Rahm v. Hemsoth
| Decision Date | 09 January 1976 |
| Parties | , 7 O.O.3d 136 RAHM et al., Appellants, v. HEMSOTH, Appellee. 1 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
R.C. 1.14, when construed together with Civ.R. 6(A) with which it is pari materia, provides that the period for commencing an action is extended to the next full work day when the last day of the statutory period falls on a Saturday.
Eden S. Feldstein, Toledo, for appellants.
Eastman, Stichter, Smith & Bergman and John T. Landwehr, Toledo, for appellee.
This is an appeal from an order of the Toledo Municipal Court sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint and defendant's motion to quash service of summons. Plaintiffs filed their action in Municipal Court on Monday, May 5, 1975, claiming damages arising out of an automobile accident occurring on May 3, 1973. The application of Civil Rule 6(A) would have allowed plaintiffs to file their action on May 5th. It is the contention of the defendant-appellee that R.C. 1.14, rather than Civil Rule 6(A), is to be used in conjunction with statutes limiting the right to bring a civil action and that this statute does not extend the period for bringing such an action to the following Monday when the last day falls on a Saturday.
Civil Rule 6(A) provides, in part:
"In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed * * * by any applicable statute, * * * (t)he last day of the period * * * shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday."
The relevant paragraphs of R.C. 1.14 read:
Civil Rule 6(A) and R.C. 1.14 are in pari materia and should be construed together so as to render their contents operative and valid. 50 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 189, Statutes, Section 216 et seq. We do not find Civil Rule 6(A) to be in conflict with R.C. 1.14; rather, we find that when the statute and rule are read together the period for commencing an action under R.C. 1.14 is extended to the first full work day when the last day of the statutory period falls on Saturday.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has construed R.C. 1.14 similarly in Van Meter v. Segal-Schadel Co. (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 185, 214 N.E.2d 664. Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the unanimous court, said at page 188, 214 N.E.2d at page 666:
" * * * (W)e believe that Section 1.14, Revised Code, and especially the addition of the second paragraph thereto in 1961 (129 Ohio Laws 1073) indicate a general legislative intention that 'the last day for' doing an act required by law shall be a full work day."
This construction of R.C. 1.14 is in line with a major purpose of the Modern Courts Amendment of the Ohio Constitution to provide for a uniform procedure in all judicial tribunals. 2
That a statute of limitations on commencing an action is involved in the case at hand, whereas a statute limiting the time for filing an application for reconsideration of an administrative decision was involved in Van Meter, supra, does not compel a different conclusion. A statute of limitation, like the statute construed in Van Meter, is remedial in nature and is to be given a liberal construction to permit the deciding of cases upon their merits. R.C. 1.11; Gregory v. Flowers (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 48, 290 N.E.2d 181; Cf. LaBarbera v. Batsch (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 106, 114, 227 N.E.2d 55 and Cero Realty Corp. v. American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. (1960), 171 Ohio St. 82, 167 N.E.2d 774. The liberal construction of a statute requires that "every reasonable presumption will be indulged and every doubt will be resolved in favor of affording, rather than denying a plaintiff his day in court." Draher v. Walters (1935), 130 Ohio St. 92 at 94, 196 N.E. 884 at 885. Cf. Brown v. Lamb (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 8, 302 N.E.2d 578.
The facts in Gregory, supra, cited by the appellee, are clearly distinguishable from the facts herein. In that case, the statute of limitation calling for a claim for compensation with the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation to be filed...
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