Rackemann v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 08 January 1910
• Citation: 90 N.E. 552,204 Mass. 394
• Parties: RACKEMANN v. TAYLOR et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

204 Mass. 394

90 N.E. 552

RACKEMANN v. TAYLOR et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 8, 1910

Jan. 8 1910.

COUNSEL

John C Gray and Clift Rogers Clapp, for appellants.

Chas F. Choate, Jr., for appellee.

OPINION

KNOWLTON, C.J.

The fundamental question in this case is whether the petitioner for the probate of the will of Caroline E. Johnson, late of the city of New York, state of New York, deceased, shall be given an opportunity to establish the will, if he can, in the courts of Massachusetts, before it has been allowed in the domicile of the testatrix. The following facts, among others, are agreed:

The testatrix died at her home in New York, which is the place of her domicile, on April 24, 1908. She had not been domiciled in Massachusetts since her marriage in 1847. For 60 years she had resided in the state of New York. For the last 18 or 20 years of her life, she spent her summers in Newport, R.I. For more than 13 years before her death she had not been within the state of Massachusetts. At the time of her death she owned two parcels of real estate in the city of New York, whose value was between $450,000 and $600,000. She had a deposit of $600 in a bank there. She owned stocks in corporations, and bonds, most of which bonds were registered, whose total value was about $250,000, and these were in the custody of her nephew and agent, Ellerton P. Whitney, in a safe deposit vault in Boston. He had held and managed them as her agent for 20 years, and they remained in his custody until the appointment of special administrators of the estate, when they were transferred to their possession. Some of these corporations were organized under the laws of Massachusetts, and some of them under the laws of other states. At the time of her death she had on deposit more than $15,000 in the New England Trust Company of Boston. She also had a power of appointment, by will, over a trust fund held by trustees appointed by the probate court for the county of Suffolk, under the will of Joseph Whitney, late of Boston. This fund then amounted to about $600,000, and consisted of stocks and bonds, real estate in Massachusetts, and an equity in real estate in New York, of the value of about $60,000. Her only heirs at law are her three daughters, who reside in New York. The other possible beneficiaries under the alleged will are 21 in number, and they all reside near Boston. The executors named in the will are her nephew, Ellerton P. Whitney, of Milton, her daughter, Mrs. Emmett, of New York, and the petitioner, a lawyer in Boston. Mrs. Emmett declined to join in the petition, and Ellerton P. Whitney declined to serve as executor. The three daughters of Mrs. Johnson appeared specially in the probate court before any hearings were had to prove the will, and objected to the presentation of the will for original probate in this jurisdiction, for the reason that the domicile of the testatrix was in New York. They asked that the proceedings be dismissed or continued until the case should be tried in the Surrogate's Court for the county of New York. This petition was denied, and the special appearance for the daughters was afterwards withdrawn, and a general appearance was entered for Josephine W. Taylor, one of the daughters, who filed a motion in writing, before the hearings were held, that the proceedings in the probate court be continued to await the result of proceedings then pending in the Surrogate's Court for the county of New York. The proceedings in New York were begun at the instance of the three daughters, by a person claiming to be a creditor of Caroline E. Johnson to the amount of $200, and in these proceedings he petitioned for the probate of the will. The daughters opposed the probate, and Mr. Rackemann, the present petitioner, filed a protest against any proceedings in the state of New York. This motion to continue was denied in the probate court.

After a hearing and the examination of witnesses in the probate court, the will was admitted to probate, and Josephine W. Taylor and Fanny L. Johnson appealed, giving as one of the reasons of appeal that Caroline E. Johnson had her domicile in the city and state of New York, and that probate proceedings concerning any will alleged to be made by her should first have been had in that jurisdiction. The alleged will was executed in Newport, R. I., but ever since its execution, until it was filed in the probate court, it has remained in the custody of Mr. Rackemann. When Mr. Rackemann presented the petition in the probate court he knew that one or more of Mrs. Johnson's daughters objected to the probate of the alleged will, and intended to contest the allowance of it. The alleged will was drawn in Boston. Upon the petition of the three daughters, before the allowance of the will in the probate court, special administrators were appointed to take charge of the property in Massachusetts.

