Rahfeldt's Estate, In re
| Decision Date | 17 October 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 50372,50372 |
| Citation | 253 Iowa 72,111 N.W.2d 303 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE of Albert F. RAHFELDT, Deceased, W. H. Brown, Executor. Florence SCHAPER, Helen Miller, Marguerite Mehlow, Albert Rahfeldt, Frances Kadolph, Charlotte Rahfeldt Erickson, and Fred A. Rahfeldt, Appellants, v. W. H. BROWN, Executor of the Estate of Albert F. Rahfeldt, Nellie Rahfeldt, Lydia Rahfeldt, William Rahfeldt, Robert Rahfeldt, Edward Rahfeldt, William Rahfeldt, Fern Stackhouse, Lorine Pille, Gladys Manful, Doris Myking, Lee Rahfeldt, Frank Rahfeldt, Gearde E. Gull, LaVaughn L. Bachman, Jessie W. Erickson, Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Lundy, Butler & Wilson, Eldora, for appellants.
Smedal & Maurer, Ames, for W. H. Brown, executor of estate of Albert F. Rahfeldt, appellee.
John R. Hattery, Nevada, for Lydia Rahfeldt Gull, William Rahfeldt, Robert Rahfeldt and Edward Rahfeldt, appellees.
This is an action involving the construction of paragraph II of the will of Albert F. Rahfeldt, who died in Story County on August 8, 1960.
Paragraph II of the will is as follows:
'I give, devise, and bequeath to my son, Fred A. Rahfeldt, the Southeast Quarter (SE 1/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28), Township Eighty-five (85) North, Range 21, West of the 5th P. M., Story County, Iowa, to have and to hold and enjoy the use and income thereof for and during his natural life, and said Fred A. Rahfeldt shall pay all insurance, repairs, and taxes out of the income derived from said real estate, as the same shall become necessary, or due, as the case may be, and after his death, said real estate shall be sold and the net proceeds therefrom distributed as follows:
To Florence Rahfeldt, daughter of
Fred A. Rahfeldt ........... $500.00
To Helen Rahfeldt, daughter of
Fred A. Rahfeldt ............ 300.00
To Marguerite Rahfeldt, daughter of
Fred A. Rahfeldt ............ 500.00
To Albert Rahfeldt, son of Fred
A. Rahfeldt ................. 500.00
To Frances Rahfeldt, daughter of
Fred A. Rahfeldt ............ 500.00
To Frank Rahfeldt, son of Fred
A. Rahfeldt ................. 300.00
To Lee Rahfeldt, son of Fred
A. Rahfeldt ................. 500.00
and the remainder thereof divided equally between my children, or to the heirs of any who may have died, such heir to receive only the deceased child's share.'
The trial court held that under the provisions of the last sentence the seven children of Fred A. Rahfeldt, who would be his heirs after his death, would not participate in the remainder of the money secured from the sale of the tract of land in which he held a life estate. Fred A. Rahfeldt and his children have appealed.
To assist in arriving at the intent of the testator it is advisable that we make a synopsis of the provisions in the other paragraphs of the will.
Under paragraph III decedent devised to his sons Robert and Edward 160 acres in Story County subject to Edward paying to Robert one-half of decedent's indebtedness to Robert. The record does not disclose the amount of the indebtedness.
In paragraph IV decedent devised the income from 80 acres of land in Story County to his daughter Lydia with the provision that after her death her children should receive the property.
In paragraph V he bequeathed $3,000 to Lydia for repairs and improvements on said farm.
In paragraph VI decedent devised to his son William and his daughter Nellie 160 acres in Story County. He provided that Nellie should pay William one-half of an indebtedness which decedent stated he owed William on a promissory note. Again the record does not disclose the amount of the note.
In paragraph VII the decedent devised to his son Charley 80 acres in Story County.
In paragraph VIII decedent devised the life income from an 80 acres of land in Story County to his daughter Charlotte, and after her death said 80 acres to be the property of her children.
In paragraph IX decedent provided that his executors should sell another 80 acres he owned in Story County at not less than the appraised value. He granted to his son William the first right to buy such land at the appraised value if he desired to do so.
In paragraph X he bequeathed to his son Fred his carpenter and mechanic's tools.
In paragraph XI he canceled any accounts or notes against any children.
In paragraph XIII he divided any residue equally among his 8 children.
