Raheem v. State

• Decision Date: 11 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. S02P0112.,S02P0112.
• Citation: 560 S.E.2d 680,275 Ga. 87
• Parties: RAHEEM v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

560 S.E.2d 680

275 Ga. 87

RAHEEM v. The STATE.

No. S02P0112.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 11, 2002.

Reconsideration Denied April 10, 2002.

Wade M. Crumbley, Crumbley & Crumbley, McDonough, for appellant.

Tommy K. Floyd, Dist. Atty., James L. Wright, III, Blair D. Mahaffey, Asst. Dist. Attys., McDonough, Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Romin Alavi, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Michael Mears, Multi-County Public Defender, Thomas H. Dunn, Atlanta, Richard A. Malone, Prosecuting Attorneys' Council, Smyrna, Other Parties.

HINES, Justice.

Mustafa Askia Raheem was convicted on two counts of malice murder, four counts of felony murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of burglary.¹ The jury fixed the sentence for the malice murder of the first victim, Brandon Hollis, at life imprisonment without parole, after finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed for the purpose of receiving things of monetary value. See OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(4). The jury fixed the sentence for the malice murder of the second victim, Miriam Hollis, at death, after finding beyond a reasonable doubt that her murder was committed during the commission of the murder of Brandon Hollis, during the commission of a burglary, during the commission of an armed robbery, and for the purpose of receiving things of monetary value. See OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(2) and (4). For the reasons that follow, Raheem's convictions and sentences are affirmed.

1. The evidence adduced at the guilt/innocence phase of Raheem's trial showed the following. On April 2, 1999, Raheem picked up Michael Jenkins and Dione Feltus in Raheem's girl friend's blue Honda automobile. Raheem dropped Mr. Feltus off at his place of employment at 4:00 p.m., where, according to the testimony of Mr. Feltus's manager, Mr. Feltus remained until 10:00 p.m. Raheem told Jenkins that he wanted to shoot his .380 caliber handgun. He then shot the handgun out the window of the blue Honda, explaining to Jenkins that he wanted to make sure the weapon would not jam. Raheem purchased black plastic trash bags at a grocery store and called Brandon Hollis from a nearby payphone. Raheem picked up Brandon Hollis and then drove Brandon Hollis and Jenkins to a remote location, where Raheem fired his .380 caliber handgun in the direction of a tree and handed the handgun to Jenkins. After Brandon Hollis said the handgun was too loud, Raheem took the handgun from Jenkins and began walking toward the blue Honda. As Jenkins walked some distance behind Raheem and Brandon Hollis, Raheem shot Brandon Hollis in the head. Jenkins inquired whether Brandon Hollis was dead, and Raheem replied, "No, but he is on his way out." Raheem then took Brandon Hollis's watch and commented to the dying man, "I guess you ain't going to be needing this watch no more." Raheem also took Brandon Hollis's keys and commented to Jenkins, "I'm glad you didn't run."

After killing Brandon Hollis, Raheem drove himself and Jenkins to the home of Miriam Hollis, Brandon Hollis's mother. Raheem opened Ms. Hollis's door with Brandon Hollis's key and instructed Jenkins to bring a trash bag into the home. Ms. Hollis stood to her feet as Raheem and Jenkins entered her home, and Raheem fired a shot at her but missed her. Raheem then ordered Ms. Hollis to her hands and knees and shot her in the head. Raheem placed the trash bag over Ms. Hollis's head, got Ms. Hollis's keys from her kitchen, placed Ms. Hollis's body in the trunk of her white Lexus automobile, and then attempted to mop up Ms. Hollis's blood inside the home. Raheem told Jenkins later that he previously had given Ms. Hollis money for the Lexus automobile but that she had refused to give the automobile to him.

