullet fired showed callousness and disrespect for human life.

The evidence introduced at trial established appellant's propensity for casual shooting and killing. This utter disregard for human life supports the jury's finding that appellant indeed poses a continuing threat to society as contemplated in Article 37.071(b)(2). Appellant's fourteenth point of error is overruled.

In his first point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence during his punishment trial that he had a few months previous to the tried offense been investigated, arrested, and ultimately no-billed in the fatal shooting of a man known as Charles Wilson. During his sentencing trial, it was introduced, over appellant's objection, that in May 1990, he was arrested and charged in the murder of Charles Wilson. It was also introduced that the charges were ultimately dismissed when no-billed by a Grand Jury, and the State's attorney testified that he had investigated the homicide and personally believed that "the evidence was such that a fair jury would probably have concluded that it was self-defense." Appellant argues that since the extraneous homicide was found to be "justifiable and lawful" and committed in "self-defense," it should not have been admitted against him. Appellant does not dispute that he committed the homicide, but challenges the relevance of such evidence and alternatively argues that it is substantially more prejudicial than probative. Tex.R.Crim.Evid.R. 402 and 403.

Appellant overstates the meaning of a no-bill. The Grand Jury's no-bill of the Wilson homicide does not mean it was justified, lawful, or in self-defense. The Grand Jury is without authority to make such findings; its authority and duty is limited to inquiring into criminal accusations and determining whether evidence exists to formally charge a person with an offense. Arts. 20.09, 20.19; and Art. 21.01 (defining indictment). A Grand Jury's no-bill is merely a finding that the specific evidence brought before the particular Grand Jury did not convince them to formally charge the accused with the offense alleged. Thus, the issue here is whether evidence of an extraneous homicide, upon which a Grand Jury no-billed the appellant, is admissible against him in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.

We recently addressed and answered an indistinguishable question in Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 908 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1114, 115 S.Ct. 909, 130 L.Ed.2d 791 (1995). Burks asserted that the trial court erred during his sentencing trial by admitting evidence, including photographs, of an unindicted murder in which he had been charged and arrested. Id. The district attorney testified that he had dropped the murder charges against Burks because he believed the evidence insufficient to convict Burks. Id. at 909. In Burks, we ultimately held that the trial court had not erred. Id. We treated the homicide evidence in...