Pringle v. Houghton

• Decision Date: 11 March 1958
• Docket Number: No. 49387,49387
• Citation: 88 N.W.2d 789,249 Iowa 731
• Parties: Elizabeth C. PRINGLE, Appellant, v. Hiram C. HOUGHTON, Jr., and H. Deemer Houghton, Trustees Under the Will of Hiram Cole Houghton, Deceased, and Stuart H. Pringle, Jr., Frederick C. Pringle, Ann Pringle and Joan Pringle, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 789

88 N.W.2d 789

249 Iowa 731

Elizabeth C. PRINGLE, Appellant, v. Hiram C. HOUGHTON, Jr., and H. Deemer Houghton, Trustees Under the Will of Hiram Cole Houghton, Deceased, and Stuart H. Pringle, Jr., Frederick C. Pringle, Ann Pringle and Joan Pringle, Appellees.

No. 49387.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 11, 1958.

Gibson, Stewart & Garrett and Harry T. Watts, Des Moines, for appellant.

R. J. Swanson, Red Oak, for trustees-appellees.

Jonathan B. Richards, Red Oak, guardian ad litem for appellees, Stuart H. Pringle, Jr., Frederick C. Pringle, Ann Pringle and Joan Pringle.

PETERSON, Chief Justice.

This action involves construction of the will of Hiram Cole Houghton. He died in Montgomery County in September 1925. He left surviving him his widow, Lulu W. Houghton, his third wife, and six children. Julia J. Eldridge was a daughter by his first wife. He made special mention of her in his will, and she is not involved in this action. He had five children by his second wife and this action pertains to a trust established by decedent as same affects the five children: Jonathan C. Houghton, Hiram C. Houghton, Jr., Luella H. Pringle, Mary H. Will, Edith H. Heckert, and their heirs, if deceased.

Hiram Cole Houghton established a trust in his will in which he provided that $6,000 per year be paid to his widow, Lulu, during her lifetime, or until remarriage; that $3,500 be paid annually to each of his five children, or if deceased, to the 'heirs of the body' of any decedent; if a child died without children, then to his surviving children or their heirs.

Jonathan died intestate in 1930 leaving a wife and four children. The income from the trust payable to Jonathan, if he had lived, has been paid throughout the years to his children.

Luella died testate in 1945 leaving three children: Donald R. Pringle, Stuart H. Pringle and Louise Pringle Olson.

Stuart H. Pringle died a resident of Stamford, Connecticut, in 1954 leaving his wife, the plaintiff, Elizabeth C. Pringle, and four minor children, the defendants.

On December 23, 1949, Stuart H. Pringle had made an assignment to his wife, Elizabeth, of his interest in both income and corpus of the trust. On the basis of this assignment she filed this action.

Lulu W. Houghton is still living, unmarried and residing in the state of California.

The provisions of the will of decedent which pertain to the action are following portion of the fifth, and all of the sixth paragraphs of Item III: 'Fifth. * * * in the event of the death of any of the said named children during said period, (of trusteeship) the share and payments that would have gone and been paid to the said child shall be paid to the heirs of the body of said decedent, and, in the event said deceased child shall leave no heirs of his or her body then the share that would have gone to said child if living shall be divided among the other children set out in this paragraph or the heirs of the body of any that may be deceased. * * * Sixth. The Trusteeship herein set out, mentioned and referred to shall continue as long as my said wife Lulu W. Houghton, remains my widow, and in event she does not remarry shall continue until the death of my said wife, and in any event whether she remarries or is deceased the said trusteeship shall continue for a period of twenty years from the date of my death. Upon the termination of the said period of trusteeship as herein set-out I do then direct that all of my property and estate then remaining by by my said trustees or their successors in office divided equally and paid to my children, Jonathan C. Houghton, Hiram C. Houghton, Jr., Luella H. Pringle, Mary H. Will and Edith H. Heckert, share and share alike, and, in the event of the death of any of the said named children before said termination of said trusteeship, the share that would have gone to said child, shall be paid to the heirs of the body of said decedent, and, in the event said deceased child should leave no heirs of his or her body then the share that would have gone to said child, if living, shall be divided in the manner herein set out to those then living, or the heirs of the body of any that may be deceased.'

There is no dispute as to the facts. The only issue in the case is whether under the will of Hiram Cole Houghton a vested remainder was created in favor of his grandson, Stuart H. Pringle, so that upon Stuart's death his widow, under assignment from him, became the owner of his share of the income from the trust, and of one-third of the Luella H. Pringle one-fifth interest in the corpus of the estate.

