Racing Ass'n of Central Iowa v. Fitzgerald
Decision Date | 03 February 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 01-0011.,01-0011. |
Citation | 675 N.W.2d 1 |
Parties | RACING ASSOCIATION OF CENTRAL IOWA, Iowa Greyhound Association, Dubuque Racing Association, Ltd., and Iowa West Racing Association, Appellants, v. Michael FITZGERALD, Treasurer, State of Iowa, Appellee. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Mark McCormick, Thomas L. Flynn, and Edward M. Mansfield of Belin Lamson McCormick Zumbach Flynn, a Professional Corporation, Des Moines, for appellant Racing Association of Central Iowa.
Gerald Crawford and Brad Schroeder of The Crawford Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant Iowa Greyhound Association.
Stephen C. Krumpe of O'Connor & Thomas, P.C., Dubuque, for appellant Dubuque Racing Association, Ltd.
Lawrence P. McLellan of Sullivan & Ward, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant Iowa West Racing Association.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jeffrey D. Farrell and Jean M. Davis, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
156 L.Ed.2d at 102, we take the opportunity on remand to reconsider our prior decision on the state constitution claim in light of the Court's ruling on the federal constitution issue.
After giving due consideration to the Court's analysis and decision, we find no basis to change our earlier opinion that the differential tax violates article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's contrary ruling and remand this case for a determination of the appropriate relief.
This action was commenced by the appellant, Racing Association of Central Iowa (RACI), to enjoin the collection of that portion of taxes it was required to pay on adjusted gross receipts from gambling in excess of the tax charged to "excursion boats" on such receipts. See generally 1989 Iowa Acts ch. 67 ( ). RACI claimed the tax was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions.
RACI operates a pari-mutuel horse racetrack and casino known as Prairie Meadows Racetrack and Casino in Altoona, Iowa. Appellant, Dubuque Racing Association, Ltd., which intervened in RACI's lawsuit, operates a pari-mutuel dog racetrack and casino known as Dubuque Greyhound Park and Casino in Dubuque, Iowa. Another intervenor, appellant Iowa West Racing Association, holds the gaming license and owns the slot machines for Bluffs Run Racetrack and Casino in Council Bluffs, Iowa. The fourth appellant, Iowa Greyhound Association, intervened to protect the interests of its members, greyhound owners who race at the Dubuque and Council Bluffs dog tracks.
The tax statute challenged by these parties is Iowa Code section 99F.11 (1999), which imposes a tax "on the adjusted gross receipts received annually from gambling games." The maximum rate is twenty percent. See Iowa Code § 99F.11. The statute has an exception, however, for the "adjusted gross receipts ... from gambling games at racetrack enclosures." Id. The tax rate on racetrack gambling receipts began at twenty-two percent in 1997, and has automatically increased by two percent each year to a maximum rate of thirty-six percent in 2004. See id.
In our first consideration of this case, we held this differential tax violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution. See RACI, 648 N.W.2d at 562.1 As already mentioned, the United States Supreme Court reversed our decision to the extent it rested on federal constitutional grounds. See Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2161, 156 L.Ed.2d at 105. It did not, however, consider the legality of the differential tax rates under the Iowa Constitution. Thus, the case was remanded "for further proceedings not inconsistent with [the Court's] opinion." Id.
Notwithstanding the fact the Supreme Court did not discuss the validity of the statute under the Iowa Constitution, we find it appropriate to reconsider our ruling on the state constitution claim since our court applied the federal rational basis test in determining whether the tax violated the Iowa Constitution. See RACI, 648 N.W.2d at 558. Thus, we again address, in light of the Court's certiorari ruling on the federal claim, whether section 99F.11 violates the Iowa equality provision. See generally Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Fachman, 255 Iowa 989, 996, 125 N.W.2d 210, 214 (1963)
( ); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 246 Iowa 9, 19, 65 N.W.2d 410, 416 (1954) (same). Before doing so, however, we consider the effect of the Court's decision on our analysis.
It is this court's constitutional obligation as the highest court of this sovereign state to determine whether the challenged classification violates Iowa's constitutional equality provision. Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Iowa 1999) ( ); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Iowa 1980) ( ); see William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It was, How It Is 172 (1987) ("the question of the meaning of the Iowa Constitution is preeminently a question to be decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa, and not by some other court") ; Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L.Rev. 1195, 1197 (1985) () [hereinafter "State Equality Guarantees"]. While the Supreme Court's judgment on the constitutionality of Iowa's disparate tax rates under the federal Equal Protection Clause is persuasive, it is not binding on this court as we evaluate this law under the Iowa Constitution. See Callender, 591 N.W.2d at 187
; Bierkamp, 293 N.W.2d at 579.
Two methodologies have been identified for an independent analysis of state equal protection claims: State Equality Guarantees, 63 Tex. L.Rev. at 1219 (footnote omitted). In determining the proper analysis here, it is appropriate to consider both methodologies.
A. Independent analysis. We begin with the second approach—applying an independently crafted analysis. Notwithstanding the broad statement made by this court in its initial opinion that we will apply the same analysis under the state equal protection provision as is applied under the federal Equal Protection Clause, this court has always reserved to itself the ability to employ a different analytical framework under state constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Bowers v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Iowa 2002)
( ); In re Interest of C.P., 569 N.W.2d 810, 811 (Iowa 1997) ; Krull v. Thermogas Co., 522 N.W.2d 607, 614 (Iowa 1994) ; Exira Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787, 792-93 (Iowa 1994) . The implication of these cases is that while we will generally apply the same analysis to federal and state equal protection claims, this court has not foreclosed the possibility that there may be situations where differences in the scope, import, or purpose of the two provisions warrant divergent analyses. See generally State Equality Provisions, 63 Tex. L.Rev. at 1207-08 ( ).2
Despite this court's right to fashion its own test for examining claims brought under our state constitution, we do not think this case is the proper forum to consider an analysis that might be more compatible with Iowa's constitutional language. We decline to do so here because the racetracks did...
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