Both appellants and appellees announce many well-known principles used in connection with construction of wills. The following three are peculiarly and sufficiently pertinent as to the will involved in the case at bar: 1. The cardinal rule in the construction of wills is that the intention of the testator must be ascertained and given effect. 2. A court should not add words to a will, unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the addition effectuates testator's intent. 3. To arrive at the intent of the testator the will as a whole must be considered; the common expression is that it must be picked up by its four corners and carefully scrutinized.
Precedent in will construction cases is only of value in a few cases. There are exceptions, to which we will refer hereafter. The basis for this statement is that each will construction case normally involves a fact situation peculiar unto itself. We are aided by certain well-established principles, such as the above, which are used as guide posts in arriving at a proper construction.
I. The chief purpose of construction of a will is to discover and carry out the intent of the testator as expressed in the will, and when the question is raised this is the function of the court. In other words, the intention of the testator is the prime consideration. This doctrine has been announced in literally hundreds of cases in the nation. We will cite only a few recent Iowa cases. In re Nugen's Estate, 223 Iowa 428, 272 N.W. 638; In re Heckmann's Estate, 228 Iowa 967, 291 N.W. 465; In re Schmitz's Estate, 231 Iowa 1178, 3 N.W.2d 512; McCulloch's Estate v. Conrad, 243 Iowa 449, 52 N.W.2d 67; Rodenburg v. Rodenburg, 247 Iowa 444, 74 N.W.2d 241; In re Yarolem's Estate, 247 Iowa 849, 76 N.W.2d 770; Pringle v. Houghton, 249 Iowa 731, 88 N.W.2d 789. Also see 95 C.J.S. Wills § 590, p. 731.
It was the opinion of the trial court that it was not the intention of the testator to include Fred's seven children in the last clause of paragraph II. With this conclusion we do not agree. The testator provided in said paragraph that after Fred's death the 160 acres in which he had a life estate should be sold. He then provided that the seven children of Fred should have certain specific bequests out of the proceeds of the sale, which total $3,100. In the last sentence of the paragraph the testator stated that the remainder of the proceeds of the sale should be equally divided between his children, or to the heirs of any who may have died, such heirs to receive only the deceased child's share. It seems clear from this language that the testator did not exclude Fred's children.
The testator Albert F. Rahfeldt was obviously a man of ability and experience. The will was carefully drawn and he made careful provision for all eight of his children. He had accumulated 800 acres of Story County land which, on the present market, would doubtless be worth over $300,000. The care with which the will was drawn would clearly indicate that if he did not intend Fred's children to receive their one-eighth share of the proceeds of the sale of the quarter section he would have added at the end of paragraph II three simple words 'except Fred's children.'
We considered a somewhat similar situation in Rodenburg v. Rodenburg, supra. Mr. John J. Rodenburg had accumulated a large acreage of land in Pottawattamie County. The question was whether or not under his will he intended to create a feesimple title in certain land, if Hugo Rodenburg, one of his children, did not have issue until after his death. Hugo's child was born after death of testator. We held the time of Hugo having a child was not important and said that if the testator intended to exclude Hugo because he did not have a child until after testator's death he could very easily have added the words 'at the time of my death' causing the provision in the will to read 'If any of my children shall be without child or children (at the time of my death) then * * * such children * * * are given only a life estate.' [247 Iowa 444, 74 N.W.2d 244.] We held the testator not having included such words the fact that Hugo had a child after his father's death was evidence of an intention under the will that Hugo should become the fee owner. We stated: 'As to those to whom it applies it is satisfied by the birth of issue at any time.'
In McCulloch's Estate v. Conrad, supra [243 Iowa 449, 52 N.W.2d 72], the following helpful statement appears: 'Precedents in such cases may be very properly employed as aids, but they should not lead either court or counsel to insist on a construction of a will, which, in view of the situation disclosed in the particular case under inquiry, it is clear was not in the mind of the testator.'
The question has been raised that the specific bequests appearing in paragraph II is an evidence of intention on the part of testator that Fred's children should not be included as having a one-eighth interest in the remainder of the proceeds of the sale of the land. A similar question was before this court in Atchison et al. v. Francis et al., 182 Iowa 37, 165 N.W. 587, L.R.A.1918E, 1087. Testator left a life estate in his wife and then provided that after her death all property in the estate should be sold and his grandson should be paid $100. After payment of said item the remainder of the proceeds should be divided between his three children and if any of the children were deceased to their children. We held that the specific bequest did not interfere with the rights of the grandchildren; that the remainder vested at the...
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