Radler v. State, No. 4D18-1737
| Decision Date | 12 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 4D18-1737 |
| Citation | 290 So.3d 87 |
| Parties | Michael RADLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Logan T. Mohs, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anesha Worthy, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Michael Joseph Radler ("Defendant") appeals his conviction and sentence for misdemeanor battery after a jury trial. We affirm the trial court's denial of a request for a jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force without further comment. However, we find the trial court erred by refusing to: (1) instruct the jury on the justifiable use of non-deadly force; and (2) permit a proffer of evidence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Charged with aggravated battery, Defendant proceeded to a jury trial. The only eyewitnesses to the events who testified at trial were the victim ("Victim") and Defendant. Because the two issues we address revolve around Defendant's version of the events, we begin with a summary of his version followed by Victim's version.
Defendant went to his girlfriend's hotel room where he saw her drinking with a female friend, Victim's sister. The two females were drunkenly shaving a dog to the point of hurting the dog. When Defendant tried to intervene, an argument ensued between Defendant and Victim's sister. The sister said she was going to call her brother to come to the room, whereupon Defendant said he was leaving to avoid any conflict. As Defendant left the room, he saw the sister using her cellphone.
As Defendant was walking away from the hotel room through a parking lot, he saw Victim approaching him. He had never seen Victim before, but assumed it was the sister's brother. Defendant shouted at Victim to stay away and mind his own business. Victim continued to proceed towards Defendant, despite his repeated protests. Defendant described Victim as a "big guy," standing five feet, eleven inches tall, and weighing 270 pounds. Defendant was particularly concerned about Victim's silence as he approached. When Victim was an arm's length away from him, Defendant was cornered between Victim and a fence. Defendant continued to insist that Victim leave him alone.
When Victim finally stopped, he "took a stance like he was squaring off." Defendant demonstrated the stance to the jury, which was described as a "squat stance." Defendant testified that as he was assuming his "squat stance," Victim Out of fear of what Victim might do, Defendant said he gave into the "[h]uman instinct to protect myself" and punched Victim in the mouth one time.
On cross-examination, Defendant admitted that Victim never said anything to him, did not raise his hand or arm as if to strike him, and Defendant never saw a weapon.
Victim gave a very different account of the events. He was sitting outside at the hotel when he saw his sister frantically waving at him to come over to her. He next saw Defendant coming towards him, taking off his jewelry as he was walking. This made him think Defendant was coming to hit him. As Defendant approached, the two greeted each other. At that moment, Defendant's girlfriend ran up to Defendant, told him to stop, and slapped him. Wanting to avoid any involvement in the altercation, Victim turned to leave but, as he turned away, Defendant punched him in the side of the face. He tried to get away, but Defendant punched him twice more in the back of the head. He had never spoken to Defendant before this incident, did not hit him, did not threaten him, and did not have a weapon.
After Defendant explained what he saw in the hotel room, his attorney asked him what his response was to that scene. At that point, the State objected on relevance grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection. Defense counsel requested to proffer what Defendant would testify. The court granted the request, and the jury left the courtroom. Defendant answered the question and stated he was disturbed by the scene, saw empty bottles of alcohol, and asked Victim's sister to leave. Based on this, the court determined that nothing Defendant proffered "ha[d] any bearing on any issue in this case." Defense counsel attempted to argue that it was inextricably intertwined because it went to "why he left the room and was headed in that direction [referring to the parking lot]." The court rejected the argument, maintaining it was irrelevant to the issue at trial. Defense counsel objected, arguing the proffer supported the defense's self-defense theory.
After the jury returned to the courtroom, defense counsel resumed questioning, during which the following exchange occurred:
The remainder of Defendant's testimony dealt with the subsequent battery after he walked out of the hotel room.
At the charge conference, defense counsel requested a jury instruction on the justifiable use of both deadly and non-deadly force. The trial court denied both requests. Relying on Thomas v. State , 96 Fla. 243, 118 So. 22 (1928), the trial court reasoned Defendant's evidence merely supported his subjective state of mind and did not support any evidence that "a reasonably, cautious, and prudent person ... under the same circumstances would have believed that danger could be avoided only through the use of that force."
The jury rendered a verdict finding Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of battery. After being adjudicated guilty and sentenced, Defendant gave notice of appeal.
The standard of review governing a trial court's decision to give a standard jury instruction is abuse of discretion. Stephens v. State , 787 So. 2d 747, 755 (Fla. 2001). "[D]iscretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court." Canakaris v. Canakaris , 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (quoting Delno v. Mkt. St. Ry. Co. , 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942) ). "However, the trial court's discretion in criminal cases is rather narrow because a criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his or her theory of defense, if there is any evidence to support this theory, no matter how weak or flimsy." St. Pierre v. State , 228 So. 3d 583, 585–86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the justifiable use of non-deadly force, contending his testimony met the "any evidence" standard for giving the self-defense instruction. We agree.
"Failure to give a standard jury instruction is reversible error when the omitted standard jury instruction goes to the heart of the defendant's case." Hosnedl v. State , 126 So. 3d 400, 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Arboleda v. State , 645 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) ). Although we could find no case law that specifically addresses the standard to be applied in assessing state of mind in the context of non-deadly force, we agree with the State that, similar to the context of deadly force, "[t]he law does not ascribe a subjective standard as to a defendant's state of mind, but concerns a reasonably prudent person's state of mind."
Chaffin v. State , 121 So. 3d 608, 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Reimel v. State , 532 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) ). We also agree with Defendant that "[t]he question of self-defense is one of fact, and is one for the jury to decide where the facts are disputed." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Dias v. State , 812 So. 2d 487, 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) ). Finally, we note that "[t]he trial court should not weigh the evidence for the purpose of determining whether the instruction is appropriate." Calkins v. State , 170 So. 3d 888, 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting Charles v. State , 945 So. 2d 579, 582 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ).
"Non-deadly force may be used when, and to the extent, that a person reasonably believes that the use of non-deadly force is necessary to defend oneself against the imminent use of unlawful force." Hosnedl , 126 So. 3d at 403 (citing Michel v. State , 989 So. 2d 679, 681 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ).
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