The trial court decided Stuart's interest was not vested in him so he could make an assignment to his wife, effective after his death; that he held a contingent remainder, and upon his death the income and corpus became the property of his four children, subject to their survival after termination of the trust. Plaintiff has appealed.

I. The primary rule in an action for construction of a will is to arrive at the intention of the testator. The complete will, and all terms thereof must be considered in arriving at the intention. Westcott v. Meeker, 144 Iowa 311, 122 N.W. 964, 29 L.R.A.,N.S., 947; Scofield v. Hadden, 206 Iowa 597, 220 N.W. 1; In re Organ's Estate, 240 Iowa 797, 38 N.W.2d 100; In re Wright's Estate, 241 Iowa 349, 41 N.W.2d 80; Lytle v. Guilliams, 241 Iowa 523, 41 N.W.2d 668, 16 A.L.R.2d 1377; Katz Investment Co. v. Lynch, 242 Iowa 640, 47 N.W.2d 800; In re Young's Will, Iowa, 79 N.W.2d 376; 57 Am.Jur., Wills, § 1133; 95 C.J.S. Wills § 590.

Excellent general statements as to the importance of arriving at the intention of the testator appear in 57 Am.Jur., Wills, § 1133 and 95 C.J.S. Wills § 590.

We quote from 57 Am.Jur., supra: 'Recognition of the fundamental axiom that the ascertainment and effectuation of the intention of the testator is controlling in the construction of wills is found in countless decisions. The courts have stated this principle in various forms, among which may be cited, by way of example, such statements as the following: The chief object and purpose in construing a will is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the testators; the cardinal rule of testamentary construction is to ascertain the intention of the testator and give it effect; the construction of any will must be for the purpose of determining the dominant intent of the testator; * * *'.

95 C.J.S. Wills § 590, supra, states: 'The chief object and purpose of construction of a will is to discover and carry out the intent of the testator as expressed in the will, and this is the prime duty of the court, and its sole function or province. In other words, the intention of the testator is the prime consideration, controlling factor or element, or pole star to guide the court to which the problem is presented in the construction of every will.'

From the numerous decisions of this court we only quote from an early case and a recent case. Westcott v. Meeker, 1909, supra [144 Iowa 311, 122 N.W. 968] 'The general rule recognized in all courts that the testator's intent shall be carried out when it is ascertainable from the language used by him, taking the will as a whole, is uniformly applied, * * *'. In re Wright's Estate, 1950, supra [241 Iowa 349, 41 N.W.2d 85]: 'The foundation upon which the construction of any will is based is the intention of the testator. When that is ascertained his will is ascertained.'

II. The question at issue depends primarily on the construction of the fifth and sixth paragraphs of Item III of the Hiram Cole Houghton will. The complete will, and particularly said two paragraphs, clearly indicate that outside of the life provision for his widow, there was a strongly expressed intent on the part of Mr. Houghton to restrict the descent of his property to the Houghton blood line. It would be difficult to word provisions of a will in a more restricted sense as to the family than the wording found in the quoted paragraphs.

On the question of a testator intending to keep his property within the family group see 57 Am.Jur., Wills, § 1187 as follows: 'Finally, there is authority to support the conclusion that where a will directs that if a member of a group of beneficiaries dies without children or issue his share shall pass to the surviving members, and one or more members die leaving issue, there is reason to conclude, particularly if the will contains a gift over to their issue or children of the shares of members who die leaving descendants, that the testator's underlying intention, in the absence of specific language in the will to the contrary, was to keep the subject matter of the gift in the families of the original members of the group.'

In Henkel v. Auchstetter, 240 Iowa 1367, 39 N.W.2d 650, 664, we said: 'It is quite natural inclination of one making a testamentary disposition of his property to keep it within the blood line of his family. This court has mentioned the fact in a number of decisions. See In re Estate of Clifton, supra, 207 Iowa 71, 79, 218 N.W. 926; Bladt v. Bladt, 191 Iowa 1344, 1345-1347, 181 N.W. 765; Scofield v. Hadden (supra); Cook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa 641, 644, 228 N.W. 629; Boiler v. Wilson, 239 Iowa 1201, 34 N.W.2d 578, 580; Smith v. Harris, supra, 227 Iowa 127, 135, 287 N.W. 255.' See also In re Young's Will, supra.

III. The distinction between a contingent remainder and a vested remainder, under facts as in this case, is whether the descent is to a determinable person, or a dubious or uncertain person, or upon a dubious or uncertain event. Under the Houghton will there are dubious or uncertain persons involved until after the remarriage or death of Lulu W. Houghton, the widow. As to what children, or what grandchildren, or even what great-grand-children, will take depends on the time of happening of one of the two events as to the widow. The question is no longer in doubt in Iowa. This court has rendered numerous decisions in...