Rackley v. County of Rensselaer

• Decision Date: 03 November 1988
• Citation: 141 A.D.2d 232,535 N.Y.S.2d 137
• Parties: In the Matter of the Claim of David L. RACKLEY, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF RENSSELAER, Appellant. Workers' Compensation Board, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 137

535 N.Y.S.2d 137

141 A.D.2d 232

In the Matter of the Claim of David L. RACKLEY, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF RENSSELAER, Appellant Workers' Compensation Board, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Nov. 3, 1988.

Sullivan, Rehfuss, Cunningham & Brennan (John J. Cunningham, of counsel), Albany, for appellant.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Jane Lauer Barker, Theresa E. Wolinski, and Iris A. Steel, of counsel), New York City, for Workers' Compensation Bd., respondent.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and CASEY, WEISS, LEVINE and MERCURE, JJ.

MERCURE, Justice.

After approximately five years of employment as a caseworker with the Rensselaer County Department of Social Services, claimant was suspended without pay and served with a list of charges relative to his conduct and job performance. Shortly thereafter, he came under the care of Dr. Arlene Reed-Delaney, a psychiatrist, and filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, alleging mental stress as a compensable injury. The employer controverted the claim and a hearing was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ). The ALJ dismissed the claim, finding that the record did not contain evidence of "any particular event which would cause claimant to have a psychic trauma" or that claimant "had any different experiences than any other social workers" at the Department of Social Services and concluding that claimant's psychiatric problems were not work related. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed the ALJ, finding that claimant sustained a chronic depression which culminated in his disablement as a result of the heavy case load he maintained in his employment. The self-insured employer appeals.

We reject the contention that the record fails to support the Board's finding of accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Contrary to the position taken by the ALJ and apparently rejected by the Board, a mental injury need not be caused by a discrete, identifiable psychic trauma, as in Matter of Chernin v. Progress Serv. Co., 9 N.Y.2d 880, 216 N.Y.S.2d 697, 175 N.E.2d 827 [cab driver struck pedestrian] or Matter of Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 510, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 330 N.E.2d 603 (employee found her immediate supervisor in a pool of blood following his suicide) in order to be compensable. There is no question that emotional stress extending over a period of months, in the absence of a "specific precipitant", will support a finding of accidental physical injury (see, Matter of Snyder v. New York State Commn. for Human Rights, 31 N.Y.2d 284, 286, 338 N.Y.S.2d 620, 290 N.E.2d 821; Matter of Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, 10 N.Y.2d 209, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14, 176 N.E.2d 714; Matter of Schechter v. State Ins. Fund, 6 N.Y.2d 506, 190 N.Y.S.2d 656, 160 N.E.2d 901). The determination to permit compensation for psychological injury caused by psychic trauma was nothing more than a melding of prior decisions which recogniz psychic trauma producing physical injury and physical impact producing psychological injury as compensable. As a result, psychological or nervous injury precipitated by psychic trauma is compensable to the same extent as physical injury (see, Matter of Schechter v. State Ins. Fund, supra, at 509-510, 190 N.Y.S.2d 656, 160...