Raheem drove with Jenkins in Ms. Hollis's Lexus to visit Raheem's girl friend, Veronica Gibbs. Raheem boasted that he had a new automobile, opened the trunk to show Gibbs Ms. Hollis's body, and informed Gibbs that he had shot the woman and a young man. Later, Raheem drove back to Ms. Hollis's home with Jenkins and Gibbs, where they burglarized the home, stole a number of items, and retrieved Gibbs's blue Honda. Later, Raheem changed his shoes, which had blood on them, and drove with Jenkins to dispose of Ms. Hollis's body. The body was placed underneath planks and tires, doused with a flammable liquid, and set ablaze.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the guilt/innocence phase verdicts, the evidence adduced at the guilt/innocence phase was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Raheem was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

Pretrial Issues

2. Raheem contends that the trial court erred by overruling his demurrer to counts four and six of his indictment. Those counts charged Raheem with felony murder, alleging that Raheem "did ... unlawfully while in the commission of a felony, to wit: Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon, cause the death of [the victims] by shooting [them] with a gun, contrary to the laws of [the] State...." Raheem correctly argues that possession of a firearm by a convicted felon can serve as the underlying felony in a felony murder charge only where the possession of the firearm was somehow "inherently dangerous." See Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 602, 602-604(1), 423 S.E.2d 255 (1992) (holding that an accidental shooting of an unanticipated victim by a convicted felon while the felon was unloading a firearm in his apartment could not support a felony murder conviction); compare, e.g., Hulme v. State, 273 Ga. 676, 677-679(1), 544 S.E.2d 138 (2001) (holding that a violation of the controlled substances statute was, under the particular facts shown by the evidence at trial, "inherently dangerous to human life"). Raheem does not contend that the possession of the firearm in his case was not shown at trial to be inherently dangerous, but he argues that, because the contested counts of his indictment did not specify how or why the possession of the firearm was necessarily inherently dangerous to the victims, those counts failed to satisfy the requirement that a charge in an indictment be "wholly complete within itself, and plainly, fully, and distinctly set out the crime charged in that count." Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 55(1), 464 S.E.2d 198 (1995). This contention is moot in light of the trial court's vacating Raheem's felony murder convictions. Laney v. State, 271 Ga. 194, 195(2), 515 S.E.2d 610 (1999). Furthermore, Raheem's argument is without merit. OCGA § 17-7-54 provides that "[e]very indictment of the grand jury which states the offense in the terms and language of this Code or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may easily be understood by the jury shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct." An indictment that tracks the language of the Code and can be "clearly and easily understood" has been held to be sufficient. Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 103(1), 475 S.E.2d 580 (1996); compare Langston v. State, 109 Ga. 153, 35 S.E. 166 (1899) (reversing where indictment, although pled in language of the Code, was inadequate to give "reasonable notice" to the defendant of what he was "called upon to meet"); Kyler v. State, 94 Ga.App. 321, 323-24(3), 94 S.E.2d 429 (1956) (noting that an indictment pled in the language of the Code might be insufficient if it fails to inform the defendant of "enough of the particular facts constituting the alleged offense to be able to prepare for trial"). Here, Raheem's indictment was pled in the "terms and language" of the Code and was fully sufficient to place him on notice of the issues to be decided and to allow him an opportunity to prepare his defense, including the opportunity to present evidence that the possession of the firearm was not inherently dangerous so that any conviction for felony murder based on the possession of the firearm could be challenged on appeal. Further specificity in the indictment was not required.

3. Because this Court has directed that all executions in Georgia be carried out by lethal injection, Raheem's argument that the trial court erred by refusing to declare execution by electrocution unconstitutional is moot. See Dawson v. State, 274 Ga. 327, 328, 554 S.E.2d 137 (2001).

Voir Dire

4. At the conclusion of voir dire, Raheem challenged the State's use of its peremptory strikes, alleging that the State had engaged in race discrimination in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Because the trial court directed the State to put forward race-neutral reasons for its strikes, the question of whether a prima facie case of discrimination was shown is moot, and the State's proffered reasons should be examined. Barnes v. State, 269 Ga. 345, 349(6), 496 S.E.2d 674 (1998) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)). Raheem concedes that the State's proffered reasons were sufficient to demonstrate a lack of discriminatory intent as to all but one of the stricken prospective jurors, juror Smith. With regard to juror Smith, the prosecutor explained that, upon learning in voir dire where the juror attended church, the prosecutor had inquired of members of that church and had received reports that the juror "was odd, that he was strange, that he exhibited some weird personality traits, [and that the church members] wouldn't put him on any kind of a jury." The prosecutor also explained, and the trial court confirmed on the record, that juror Smith had exhibited difficulty hearing in court. There is no merit to Raheem's contentions that the State's proffered reasons relied upon racial stereotypes or were too vague. See Barnes, 269 Ga. at 349(6), 496 S.E.2d 674; Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151(2), 476 S.E.2d 252 (1996) (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995)). This...