After the entry of the appeal in the Supreme Judicial Court, two of the daughters, upon the suggestion of the presiding justice, filed a motion that the petition for the probate of the will be dismissed without prejudice to the right to petition for probate later, if occasion should arise therefor, alleging as reasons for their motion the facts stated above. They also filed a motion for a stay of proceedings until the validity of the will should be determined in the domicile of the alleged testatrix.

The case is before us upon a report of the justice upon questions raised by the foregoing facts.

It is a familiar rule of law that the right of succession to the estate of a deceased person, whether he leaves a will or dies intestate, depends upon the law of his domicile. The settlement of his estate and the disposition of his property are to be made in accordance with the law of that place. If he owns real estate in another state or country, that is, of course, subject to the local laws of the place where it is situated, and no owner can take or hold it otherwise than in conformity with those laws. But these laws are not intended to interfere with the reasonable right of control and disposition of its owner, so far as to have a situs for the purposes of disposition by will, or by succession under the statutes of distribution in the place of his domicile. The primary proof of a will and the primary administration of an estate, if the owner dies intestate, should be where he had his domicile. If he has property in another state or country it may be necessary to prove the will or to take out administration there, either for the purpose of obtaining and collecting the property, or for the security of local creditors, or the protection of rights of the state to receive taxes, or of residents of the state who ought to get what they are entitled to receive from the estate without being obliged to follow the property into another jurisdiction. But such probate of a will or such administration of an intestate estate is always merely ancillary. It is not for the purpose of establishing rights of succession, whether under a will or otherwise. Those are to be established in the courts of the state or county where the deceased person had his domicile. The strictly ancillary character of such proceedings has been recognized by many decisions of the courts of our own state, as well as of courts elsewhere. Selectmen of Boston v. Boylston, 2 Mass. 384; Richards v. Dutch, 8 Mass. 506; Stevens v. Gaylord, 11 Mass. 256-263; Jennison v. Hapgood, 10 Pick. 77-100; Dawes v. Head, 3 Pick. 128-141-145; Crippen v. Dexter, 13 Gray, 330; Shannon v. White, 109 Mass. 146-148; Shannon v. Shannon, 111 Mass. 331-334; Talbot v. Chamberlain, 149 Mass. 57, 20 N.E. 305, 3 L. R. A. 254; Bowdoin v. Holland, 10 Cush. 17; Frothingham v. Shaw, 175 Mass. 59-63, 55 N.E. 623, 78 Am. St. Rep. 475; Wallace v. Wallace, 3 N. J. Eq. 616-622; Hyman v. Gaskins, 27 N.C. 267-274; Mills v. Fogal, 4 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 559; Manuel v. Manuel, 13 Ohio St. 458; Stark v. Parker, 56 N.H. 481-485-487; Morris v. Morris, 27 Miss. 847. It was said in Prescott v. Durfee, 131 Mass. 477, 478, that 'the object of appointing an administrator (in another jurisdiction than that of the domicile of the testator) is not to determine the rights of the parties interested in the estate, but to have a local representative of the estate of the deceased within the commonwealth, against or through whom those rights may be asserted.' In Talbot v. Chamberlain, ubi supra, the court said: 'Unless it [the domicile] was in Iowa, the courts of that state did not have, and the courts of Massachusetts did have, jurisdiction of the original probate of his will.' The subject is discussed very fully in Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N.Y. 103. In the Matter of Cameron, 47 A.D. 120-126, 62 N.Y.S. 1133, affirmed on appeal in 166 N.Y. 610, 59 N.E. 1120, it was held that the alleged will of a person domiciled in New York, which had been proved in Illinois on the ground that he left property there, could not be allowed in New York on the proof furnished to the court, the will itself being retained in Illinois. An administrator was appointed to settle the estate as intestate. The judges were unwilling to have the laws of New York (to use their language) 'circumvented by the practical administration of the estate under a will which, if valid, ought to be established according to our laws; but if not valid, ought not to be made effectual by indirection.' In Davis v. Upson, 230 Ill. 327, 82 N.E. 824, the same alleged will was before the court, and the judges said: 'If the decision of the court of the domicile of a deceased person does not control in the matter whether the deceased died testate or intestate, there must necessarily result a multitude of decisions upon that question, and if a...