Ragan v. Ragan, 20771

• Decision Date: 06 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 20771,20771
• Parties: Wesley L. RAGAN, Jr., and Pat Brown, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Joseph T. RAGAN, Robert T. Ragan, and Westi J. Adlesich, Defendants, State of Missouri, Division of Child Support Enforcement, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 888

931 S.W.2d 888

Wesley L. RAGAN, Jr., and Pat Brown, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Joseph T. RAGAN, Robert T. Ragan, and Westi J. Adlesich, Defendants,

State of Missouri, Division of Child Support Enforcement,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20771.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Two.

Sept. 6, 1996.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Oct. 1, 1996.

Application to Transfer Denied

Nov. 19, 1996.

Rick S. Vasquez, Springfield, for appellant.

W. Patrick Cronan, Cronan & Robinson, Columbia, for respondent.

SHRUM, Judge.

Wesley L. Ragan, Jr. (Father) ¹ brought this action for a judicial determination that his twin sons, Robert T. Ragan (Robert) and Joseph T. Ragan (Joseph), became emancipated in September, 1994, although they were then only seventeen years of age. Father's allegations of emancipation were that his sons "moved out of the house and ran away from their father ... [,] they were self-supporting[,] and parental control had been lifted by express or implied consent." The State of Missouri, Division of Child Support Enforcement (Division) ² appeals from the trial court's judgment that declared Robert and Joseph emancipated as of September, 1994. Division charges that Father's evidence was not sufficient to support the judgment. This court agrees. We reverse the judgment.

FACTS

Robert and Joseph, born July 31, 1977, were living with Father prior to September, 1994. Both were attending high school and both had part-time jobs after school. Father testified that in September, 1994, he talked to Robert about saving money and also about living by Father's rules. Robert became angry, an argument ensued, and Robert left the house. Joseph also left and both young men commenced living with Adlesich. They stayed at Adlesich's home thereafter until the summer of 1995, when they reached age eighteen. During that year, Adlesich received a monthly AFDC ³ check from the State of Missouri for the support of Robert and Joseph. Also, during that period both Robert and Joseph lost their jobs.

Regarding his efforts to keep his sons home and support them, Father testified as follows. He did not tell his sons to leave, and in fact asked them repeatedly to return home, once via a letter sent to them. He called the Rolla police department to report them as runaways but was told not to worry about it; that "they're considered adults in ... Missouri and there's nothing they can do." He called Adlesich and asked her to send Robert and Joseph home and not let them stay with her, but she refused his request. He sent several letters to Division in which he asked that agency not to provide "Q. [to Father] You didn't consent to them leaving the house?

support because he was willing to have his sons in his home. On cross-examination, Father testified thusly:

"A. Consent? Did I give them permission. No. They just left on their own.

"Q. You were opposed, in fact, to them leaving the house; is that not correct?

"A. Right."

Father also testified that both Robert and Joseph were enrolled in high school at all times after they left his home.

The trial court found that Robert and Joseph were "emancipated effective September, 1994 by reason of their voluntarily leaving the family home and becoming self[-]supporting with the implied consent of the custodial parent." This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Division contends that the trial court's emancipation determination was not supported by any evidence that Robert and Joseph were self-supporting or that Father had expressly or impliedly consented to their emancipation. Where the issue is the emancipation of a child, the scope of appellate review is governed by the familiar precepts of Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo.banc 1976). Sparks v. Trantham, 814 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Mo.App.1991). Thus, we must affirm the judgment of the trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it or it is against the weight of the evidence or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32.

Generally, a parent's duty to support is "terminated by emancipation of the child." § 452.370.4. ⁴ The purpose of this statutory provision is to "make it absolute" that unless there are contrary provisions in the dissolution decree or the separation agreement, the child support obligation ends upon the child's emancipation and does not automatically continue during the child's minority. Bushell v. Schepp, 613 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Mo.App.1981).

The appellate courts of this state have defined emancipation as the " 'freeing of a child for all the period of its minority from the care, custody, control, and service of its parents; the relinquishment of parental control, conferring on the child the right to its own earnings and terminating the parent's legal obligation to support it.' " In re Marriage Of Hughes, 773 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Mo.App.1989) (quoting the predecessor to 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 5 at 174-75 (1978) and citing Black v. Cole, 626 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Mo.App.1981) and In re Marriage of Heddy, 535 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Mo.App.1976)). Emancipation is never presumed and the burden is upon the party asserting it. Heddy, 535 S.W.2d at 279. Emancipation can be accomplished by either express or implied consent of the custodial parent. Vinson v. Vinson, 628 S.W.2d 376, 377 (Mo.App.1982).

Case law pronouncements concerning emancipation were incorporated into the version of § 452.340 enacted by the General Assembly in 1988. 1 Mo. Family Law, § 14.19 (Mo.Bar 4th ed. 1988). Pertinent portions of § 452.340 read:

"3. Unless the circumstances of the child manifestly dictate otherwise and the court specifically so provides, the obligation of a parent to make child support payments shall terminate when the child:

....

(4) Becomes self-supporting, provided that the custodial parent has relinquished the child from parental control by express or implied consent...."

Division's claim that the judgment of emancipation is not supported by substantial evidence has two parts. First, Division argues that there was no evidence that Father impliedly consented to the children's emancipation since the only evidence is Father's testimony that he did not consent. Second, it contends that there is no evidence that Robert and Joseph were self-supporting, but to the contrary the only evidence is that as soon as they left Father's custody they immediately became supported by the taxpayers via AFDC. Division suggests that the trial court's decision, if allowed to stand, presents the possibility that any custodial parent who involuntarily loses custody to a third party, e.g., through guardianship or Family Services intervention, can avoid his or her support obligation by claiming emancipation.

In Sparks, this court reviewed numerous Missouri decisions that considered the relationship between a child's emancipation and the degree of financial and material assistance that child received from others. We concluded that:

"it is not inappropriate for a court to declare a child emancipated even though the child receives significant financial and other material support from others, including the custodial parent. We do not believe the legislature,...