Radosevich v. City of Ottumwa

Decision Date13 January 1970
Docket NumberNo. 53134,53134
Citation173 N.W.2d 522
PartiesCarl RADOSEVICH, William J. Treneman, Tom Graham, and Board of Park Commissioners of the City of Ottumwa, Appellees, v. The CITY OF OTTUMWA, Richard M. Hofmann, Mayor, Virgil Johnson, Jr., M. Z. Bailey, Paul Heckart, Jr., Paul Troeger, Councilmen of the City of Ottumwa; Genevieve Howard, City Clerk of the City of Ottumwa, Appellants.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

William R. Dew, City Atty., Ottumwa, for appellants.

Walter F. Johnson, of Johnson & Bauerle, Ottumwa, for appellees.

SNELL, Justice.

We are faced with a legislative anomaly arising because of the dissonant provisions of the law relating to cities and towns.

The sole question, strictly statutory, is whether the city council exceeded its authority in ordaining the abolition of the Park Board.

It should be kept in mind that we have no authority to either enact or repeal legislation. That authority is vested in the General Assembly.

In the case before us there is no dispute as to the facts.

The City of Ottumwa is a municipal corporation having a population in excess of 30,000 operating under the Commission form of government prescribed by chapter 363B, Code 1966. This form of government was invoked by election in 1960 and has persisted since January 1, 1962 as a replacement of the Council-Manager form theretofore in force. The defendants-appellants are the city and the duly elected qualified and acting councilmen of the City of Ottumwa and the duly appointed, qualified and acting city clerk.

We are told in the briefs that Ottumwa is one of only three cities in Iowa governed by this chapter of the Code.

On January 2, 1968, the city council of Ottumwa by new ordinances attempted to abolish the Board of Park Commissioners which had been established since 1949, pursuant to chapter 370, Code 1966.

Plaintiffs-appellees, the duly elected members of the Board of Park Commissioners, brought an action by certiorari challenging the legality of the council's action.

Based upon an agreed Stipulation of Facts, the cause was submitted on written briefs. The trial court sustained the Writ of Certiorari, holding that the city council and members thereof exceeded their proper jurisdiction and otherwise acted illegally in attempting to abolish the Board of Park Commissioners.

This appeal followed.

We affirm, albeit with some reluctance because the result is a duplication of authority not necessarily conducive to harmony in municipal government.

I. Chapter 363B, Code of 1966, under which the defendant City is currently organized, relates to commission form of government.

Section 363B.1 provides:

'Cities of 30,000 or more population. Municipal corporations operating under the commission form of government, and having a population of thirty thousand or over Shall be governed by a council, consisting of a mayor and four councilmen elected at large. One councilman Shall be elected to preside over the department of accounts and finances. One councilman Shall be elected to preside over the department of public safety. One councilman Shall be elected to preside over the department of parks and public property. One councilman Shall be elected to preside over the department of streets and public improvements.'

The repeated use of the mandatory word 'shall' should be kept in mind. The emphasis throughout is added.

Section 363B.4 provides:

'Departments. The executive and administrative powers, authority, and duties in such cities Shall be distributed into and among five departments, as follows:

'1. Department of public affairs.

'2. Department of accounts and finances.

'3. Department of public safety.

'4. Department of streets and public improvements.

'5. Department of parks and public property.'

Chapter 368, Code of 1966, relates to general powers of cities and towns. Section 368.42 provides:

'General law applicable to special forms of government. Except as otherwise specifically provided, all laws heretofore or hereafter enacted which by their terms are made applicable to municipal corporations generally, shall be applicable to municipal corporations organized and operating under the commission form of government * * *.'

Chapter 370, Code of 1966, relates to park commissioners. The provisions thereof pertinent to this appeal are the same as in Chapter 370, Code of 1950. Those provisions are:

Section 370.1: 'Election-appointment. There Shall be elected in all cities over thirty thousand population, three park commissioners whose terms of office shall be six years, one to be elected at each regular municipal election. * * *

'All other cities under thirty thousand population and towns may, by ordinance provide for the election of such park commissioners, * * *.

'Any city operating under the commission form of government having a department of parks and public property under a commissioner elected as superintendent thereof may, in its discretion whenever its population exceeds thirty thousand, So continue without electing the park commissioners required by this chapter. * * *' (Emphasis added.)

Section 370.20: 'Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of such board Shall extend over all lands used for parks within or without the corporate limits, and all ordinances of such cities and towns shall be in full force and effect in and over the territory occupied by such parks.'

As noted, Ottumwa had established its park commission under chapter 370, in 1949; it could not therefore qualify for the exception created in the third paragraph of section 370.1.

II. The law applicable to government of cities by commission in 1949 appeared as chapter 416, Code of 1946. The applicable parts also appeared in the Code of 1950.

Section 416.88 of the 1946 and 1950 Codes provided:

'The council. The council shall have and possess, and the council and its members shall exercise, all executive, legislative, and judicial powers and duties now had, possessed, and exercised by the mayor, city council, solicitor, treasurer, auditor, city engineer, and other executive and administrative officers in cities of the first and second class, and in cities under special charter, and shall also possess and exercise all executive, legislative, and judicial powers and duties now had and exercised by the park commissioners, * * *.'

Section 416.105, Codes 1946 and 1950, provided:

'Parks and park commissioners. The provisions of chapter 370, relating to parks and park commissioners, May be applicable to and be in force in cities and towns organized under the provisions of this chapter to the same extent and effect that such provisions are applicable to and in force in cities and towns of the same class organized under the general laws of the state, provided that an ordinance is passed providing for the election of three park commissioners in the manner prescribed in section 370.1. The board of park commissioners, if created in the manner herein prescribed, shall have and may exercise all powers conferred upon them by the provisions of said chapter.' (Emphasis added.)

All provisions of chapter 416 in the 1950 Code relating to government of cities by commission were repealed or transferred in 1951 by the 54th General Assembly. There is now no chapter 416 in our present Code.

As noted, supra, cities operating under a commission form of government, such as appellant, now do so under the authority of chapter 363B, Code of 1966.

III. Appellants rely heavily on Eckerson v. City of Des Moines, 137 Iowa 452, 115 N.W. 177....

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3 cases
  • Davenport Water Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Commission
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • September 27, 1971
    ...seek always for legislative intent by what the legislature said, rather than what it should or might have said. See Radosevich v. City of Ottumwa, 173 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa); Sueppel v. City Council of Iowa City, 257 Iowa 1350, 1354, 136 N.W.2d 523; cf. Young v. O'Keefe, 246 Iowa 1182, 1186......
  • State v. Vietor
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • July 3, 1973
    ...change the terms of a statute. Davenport Water Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Com'n., Iowa, 190 N.W.2d 583, 594, 595; Radosevich v. City of Ottumwa, Iowa, 173 N.W.2d 522, 525; Bergeson v. Pesch, 254 Iowa 223, 227, 117 N.W.2d 431, 433 and III. With these rules in mind we turn our attention first......
  • Peters v. Iowa Employment Sec. Commission, 2--56489
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • November 12, 1975
    ...205 N.W.2d 692, 697 (Iowa 1973); Llewellyn v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 200 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Iowa 1972); Radosevich v. City of Ottumwa, 173 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa 1970). Although an express general repealing clause like § 19A.22 is ineffective as a repealing device, it does constitute ......

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